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Summary 
This thesis investigates how web users negotiate and engage with contemporary 
algorithmic personalisation practices; that is, practices which seek to infer (via data tracking 
mechanisms and other algorithmic means) a user’s habits, preferences or identity 
categorisations in order to ‘make personal’ some component of that user’s web experience.  
 
Drawing on thirty-six semi-structured interviews, I employ a qualitative methodology that 
seeks to bridge the gap between critical theorisations of algorithmic personalisation and the 
negotiations of web users themselves who encounter algorithmic personalisation in 
everyday life. To do this I focus on three sites of investigation. I first examine privacy tool 
Ghostery and the ways in which Ghostery users’ negotiate their positions as data-tracked 
subjects, especially in relation to privacy, knowledge and their sense of self. I then 
investigate Facebook’s autoposting apps as examples of algorithmic personalisation that act 
on the user’s behalf, and draw on the accounts of Facebook app users to explore themes 
such as identity performance, autonomous control and algorithmic governance. Finally I 
examine users’ engagement with the ‘predictive powers’ (Google Now, 2014) of the 
personalisation app Google Now, specifically in regards to notions of user trust, 
expectation and speculation.  
 
My critical enquiries produced a number of themes that tie this thesis together. Central 
were: the epistemic uncertainties that emerged as trust and anxiety in participant responses; 
the implications for a performative understanding of selfhood when algorithmic 
personalisation intervenes in user self-articulation; the (asymmetrical) data-for-services 
exchange which web users must negotiate with commercial data trackers; and the struggle 
for autonomy between user and system that algorithmic personalisation creates. The thesis 
also argues that algorithmic personalisation demands that web users’ identities be 
constituted as both a stable and fixable ‘single identity’, but also as recursively reworkable, 
dividualised and endlessly expressable entities.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction: Making it personal  
 
‘By using this site you agree to the use of cookies for analytics, personalized content and ads’ 
                        (Microsoft, 2015). 
 
‘Our goal is to build the perfect personalized newspaper for every person in the world… we are trying to 
personalize [News Feed] and show the stuff that’s going to be most interesting to you’ 
               (Mark Zuckerberg cited in Business Insider, 2014).  
 
‘Previously we only offered Personalized Search for signed-in users, and only when they had Web History 
enabled on their Google Accounts. What we’re doing today is expanded Personalized Search so that we can 
provide it to signed-out users as well’ 
(Google Blog, 2009). 
 
 
Hints that components of a user’s web experience might now be ‘personalised’ exist in 
innumerable manifestations all over the web – the above quotes from Microsoft, Facebook and 
Google all allude to the fact that these organisations are (at least discursively) embracing what 
Fan and Poole call the ‘intuitive but also slippery’ concept of personalisation (2006: 183). 
Microsoft mobilises the term to legitimise the use of cookies1 across their platforms (MSN, 
2015; Microsoft, 2015, Live; 2015); Facebook CEO’s Mark Zuckerberg hopes that Facebook’s 
News Feed will automatically deliver news content that is individually ‘relevant’ to the inferred 
interests of the site’s one billion users; and Google use the term to describe their tailored 
search results system, which uses at least fifty-seven different signals to identify a web user in 
order to personalise results based on their Google profiles and pre-existing search preferences 
(Pariser; 2011). Invoking the sentiment that ‘Personalized Search’2 can only be convenient for 
																																																								1	The	cookie	(also	known	as	the	http	cookie)	is	defined	by	Peacock	as	a	small	piece	of	code	that	facilitates	‘a	way	of	
storing	information	on	the	user’s	computer	about	a	transaction	between	a	user	and	a	server	that	can	be	retrieved	
at	a	later	date	by	the	server’	(2014:	5).	As	I	will	explore,	cookies	are	widely	used	by	platforms	not	only	to	facilitate	
platform	functionality	but	also	to	collect	data	about	users	for	monetisation	purposes.		
2	In	keeping	with	Harvard	referencing	guidelines,	US	spellings	in	citations	have	been	kept	to	their	original	spelling,	
however	the	thesis	itself	adheres	to	UK	spelling.		
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its users, the Google Blog states that they now provide the service even to those who are 
‘signed out’ of Google. What is made less clear is that the mechanisms used to algorithmically 
personalise users’ search results are also used to target these very same users for advertising 
purposes; for example in their advertiser-facing marketing materials, YouTube (who are owned 
by Google) states that advertisers can ‘[z]ero in on the right people based on who they are, 
where they’re located and what they’re interested in – for example, men aged 18-34 in 
Birmingham or women who enjoy travelling’ (YouTube, 2015).  
 
The quotes above share three similarities that I wish to highlight: firstly, they treat 
personalisation as ‘intuitive’ – it does not need to be explained or justified, but is instead 
presented as a practice that simply exists, apparently for the unarguable advantage to the user. 
Secondly they exemplify that personalisation is indeed ‘slippery’ – it can be mobilised in various 
contexts, and can be used in ways that do not necessarily need to reveal the specificities of what 
is being personalised (simply ‘content’, ‘stuff’ or ‘results’3), nor how or when. Thirdly, they 
highlight that in the context of the contemporary web, personalisation is not something that is 
enacted by the user – but instead via commercial and market-facilitating systems enacted by the 
platform or service. You do not personalise your web experience; rather, with the help of your 
‘personal data’ harvested as you click through the site(s), your experience is ‘conveniently’ 
personalised for you.  
 
It is the persistent, ‘slippery’, but certainly not intuitive presence of personalisation in my own 
web experience that provides the foundational motivations for this thesis. When I first 
embarked on this research in 2012, evidence that some components of my web experience 
were being ‘personalised’ took the form of web advertisements for ‘recommended’ products I 
had recently browsed on retailers’ web sites. At the time these ads seemed crude, invasive and 																																																								
3	The	latter	‘results’	is	admittedly	more	specific	than	‘content’	or	‘stuff’;	however	the	implementation	of	the	term	is	
again	here	‘slippery’	in	that	Google	Search	does	not	reveal	to	users	which	search	results	have	been	personalised	to	
them	and	which	are	universally	delivered	to	all	Google	Search	users.	
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most of the time entirely ineffective – sometimes I would be served advertisements for 
products that I had literally just bought, rending the point of ‘targeting’ me based on my 
previous browsing habits so precise as to be absurdly pointless. At other times, the knowledge 
(produced by the ad’s very existence) that the advertisement could only be generated by 
algorithmically ‘watching’ me triggered a feeling of privacy invasion that worked to overshadow 
any ‘relevance’ the ad might have had to my own personal preferences, tastes or habits. The 
enduring presence of these ‘tailored’ advertisements, delivered across platforms and in a variety 
of different formats, served as a reminder that the personalising of my daily web trajectory 
inherently involved relinquishing some form of personal data in exchange for the free content, 
platforms and services I accessed on a daily basis.  
 
Such attempts to deliver users personally relevant advertisements still persist, yet are now 
accompanied by other personalisation practices that seemingly transcend (but, as I will argue, 
never fully depart from) targeted marketing – it is no longer only clearly bounded 
‘recommended ads’ that are marked as personalised but also content, services, interfaces or 
sometimes simply ‘experiences’4. The term ‘personalisation’ is frequently used to legitimise the 
tracking of users by commercial platform providers on some of the world’s most visited sites;5 
for example, AOL’s privacy policy states that their second ‘principle of privacy’ is that ‘we may 
personalize experience based on how you use the AOL network’ (AOL, 2015). Entertainment 
website Buzzfeed states that ‘[t]he information we gather enables us to personalize, improve 
and continue to operate the services’ in order to explain the tracking of users’ data as and when 
they visit the site (Buzzfeed, 2015). Online music player Spotify’s privacy policy states that the 
primary reason for collecting data is to ‘provide, personalise, and improve your experience with 
the Service’ (Spotify, 2015). The term is used to explain the presence of cookies in user-facing 																																																								
4	For	example,	in	their	privacy	policies	Yahoo	(2015a),	Microsoft	(2015),	travel	site	Trip	Advisor	(2015)	and	game	
producers	Electronic	Arts	(2015)	use	the	terms	‘personalized	experience’	or	‘personalize	your	experience’	as	one	of	
their	reasons	why	they	track	web	users.	
5	All	references	here	feature	on	the	Alexa	500	list	of	the	world’s	most	visited	sites	(2015).		
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cookie notices (such as the Microsoft notices cited above, but also on sites such a eBay, BBC 
and Twitter) – some of which promptly disappear within a few seconds of visiting the site, 
their ephemerality making such notices hard to capture and harder to scrutinise. On the 
contemporary web, personalisation seems to be both elusive and just ‘there’ – in their Privacy 
Policies, nine out of the ten most popular UK web sites cite the ‘personalisation’, ‘customising’ 
or ‘individual tailoring’6 of users’ experience as one of the primary reasons for harvesting users’ 
personal data.7 
 
The concept that our web experience can and should be personalised is similarly reflected in 
discourses surrounding the ‘intelligent personal assistants’ (Myers et al., 2007) offered by 
platforms such as Google, Microsoft and Apple. Google Now, Apple’s Siri, and Window’s 
Cortana (launched in 2014, 2011 and 2014 respectively) claim to be able to personalise the 
information and services that users ‘need’ (Google Now, 2014) by acting autonomously on the 
user’s behalf, in order to offer the most ‘personally relevant’ information in the face of  
‘Information Overload’ (Lovink, 2011). The ‘personal’ touch of these digital assistants is 
enacted by algorithmic mechanisms, and is framed as a form of computational engagement that 
can pre-empt what information we require, what texts we’d like to watch, listen to, consume, 
and what products most suit our preferences. When I first encountered these assistants, it 
seemed to me that the inner computational mechanisms of these softwares, as well as the ways 
in which they generate value for the platform provider, remained as slippery as what these 
assistants were claiming to provide to users: a free, convenient and efficient service that could 
somehow ‘know’ me, pre-empt my daily needs, and cater to my everyday habits.  
 
																																																								
6	Though	these	terms	are	different,	in	many	instances	they	are	used	to	mean	the	same	thing	–	that	is,	to	‘know’	a	
users’	individual	tastes,	preferences,	identity	components,	habits	or	desires	in	order	to	deliver	some	content,	
interface	or	service	that	is	deemed	to	be	individually	suited,	filtered	or	tailored	to	correspond	to	that	user.		
7	Based	on	the	Alexa	500	list	for	most	visited	UK	sites.	The	sites	are	Google.co.uk,	Google.com,	Facebook.com,	
YouTube.com,	Amazon.co.uk,	eBay.co.uk,	BBC.co.uk,	Yahoo.com,	Live.com,	and	Wikipedia.org	(Alexa,	2015).	The	
only	site	that	does	not	include	the	above	terms	in	its	privacy	policy	is	Wikipedia,	which	is	famously	not-for-profit.		
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It is not only the widespread mobilisation of this slippery concept by commercial platforms 
that has sparked my investigations, but the impact of personalisation on the person who is 
implicated in personalisation processes. As the following chapter details, the type of 
personalisation upon which this thesis is focused is that which is implemented, not by the user 
themselves, but by computational mechanisms designed to algorithmically enact personalisation on 
behalf of the user. In doing so, this form of personalisation looks to determine some component 
of their interests, habits and identities through a process of inference (Thurman and Schifferes, 
2012); that is, by automatically inferring what a user might ‘like’ through data tracking and 
mining strategies (rather than explicitly requesting personal information from the user) in order 
to tailor content, services, interfaces or information accordingly. The above process of user 
tracking, identification, management and anticipation has been critically defined by some 
scholars as a process of subjectivity constitution: this process creates ‘algorithmic identities’ 
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 164), ‘data doubles’ (Lyon, 2014: 6), ‘database subjects’ (Jarrett, 2014: 
25) and ‘algorithmic selves’ (Pasquale, 2015: 1) that, as I shall explore, are designed to intersect 
and interact with the identities that they are intended to mirror, represent and/ or constitute.  
 
The importance of studying personalisation  
The first and third parties that claim to personalise for users some component of their web 
experience commonly deploy a host of algorithmic dataveillance techniques in order to shadow 
their users’ everyday habits and socio-cultural economic practices.8 This includes harvesting 
users’ browsing histories, Facebook ‘likes’, geolocation, app interactions, the photos they 
upload, the comments they write, their cross-device activity, their commute to work, their 
friend connections, their purchase history, their song downloads, their movie/ TV viewing 
																																																								
8	The	socio-technical	habits	practices	that	are	shadowed	in	order	to	provide	personalised	experiences	are	usually	
web-based,	however	technological	developments	mean	that	it	is	increasingly	possible	for	platform	providers	to	
shadow	users’	‘offline	habits’.	For	example,	Google	Maps	can	track	your	location	without	connecting	to	the	internet	
(Google,	2015).	As	Sauter	(2013)	and	Berry	(2014)	note,	the	increasing	ubiquity	of	web-connected	devices	in	
everyday	life	means	making	such	the	distinction	between	‘offline’	and	‘online’	is	becoming	increasingly	unhelpful	-	
individuals’	daily	trajectories	are	becoming	‘more	and	more	implicated	with	digital	tools’	(Sauter,	2013:	2).	
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choices, their gaming high-scores and their recordable affective fluctuations, amongst a host of 
other now traceable everyday actions.9 Upon being shadowed, these snippets of everyday 
trajectory are then collated and connected to other such user data sets in order to construct and 
manage behavioural profiles, user demographics or other configurations of user identity. The 
collection of this anonymous,10 pseudonymous and personal user data is commonly known as 
data tracking.   
 
As a topic of debate, data tracking has attracted a large degree of public and academic scrutiny. 
Especially in the wake of the Snowden scandal11 – which exposed the extent of US and UK 
state surveillance via data tracking on social media, mobile phones, MSM and email – data 
tracking has been debated and challenged as a matter of ‘privacy’; of defending it on the 
grounds of human rights (McStay 2012; Lynch, 2014; Balkan, 2014) or relinquishing it in 
exchange for the free and convenient services that commercial web platforms offer us (Bassett, 
2013; Jordan, 2014; Turow et al; 2015; Peacock, 2015; Machanavajjhala et al; 2011). The 
ubiquity and opacity of data tracking (Falahrastegar et al., 2014; Peacock, 2014; Brunton and 
Nissenbaum, 2011) combined with the lack of data tracking regulation (Peacock, 2014) means 																																																								
9	One	of	the	latest	possible	means	of	collecting	user	data	is	through	access	to	users’	mobile	phone	camera	and	
microphones	–	Facebook	recently	updated	its	Terms	of	Service	on	its	Facebook	Messenger	Mobile	app	to	state	that	
in	order	to	use	the	app,	users	must	agree	to	‘allow	the	app	to	use	the	camera	/	record	audio	with	the	microphone	
at	any	time	and	without	your	confirmation’	(Facebook	Messenger	App	cited	in	Watson,	2013	my	emphasis).	The	
ambiguous	wording	means	that	it	is	not	known	if	this	data	collection	strategy	is	yet	in	practice,	but	Facebook’s	
terminology	certainly	allows	for	the	possibility	of	this	form	of	tracking.		
10	Turow	argues	that	though	collected	user	data	is	claimed	to	be	‘anonymous’	or	‘anonymised’,	this	data	is	then	
connected	to	unique	identification	codes	that	correspond	to	individual	users,	thus	rendering	this	claim	to	
anonymity	‘meaningless’	(2012:	138).	
11	The	Snowden	Scandal	was	a	series	of	revelations,	disclosed	in	June	2013	by	NSA	‘whistleblower’	Edward	Snowden	
and	reported	by	The	Guardian	and	The	New	York	Times,	uncovered	extensive	mass	dataveillance	programs	being	
deployed	by	state-surveillance	agents	both	in	the	US	and	UK	(MacAskill	et	al.,	2013;	Mazzetti	and	Schmidt,	2013;	
BBC,	2013).	Snowden	reported	that	the	US	state	agency	the	NSA	had	‘access	to	a	vast	quantity	of	emails,	chat	logs	
and	other	data	directly	from	the	servers	of	nine	internet	companies’	(Black,	2013)	and	thus	was	undertaking	blanket	
data	collection	schemes	that	targeted	hundreds	of	thousands	of	citizens.	In	the	UK,	the	state	agency	GCHQ	was	
accused	of	similar	mass	data	tracking	and	collection.	Snowden	claimed	that	these	strategies	were	being	deployed	
with	the	cooperation	of	commercial	enterprises	such	as	Verizon,	Google,	Facebook	and	AOL,	who	were	collecting	
similar	mass	data	sets	for	commercial	purposes	(MacAskill,	2013).	The	Snowden	revelations	mark	an	important	
historical	point	in	relation	to	this	thesis,	in	that	the	Snowden	revelations	marked	a	revival	of	public	discourse	on	
online	privacy	at	the	time	that	this	thesis	was	researched	and	written.	As	Black	write	for	The	Guardian,	‘these	
revelations	have	underlined	the	sheer	power	of	electronic	snooping	in	the	internet	era	and	have	injected	new	
urgency	into	the	old	debate	about	how	far	a	government	can	legitimately	go	in	spying	on	its	own	people	on	the	
grounds	that	it	is	trying	to	protect	them’	(Black,	2013).		
 14 
that the framing of data tracking as a problem of privacy is certainly valuable. However, as I 
expand on in the next chapter, though this thesis is secondarily concerned with privacy (indeed 
Chapter Four is built around user negotiations with online privacy tool Ghostery) I am in 
sympathy with scholars such as Gillespie and Essaid when they state that to engage with 
debates around privacy is to be having the ‘wrong conversation’ (Essaid, 2015) – at least if this 
is the only conversation – in relation to data tracking. As Gillespie recognises, ‘much of the 
scholarship about the data collection and tracking practices of contemporary information 
providers has focused on the significant privacy concerns they provoke’ (2014; 174)– and yet 
he states that ‘privacy is not the only concern’ (2014: 174). I agree with Gillespie’s sentiment 
that the socio-cultural implications of data tracking extend far beyond breaching one’s privacy, 
as my empirical investigations hope to highlight. This is because data tracking does not exist, in 
and of itself, simply to surveil or track users, but to ‘anticipate’ them (Gillespie, 2014); to 
‘know’ some facet(s) of a user’s identity in order to ‘make personally relevant’ on their behalf 
some component of experience. Crucially, this process of anticipation is executed not just to 
‘watch’ the user but to act on, with, or against them.  
 
Take for example Facebook’s data tracking practices: according to ‘My Ad Preferences’,12 
Facebook had categorised my behaviour on Facebook into a list of over fifty ‘interests’, which 
include ‘Feminism’, ‘Media Studies’, ‘Digital Technologies’ and ‘University of Sussex’. Many of 
the listed categories do indeed reflect some of my socio-cultural interests, despite that fact that 
I have actively resisted explicitly giving this information to Facebook. These ‘interests’ have 
instead been inferred from my trajectory on Facebook and on the web more generally. These 
inferred interests are then used to anticipate the kind of advertising, ‘sponsored stories’, 																																																								
12	The	name	‘My	Ad	preferences’	suggests	that	these	categories	of	‘interest’	only	affect	the	adverts	I	see	–	but	in	
actuality	these	‘ads’	usually	take	the	form	of	‘suggested	posts’,	which	are	formatted	not	as	ads	but	as	news	and	
entertainment	content.	This	blurring	between	advertising	and	‘organic’	content	highlights	that	though	
personalisation	processes	often	revolve	around	targeted	advertising,	its	effects	extend	beyond	targeted	products	or	
services,	especially	given	that	consumption	of	such	‘advertorial’	content	then	goes	on	to	inform	later	‘algorithmic	
categorisations’,	as	explored	above	and	throughout	this	thesis.	For	more	work	on	the	collapse	of	advertising	and	
editorial	boundaries	through	the	branding	of	online	content,	see	Hardy	(2014;	2015)	and	Jenkins	(2006).		
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‘suggested posts’ and other content that I might want to see, and my news feed is filtered and 
adjusted accordingly (Facebook Help Centre, 2015), which through a process of recursion 
(Jordan, 2015),13 in turn informs the kind of interests that Facebook might infer from my 
activity henceforth (the cycle goes on). Such a cycle highlights that the very purpose of data 
tracking is to act accordingly on me – to make decisions on my behalf, to filter, re-order or 
display content or information in such a way as to be personally relevant.  
 
Audiences and individuals have been anticipated and targeted for many decades by various 
media marketing systems (Smith-Shomade, 2004; Scannell, 2006; Kant 2014). However, as I 
detail in the next chapter, new algorithmic, real-time and correlational techniques mark a 
departure from previous ‘representational models’ (Bolin and Andersson-Swartz 2015: 1) of 
anticipating the individual or the audience. In this thesis I will propose that though commercial 
online data tracking is often critiqued as a matter of privacy, if data tracking is instead 
considered as a matter of anticipation in the name of personalisation, then it is possible to 
consider a host of fresh critical questions arising around identity, knowledge production, user 
autonomy and the negotiation of selfhood. For example, if data tracking is deployed to identify 
and anticipate the user, as well as (recursively) act on them in order to personalise some 
component of their experience, then how can we define who ‘the user’ is, or how they are 
constituted? If personalisation practices seek to act on this user’s behalf, then how can a user’s 
autonomy be defined, approached and theorised? And how can a user seek to epistemologically 
‘know’ the algorithmic processes that apparently ‘know’ who they are? These kinds of 
questions have inspired and informed the research questions below, and this thesis takes up 
these considerations through a qualitative and critical methodology that I will detail shortly. 																																																								
13	Jordan	describes	recursion	as	a	process	in	which	‘information	can	eat	itself	[and]…	in	this	way	produce	more	
information’	(2015:	30);	that	is	recursion	affords	‘the	ability	to	take	on	digital	information	and	then	use	it	again	and	
again	to	change	similar	digital	actions’	(2015:	31).	Jordan	notes	that	‘recursion	may	seem	like	it	is	based	on	technical	
matters	of	how	mathematics	is	found	and	how	this	relations	to	articulating	a	basis	for	creating	modern	computers.	
However	this	theory	of	recursion	has	immediate	political	and	cultural	ramifications’	(2015:	31).	Jordan	explores	
some	of	these	ramifications	in	relation	to	exploitation	of	information	by	data	controllers;	however	I	believe	the	
reactive,	feedback-able	nature	of	recursion	is	also	useful	for	considering	how	identities/	algorithmic	identities	are	
co-constituted	and	co-related.		
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Furthermore I feel these considerations begin to raise critical implications that demand we go 
beyond public and academic discourses which consider whether users have ‘consented’ to the 
invasive tracking techniques to which they are subjected, or even go beyond how and why 
privacy is framed as valuable to some users but as dispensable to others. As such, one of the 
central claims of this thesis to consider fresh critical implications of data tracking – especially in 
regards to user negotiations of data tracking – not as a matter of privacy, but as a matter of 
personalisation.  
 
By ‘critical’ I mean that this thesis is not primarily interested in the instrumental uses, 
applications and benefits of algorithmic personalisation (for either users who are subject to it 
or the commercial systems that employ it). I am not really concerned whether personalisation 
practices are ‘successful’ in achieving ‘personal relevance’, or how such systems could be 
‘improved’. Instead I am interested in the nuances of socio-technical and socio-economic 
operation and organisation that might work through or underpin personalisation practices, and 
I am interested in the negotiations that web users – who are always embedded, possibly 
conditioned, but not always exploited social subjects – might employ, embrace or reject in 
order to navigate these systems.  
 
In this sense I seek to fit into a longer tradition of critical considerations in Media and Cultural 
Studies – from the work of Hall ([1989] 2009, [1986] 1996, 1996), Butler (1989, 1990, 1993) 
and Giddens (1991) which seeks in different ways to interrogate the structural conditions 
imposed on subjects without denying those subject space for negotiation; or Bourdieu ([1984] 
1998, [1979] 1989), who looks to situate individuals within ‘fields’ that underpin and structure 
their choices, but which change and mould depending on specific contexts; or scholars such as 
De Certeau  ([1984] 2002) and Silverstone (1994), who point out the power dynamics 
embedded in negotiations of every day life. These critical traditions of interrogating socio-
economic and cultural hierarchies, of questioning social power and of considering the 
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individual as an agent engrained in wider social structures, have been brought into the realm of 
the computational by a plethora of scholars who also inform this thesis, as I will expand on 
shortly. 
 
The difference between algorithmic personalisation and personalised media 
Before I expand on these critiques, I would like to highlight that the slipperiness of the term 
‘personalisation’ means that the term is not exclusively applied to algorithmic processes of 
personalisation such as those introduced above. This is where I find my own way in. First then, 
this thesis is not primarily concerned with a critical interrogation of ‘personalisation’ in the 
broad sense of a product, interface or service being ‘personal’ to an individual, but to the 
processes of algorithmic personalisation that are embedded into the socio-computational-economic 
architectures of contemporary commercial web-based platforms.  
 
To look harder at this distinction, it is useful to examine studies such as Hjorth’s. In her 
analysis of individual attachment to and engagement with mobile phones, Hjorth (2012) uses 
the term ‘personalization’ to describe an individuals’ emotional and affective attachment to 
their personal mobile phone. Similarly, Drotner uses the term ‘personalised media’ to refer to 
‘portable, personalised and interactive media’ such as ‘the Gameboy, the discman, the mobile 
phone, the PDA and the MP3 player’ (2005: 53). In these studies, ‘personalisation’ refers to a 
kind of intimate personal use of a technology, a form of interaction between technology and 
user that describes a highly individualised engagement with a particular piece of technology.14 
The opportunities to research these personal, intimate engagements with media technologies 
are valuable and widespread, but ‘personalisation’ in this sense of the term is not the focus of 
this thesis.  																																																								
14	The	term	‘personalised’	is	similarly	mobilised	in	early	explorations	of	‘personal’	web	use	on	the	internet	–	that	is,	
the	internet	was	seen	as	personalised	medium	that	afforded	individuals	the	opportunity	to	create	their	own	
individualised,	intimate	personal	spaces.	As	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Two,	the	‘individualised’	space	that	the	web	creates	
is	important	to	this	thesis,	but	it	differs	from	the	central	focus	of	this	thesis	in	again,	this	sense	of	‘personal’	web	
consumption	does	not	necessarily	involve	algorithmic	intervention.		
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Instead it is algorithmic personalisation that forms the focus of this thesis. As Bodle recognises, this 
form of personalisation (though he does not explicitly label it as ‘algorithmic’) relies on an 
‘algorithmically generated feedback loop’, wherein the ‘prior actions of a user’ (2015: 131) as 
well as user-to-user interactions are used to inform and structure the personalised content, 
services, information streams and interfaces that are presented to them by the system. Scholars 
such as Pariser (2011), Bodle (2015) Stadler and Mayer (2009) and Fuez et al. (2011) discuss the 
implications and effects of this form of personalisation at length, yet take the term to be self-
evident. Furthermore, there are a number of other scholars that critically examine 
computational systems of user anticipation and prediction – such as Jarrett (2014), Gillespie 
(2014), Van Couvering (2007) and Mai (2016) – but do not use the term ‘personalisation’ to 
describe such systems. Another of the central aims of this thesis is to bring together these 
theorisations, as well as offer up some definitions of algorithmic personalisation, capturing 
their theoretical and critical detail, and to explore algorithmic personalisation in relation to its 
mobilisations and implementations.  
 
As I will explore in the next chapter, at present the critiques and studies relevant to this thesis 
largely undertake a theoretical engagement to algorithmic personalisation. These theorisations 
have been invaluable in informing this thesis and also move beyond instrumental studies of 
whether personalisation ‘works’ – indeed, they help to identify the critical implications 
embedded in personalisation practices even when they do provide users with ‘personal 
relevance’. However Gillespie notes that at present there is ‘gap between theory and 
documentation’ (Gillespie, 2014: 187) in regards to how such theorisations play out in the lived 
experiences of the users that engage with and negotiate the commercial computational systems 
that seek to ‘know’ and ‘anticipate’ them. One of the central contributions to knowledge that 
this thesis seeks to make is therefore to bridge this gap in research on algorithmic 
personalisation. I work to bridge between critical theorisations concerning algorithmic 
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personalisation and the lived experiences of those who encounter, negotiate and engage with 
algorithmic personalisation practices on the plain of everyday life.  The methodologies 
employed in this research seek to connect and contextualise critical interrogations of contemporary 
algorithmic personalisation with and within the daily lives of the people who encounter it.  
 
Developing my methodology, I was clear that algorithmic personalisation is largely a market-
driven practice.15 Thus, though my primary methodologies are qualitative and ethnographic, they 
are informed and underpinned by a critical political economy approach that acknowledges the 
role that commercial forces play in user engagements with algorithmic personalisation 
practices. Taking into account wider socio-economic structures helps to clarify and situate the 
negotiations of users who are understood broadly as agents engrained in but not determined by 
broader socio-cultural and economic contexts. I will expand on this claim in the next two 
chapters, but here with these considerations in mind I would like to propose the following 
research questions:   
 
RQ1: What ‘horizons of possibility’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) does algorithmic 
personalisation, as a market-driven practice designed to anticipate the user, create for 
users, who are at once bound up in, and are the subject of, its operations?  
 
RQ2: How do users who encounter algorithmic personalisation practices understand, 
engage with and negotiate those practices?  
 
																																																								
15	By	‘practice’	here	I	mean	the	‘modes	of	operation’	(De	Certeau,	1984:	xi)	that	are	enacted	by	platforms	in	order	
to	‘make	personal’	some	component	of	a	user’s	web	experience.	As	De	Certeau	distinguishes	the	subject	who	
practices	from	the	practice	itself,	I	too	want	to	distinguish	the	technologies	that	deploy	algorithmic	personalisation	
from	the	‘operational	logic’	(1984:	xv)	that	structures,	informs	and	drives	these	technologies.	This	is	because	the	
technologies	that	achieve	algorithmic	personalisation	are	numerous,	developing,	opaque	(to	front	end	users,	as	I	
will	explore)	and	specific	to	platforms,	whilst	the	practice	of	algorithmically	personalising	–	of	inferring	a	users’	
needs,	intentions,	preferences	and	identity	configurations	through	algorithmic	means	–	is	not	individually	specific	to	
these	technologies	but	is	‘concealed	within’	them	(De	Certeau	1984:	xv).		
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RQ3: How can the negotiations and engagements created between algorithmic 
personalisation practices and those who encounter such practices be critically 
scrutinised?  
 
As well as informing the design of my research, these questions have shaped my decision to 
take as a central three sites of investigation, each of which enabled me to explore different 
aspects of algorithmic personalisation. As I expand on below, in the first site I examine privacy 
tool Ghostery and the ways in which Ghostery users’ negotiate their positions as data-tracked 
subjects, especially in relation to privacy, knowledge and their sense of self. I then investigate 
Facebook’s autoposting apps as examples of algorithmic personalisation that act on the user’s 
behalf, and draw on the accounts of Facebook app users to explore themes such as identity 
performance, autonomous control and algorithmic governance. Finally I examine users’ 
engagement with the ‘predictive powers’ (Google Now, 2014) of the personalisation app 
Google Now, specifically in regards to notions of user trust, expectation and speculation.  
 
This inquiry produced a number of themes that were recurrent in my research and that tie this 
thesis together. Central were: the epistemic uncertainties of how, when and why users are being 
anticipated by algorithmic personalisation; the implications for a performative understanding of 
selfhood when algorithmic personalisation intervenes in, and at times disrupts, user self-
articulation; the (asymmetrical and opaque) data-for-services exchange which web users must 
negotiate with commercial data trackers; and the struggle for autonomy between user and 
system that algorithmic personalisation creates. These findings are brought together by an 
investigation of how algorithmic personalisation intervenes in, constitutes and frames users’ 
sense of self – and how users themselves negotiate the demands that algorithmic 
personalisation makes on them as data-tracked subjects with lived experiences and as ‘dividuals’ 
(Delueze, 1992) that underpin the economic operations of the contemporary web. 
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Introducing the methodological approach  
At the heart of this thesis are the qualitative interviews and other engagements that I conducted 
with users who engage with, negotiate and are entangled with specific personalisation practices. 
In total this thesis draws on the accounts of thirty-four interview participants; twelve Ghostery 
users, sixteen Facebook users and six Google Now users. As Chapter Three further details, 
interviews were designed to be semi-structured and elicit responses which map the different 
‘horizons of possibility’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) that personalisation might create for 
users. Gerlitz and Helmond use the term to describe the different possibilities for engagement, 
negotiation and interaction available to web users who traverse what they call ‘the like economy’ – 
that is, a cross-platform, socio-technical ‘infrastructure that allows the exchange of data, traffic, 
affects, connections, and of course money’ (2013: 1353). I use the term to consider the kinds of 
possibilities (and limitations) that the drive to personalise users’ web experience might produce 
for those who are subject to personalisation. As the following chapter seeks to emphasise, this 
horizon of possibility should be not considered necessarily disciplinary or deterministic – 
depending on the context, the possibilities facilitated by algorithmic personalisation can be 
analysed in various ways.  
 
Introducing the theoretical framework(s) 
There are two primary topics that I consider crucial to this thesis: commercial data tracking (in 
relation to convenience, control and online privacy), and the constitution of ‘algorithmic 
identities’ (in relation to the constitution of selfhood, performativity and governance). In 
regards to data tracking I draw on the work of scholars such as Turow et al. (2015), Peacock 
(2014), McStay (2012), Marwick and boyd (2014) and Lynch (2014) to explore data tracking in 
relation to participants’ sense of privacy and control; Turow (2011) and Gerlitz and Helmond 
(2013) to explore participants assertions such as ‘we are all products’ (Ghostery participant in 
interview, 2013) and Bassett et al. (2014), Berry (2012), Savage et al (2013), and Brunton and 
Nissenbaum (2011) to explore the epistemic asymmetries produced by commercial third party 
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data tracking.  Furthermore, analysis of this research is underpinned by broader theories from 
Delueze (1992), De Certeau (1984), Gillespie (2014), Agre (1996), Foucault (1988, 1994), 
Jordan (2013, 2015) and Kitchin and Dodge (2011) to critically unpick how ‘data providers’ 
(Van Dijck, 2009) might resist, negotiate or resist the data tracking to which they are subject.  
 
By ‘data providers’ I mean all web users who are tracked and anticipated by commercial 
platforms. As Van Dijck herself asserts, though contemporary discourses of user ‘prosumption’ 
tend to categorise web users within a spectrum of ‘passive consumption’ or ‘active production’, 
any user’s value is always-already underpinned (and indeed superseded) by their value as 
producers of data – that is, ‘only a small percentage of users actually create content whereas the 
large majority consists of passive viewer; yet all categories of users actually qualify as potential 
data providers’ (2009: 47).16 This thesis thus considers users not as prosumers or passive 
consumers, but primarily as ‘data providers’ for the algorithmic personalisation practices that 
seek to anticipate them. 
 
The other topic of enquiry – ‘algorithmic identities’ – draws on theories of identity to explore 
how this process of data tracking and anticipation intersects with users’ ideas of themselves, 
their identity performances, their socio-cultural tastes and habits, their sense of selfhood, and 
their web use as a part of their everyday life. For this reason as the following chapter details, 
this thesis is also underpinned by a theoretical body of work concerning identity theory; I will 
draw on the work of Butler (1991, 1992, 1993), Barad (2007) Cover (2012), Jordan (2013),  
Bassett (1997, 2004) in relation to performativity; Marwick (2014), Jordan (2015) Marwick and 
boyd (2011), Sauter (2013), and Liu (2008) in relation to online identity articulation; Giddens 
																																																								
16	Though	all	users	are	‘data	providers’	for	commercial	platforms,	providers	and	parties	this	should	not	suggest	that	
they	are	all	‘worth’	the	same	thing	in	terms	of	monetary	value.	For	example,	‘Facebook	users	in	the	US	and	Canada	
are	currently	worth	$13.54	each	to	the	site,	whilst	European	users	are	worth	$4.50,	Asia-Pacific	region	users	are	
worth	$1.59,	‘while	the	“rest	of	the	world”,	which	includes	most	developing	nations	are	only	worth	$1.22	per	user’	
(Gibbs,	2016).	Such	discrepancies	highlight	the	whole	point	of	data	tracking	is	to	define	and	differentiate	between	
users	in	ways	that	have	both	economic	and	socio-cultural	implications.			
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(1991), Ringrose and Walkerdine (2008), Noys (2015) Rainie and Wellman (2014) to analyse 
neoliberal ideologies and the cultivation of the autonomous self; and Jarrett (2014), Lyons 
(20150, Gillespie (2014), Agre, (1994), Bolin and Andersson-Schwartz (2015) and Cheney-
Lippold, (2011) to explore algorithmic identity constitution. 
 
Though the next chapter will explore in depth the identity theories that underpin my analysis, 
what I want to introduce here is that algorithmic personalisation relies on form of selfhood 
that is in tension. I will argue that algorithmic personalisation demands user identities must be 
constituted as both unitary, inner and fixable and as endlessly expressive, recursively reworkable 
and flexible. By this I mean that the algorithmic personalisation relies on the premise that ‘you 
have one identity’ (Zuckerberg cited in Van Dijck, 2013) which can be tracked, profiled, fixed 
and anticipated but that can also be indefinitely worked on, acted on, ‘dividuated’ (Delueze, 
1992) and expressed across platforms and articulated in all contexts. I will argue that Bolin and 
Andersson Schwarz’s (2015) analysis provides a framework for explaining how this tension 
comes about – they propose that in data tracking individuals are constituted through real-time, 
mass-popular correlation but translated back into representations by commercial data tracking 
and personalisation practices. The tensions between the types of self that algorithmic 
personalisation both constitutes and demands emerged in different ways through participant 
responses with each site of investigation, as I will explore in the following chapters.  
 
Structure of this thesis 
The following chapter, The Drive to Anticipate the Data-Tracked user, asks ‘what is personalisation?’ 
and offers some scholarly definitions that help to clarify what I mean by algorithmic 
personalisation. The chapter then works outwards from these definitions towards a broader 
literature review of the relevant theories needed to explore algorithmic personalisation as a 
matter of anticipating the user. Subsequently I offer an analysis of how user identities have 
been theorised historically and socio-economically, and how the ‘data-tracked user’ has come to 
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by constituted and valued. I then explore how neoliberal discourses of networked individualism 
intersect with the commercial drive to constitute the data-tracked user. Finally I argue that even 
as algorithmic personalisation claims to aid the individual in their fight against ‘infoglut’ 
(Andrejevic, 2013), the autonomous decision-making capacities of algorithmic personalisation 
actually create a struggle for autonomy between user and system.  
 
Chapter Three looks to detail how the lived experiences of those who encounter and are subject 
to algorithmic personalisation practices might be taken into account. The chapter details 
methodological approaches towards participant recruitment and interview design adopted in 
my research, but also considers my role as a researcher in relation to participants’ experiences 
of everyday life. The chapter looks to take into account the methodological limitations of the 
project, as well as interrogate the dynamic between myself as researcher and interview 
participants as socio-culturally situated subjects – or indeed as ‘dividuals’ (Delueze, 1992). 
 
The subsequent three chapters constitute the main qualitative body of this thesis. These three 
chapters focus on three specific sites of investigation. Drawing on the accounts of twelve 
interview participants, Chapter Four – Personalisation and Privacy in Relation to Data tracking –  
focuses on privacy tool Ghostery and the ways in which Ghostery users negotiate their 
positions as (unwilling) ‘data providers’ (Van Djick, 2009), especially in relation to algorithmic 
personalisation. The chapter explores a number of themes that emerged from interview data 
that was semi-structured using Ghostery’s own marketing tagline of ‘Knowledge + Control = 
Privacy’ (Ghostery, 2014). These themes include the data-for-services exchange undertaken by 
participants, as well as the epistemic anxiety articulated through participant statements such as 
‘Ghostery gives me a false sense of security’. The chapter argues that this epistemic uncertainty 
actually increased in accounts of participants who could be considered ‘power users’ (Sundar 
and Marathe, 2010). The chapter also analyses how ‘personalisation’ fits into Ghostery’s 
rhetorical sum; that is, I explore the disconnect between participants’ negotiations with data 
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tracking - which they wholeheartedly resisted – compared with their negotiations with 
personalisation practices – which some welcomed, despite the fact that data tracking exists in 
order to ‘anticipate the user’. Finally, the chapter explores participants’ sense of privacy in 
relation to critical notions of selfhood, and argues that participants framed their use of 
Ghostery as protecting a holistic, inner selfhood which must be sheltered from the 
dehumanising threat of data tracking.   
 
Chapter Five – ‘Spotify has added an event to your past’ – refocuses its concerns away from 
personalisation in relation to user engagements with privacy tools and instead looks to explore 
the performative implications that emerge for subjects from algorithmic personalisation 
practices. To do so the chapter draws on interviews with sixteen Facebook users and explores 
their engagements with third party apps that have the ability to ‘autopost’; that is, automatically 
post status updates on the users behalf. I will argue that the ability of third party apps to act in 
the user’s stead raise a host of critical questions in regards to user self-expression, autonomy 
and identity performance. The chapter argues that moments of autoposting work to intervene 
in and on occasions disrupt participants’ staged self-performance to their ‘invisible audience’ 
(Sauter, 2013) on Facebook, and considers that if such instances of algorithmically personalised 
autoposting can be considered performative, then apps hold the constitutional capacity to 
actively rewrite, regulate and even constitute the self to suit the operations of personalisation in 
way that transcend the boundaries of Facebook.    
 
Chapter Six – ’In Google We Trust’ – explores the ‘predictive powers’ (Google Now, 2014) of 
Google Now, a personalisation app that claims to ‘give users the information they need 
throughout their day before they even ask’ (Google Now, 2014). This chapter marks a slight 
deviation from the two previous chapters in terms of methodological approach – though still 
qualitative, this research sought to: (i) explore the accounts of individuals who do not 
necessarily self-identify as users of the technology in question (unlike the self-conscious 
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engaged users of Facebook and Ghostery who were previously interviewed) and (ii) takes a 
more longitudinal, co-observant and ethnographic methodological approach in that users were 
interviewed over the space of six weeks. The participants involved were six first year, first term 
undergraduate students, whose positions as media students resulted in some interesting 
methodological outcomes in that the study mapped their development both as critical media 
studies students and as Google Now users. The chapter is broadly structured by the 
overarching sense of trust that participants invested in Google Now – despite the fact that the 
app’s personalisation techniques repeatedly failed to live up to participants’ high expectations. 
The chapter explores this tension between faith and failure, and argues that Google Now’s 
personalisation framework is in fact deeply apersonal; that is, Google Now constructs an idea 
of what ‘life should look like’ that persistently failed to map on to participants’ trajectories of 
every day experience. As the chapter explores however, despite their development as critical 
media students, these students legitimised such normative frameworks as ‘for everyone’ (yet 
not ‘for them’). In doing so participants retained their faith that Google was capable of 
personalisation to an extraordinarily high degree.  
 
Finally, a brief conclusion emphasises some core themes and findings that have emerged from 
my doctoral investigations, and explains how those core findings changed the trajectory of my 
research enquiries. I also discuss how the research might be further developed in the future. 
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Chapter Two  
 
The drive to anticipate the user: contextualising contemporary logics of 
personalisation 
 
Part I 
Introduction 
This chapter looks to situate contemporary17 practices of algorithmic personalisation within 
broader historical and theoretical contexts, as well as relate those theories to wider critical 
notions of socio-computational management and (online) identity performance/ constitution. 
The chapter is split into three parts. In Part One I will detail how personalisation can be 
defined, critiqued and theorised. I focus on the distinction between system-initiated 
personalisation and user-initiated customisation – a distinction that forms a central 
consideration in my thesis. I will argue however that the terms ‘user-initiated’ and ‘system-
initiated’ belie some of the complexities (and contradictions) inherent in contemporary 
personalisation, and as such will propose that while these terms are helpful, the term 
‘algorithmic personalisation’ more accurately encompasses the entanglements created between 
user and system in the contemporary personalisation practices that are the focus of this thesis.  
 
In Part Two I move on to explore how contemporary algorithmic personalisation practices can 
be contextualised in to wider critical, historical and political-economic frameworks. To do so, I 
explore some critiques of the opaque commercial data tracking systems upon which 
contemporary personalisation practices are contingent. I then outline how identities have come 
to be understood as constituted and critically theorised. I propose that technological 
developments in data tracking mean that users are no longer anticipated as demographically-																																																								
17	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	‘contemporary’	refers	to	those	practices	that	have	emerged	or	are	in	operation	
during	my	doctoral	research:	that	is,	from	2012	to	2016.		
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defined and represented audiences (Cohen, 2013; Bolin and Andersson Schwarz, 2015; 
Ruppert, Law and Savage, 2013) or self-identified individuals, but through a process of 
correlation, ‘mass individualisation’ (Stadler and Mayer, 2009) and ‘whole population’ analysis 
(Ruppert, Law and Savage 2013). Furthermore, I will propose that algorithmic personalisation 
practices demand that individuals be constituted as both fixable, inner and largely unitary 
identities that can be efficiently identified and categorised and multiple, endlessly expressive, 
performative identities that can be recursively reworked.    
 
I will use these models of anticipation to explore arguments that suggest personalisation 
practices might create new ‘horizons of possibility’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) that not only 
demand new considerations of identity construction but also potentially create and impose new 
‘grammars of action’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2011) for data-tracked selfhoods. However, I argue that 
though algorithmic personalisation practices might create certain horizons of possibility for the 
users that become ‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with and within them, my research suggests that 
though these horizons might structure and even condition experience, the ways in which users 
negotiate these conditions mean such horizons are not necessarily always disciplinary or 
regulatory.  
  
Finally, in Part Three I will argue that providers of algorithmic personalisation purport to 
‘assist’ individual autonomy through discourses that celebrate neoliberal notions of ‘networked 
individualism’ (Rainie and Wellman, 2014). However I propose that algorithmic personalisation 
practices actually work to undermine the autonomy that the networked individual enjoys even as 
it aids it, by effectively ‘outsourcing’ the autonomy of the individual to the system and thereby 
creating a struggle for autonomy between the system and user – both of whom (which) are 
‘demanding’ to be agents. This struggle for autonomy between user and system emerged 
frequently through all three of my site investigations, and so constitutes a central theme of this 
doctoral investigation.  
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I would like to briefly note that throughout this chapter I use the term ‘user’ without taking 
into account the specificities of who the ‘users’ of personalised technologies might actually be, 
and how their socio-technical contexts might affect how they are constituted as ‘users’. I will 
dedicate more time to such complexities in Chapter Three (which outlines my methodological 
approach) and throughout my thesis; here however I would like to focus on algorithmic 
personalisation as a set of socio-technical practices underpinned by a socio-economic drive to 
anticipate the user.  
 
Theoretically contextualising personalisation  
Defining personalisation  
What does ‘personalisation’ mean? At face value the term denotes a rather straightforward act 
– it is simply the ‘action of making something personal, or focused or concerned with a certain 
individual’ (OED, 2015). As this definition suggests, practically anything can be rendered 
personal – gifts, clothes, shoes and furnishings can be individually tailored to suit personal 
preferences (Getting Personal, 2015; Prezzy Box, 2015; Your Design, 2015); health care (Astra 
Zenica 2015), social care (NHS, 2016) and educational packages (Personalising Education, 
2015) can be individualised; political campaigns (Ines, 2015) can be personalised to appeal to 
specific people. Most pertinently in regards to this thesis, a huge range of online and mobile 
hardwares and softwares can be – and are – ‘personalised’ to some degree, as I will exemplify 
shortly. 
 
As stated in the introduction, the commonality and breadth of what can be ‘made 
personal’ has lead Fan and Poole to state that ‘the concept of personalization is intuitive 
but slippery’ (2011: 183). The term is not so slippery that it evades definition altogether – 
as I explore below, there are scholars who have sought to pin down and scrutinise the 
term for academic purposes. However, the slipperiness of the term means that studies of 
‘personalisation’ can be found in a broad range of disciplines, with Business and HCI/ 
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Computer Science dominating current work on personalisation. Other subjects include 
the cognitive sciences, medicine, politics, geography, sociology, engineering and maths 
(Fan and Poole, 2011). My own search for resources has also revealed education (Hartley, 
2012; Richardson, 1982), healthcare (Sanderson, 2014; Morgan, 2010; Mladenvo et al, 
2001) and politics (Bennett and Sandberg, 2012; Blondel, 2010) as subjects in which 
‘personalisation’ has been awarded academic attention. In an attempt construct an 
interdisciplinary definition that spans these fields, Fan and Poole describe personalisation 
as follows: 
Personalization is a process that changes the functionality, information access and 
content, or distinctiveness of a system to increase its personal relevance to an 
individual or category of individuals (2011: 183, original emphasis).  
 
This definition is useful because it emphasises the importance of ‘relevance’ in the 
enacting of personalisation – that is, personalisation is a process of rendering something 
‘relevant’ to an individual’s or ‘category of individuals’ existing needs, desires and 
preferences. However, I want to point out that the assertion that personalisation can be 
applied to ‘a category of individuals’ might seem like a contradiction in terms, in that 
grouping individuals together surely negates the idea that personalisation can make 
something personal to the individual. In some ways this thesis proposes that 
personalisation enacted for a ‘category’ of individuals is a contradiction in terms – the 
personalisation practices I scrutinise deploy processes of mass-individuation that work to 
render personalisation practices ironically apersonal. I will explore this notion throughout 
my thesis, but it is interesting to note that this definition takes the notion that 
personalisation can be applied to category of individuals as a foundational premise.  
 
As scholars such as Gillespie (2014), Van Couvering (2007) and Pariser (2011) note, the 
notion of individual ‘relevance’ can be problematised as I will explore further below. 
However, though Fan and Poole’s definition is useful for highlighting ‘relevance’ as a 
condition for delivering personalisation, its universal application means that the definition 
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does not explicitly address how algorithmic or computational systems specifically might 
relate to this process. In a definition that does hone in on the computational applications 
of the term, Thurman and Schifferes state that personalisation is:  
[A] form of user-to-system interactivity that uses a set of technological features to adapt the 
content, delivery and arrangement of a communication to individual users’ explicitly 
registered and/ or implicitly determined preferences (2012: 776). 
 
Thurnham and Schiffere’s definition is pertinent to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it 
highlights that in order to provide the ‘relevance’ that Fan and Poole define as integral to 
personalisation, computational personalisation systems must seek to ‘know’ or ‘determine’ an 
individual’s pre-existing personal preferences.  This thesis is especially interested in 
personalisation systems that seek to implicitly determine a user’s identity and preferences (through 
the processing of data such as a user’s browsing history, Facebook ‘likes’ or location) rather 
than explicitly register such identity and preferences (through asking a user to directly input their 
preferences/ identifying data into a system themselves, such as their name, gender, data of 
birth, favourite sports team or preferred music genre). Though articulated in different terms, 
the ‘implicit determination’ of user preferences draws strong parallels with Gillespie’s notions 
of ‘anticipating the user’ (2014: 173) through data tracking. It is the implicit determination of 
users’ needs, preferences and desires that opens up opportunities for the construction and 
management of the ‘algorithmic identities’ that, as explored in the introduction and throughout 
this thesis, makes the deployment of current personalisation practices possible.  
 
Secondly, Thurnham and Schiffere’s (2012) definition is important for this thesis as it also 
identifies the two agents constructed by algorithmic personalisation practices – that is the ‘user’ 
and the ‘system’. As Sundar and Marathe (2010) identify, the differences between ‘user’ and 
‘system’ as agents have led HCI researchers to define two types of personalisation; that is 
‘system-initiated personalization’ (SIP) and ‘user-initiated customization’ (UIC). As the two 
terms suggest, the distinction between these two types of personalisation lie in who or what 
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initiates the personalisation process. Formally speaking, user-initiated customisation places the 
user as the primary agent, or ‘gatekeeper’ (Sundar and Marathe, 2010) of what is being 
personalised, when, and how, whilst system-initiated personalisation practices place the system in 
charge.  
 
I want to complicate this distinction between user- and system- initiated personalisation in the 
next few paragraphs, but the distinction remains useful here in that there are quite a few 
contemporary personalisation practices that in some ways fit these models. Examples of system-
initiated personalisation include: Netflix’s movie and TV recommendation system, in which 
Netflix’s prized recommendation engine computationally infers what a user might like to watch 
(Hallinan and Striphas, 2014); Facebook’s News Feed in which Facebook algorithmically 
determines what a user’s ‘interests’ might be and tailors their news feed to suit these 
determined interests (Facebook Help Centre, 2015); Google’s Personalised Search, in which a 
user’s search history is used (amongst other data) to personalise their returned search results; 
and Google Now, which aggregates personal data from a user’s location history, browsing 
history (across devices), email contents, and other Google services to automatically deliver 
what Google Now deems to be ‘the information you need before you even ask’ (Google Now, 
2015; see Chapter Six for further details). Examples of user-initiated customisation include: 
Gmail’s design interface; which allows a user to explicitly change the colour and look of their 
Gmail inbox to suit their aesthetic tastes; Ghostery, which enables users to pick and choose, on 
a case-by-case basis, which trackers a user wants to block (Ghostery, 2013); and Netvibes, a 
personalised homepage service that allows users to customise their web homepage with the 
content and sites they choose to display (Netvibes, 2016). The crucial difference then between 
SIP and UIC is that SIP works primarily from implicitly gathered or inferred data to personalise 
the content or service in question, and in doing so places the system as the ‘primary decision-
making agent’ (Sundar and Marathe, 2010: 310), whilst UIC uses explicitly registered data or 
user-controlled functions to personalise, thereby placing the user as the primary agent. In 
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placing the system as the primary decision-making agent, system-initiated personalisation 
therefore aims to act automatically and autonomously on behalf of the user.  
 
There are two points to make about this distinction between user-initiated customisation and 
system-initiated personalisation. One is that even when the system is given gatekeeping agency, 
the user still functions as a ‘data provider’ for the system (Van Djick, 2013); that is, in order for 
the system to initiate any kind of personalisation practice, the user must still provide some kind 
of data or input in order for the system to act as a decision-making gatekeeper. It should 
therefore not be assumed that even when the system is given priority over the personalisation 
process that the user is not entangled with(in) the system – the user’s data always informs the 
personalisation process to which the user is subject, even when they are not primarily in 
control of such processes.  
 
Secondly, it is important to note that the line between ‘user-initiated’ and ‘system-initiated’ can 
become extremely hard to distinguish depending on the personalisation system in question; for 
example the personalised news app ‘News Republic’ denotes the user as the primary agent at 
the point of registration (wherein the user chooses between 200 news categories which news 
they would like to see), but thereafter relinquishes gatekeeping to the system’s ‘smart’ algorithm 
which ‘learns as you read and personalises your news experience automatically’ (News 
Republic, 2015). Furthermore, even with more clear-cut examples of SIP, it is unusual that the 
user is denied all control or agency over what is being personalised – for example, although 
Google Now initiates and manages the personalisation of content, the user can customise or 
intervene in this process in a number of different ways (as explored further in Chapter Six).  
 
Indeed, the engagements, interactions and tensions between user and system that emerged in 
my qualitative investigations highlight that the agential capacities of the personalisation system 
are not absolute, as I will explore in Chapters Four, Five and Six. That said many cultural 
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theorists, such as Ringrose and Walkerdine (2008), Adorno (1994) and Delueze (1992), have 
noted being awarded degrees of ‘choice’ or ‘control’ does not necessarily mean that individuals 
enjoy a greater horizon of possibility in the systems in which they find themselves embedded. 
As Chapter Four highlights, sometimes the choice that user-initiated customisation awards can 
actually be revealed as ‘but an illusion’, yet in this context such an illusion is based in material 
operations – that is, on the sprawling mechanics of back-end data capture, rather than the 
tyranny of choice – that is, on different types of identical ‘star’ (Adorno, 1994).  
 
Thus though the distinction between user- initiated or system-initiated should not be taken as 
absolute, what is important is that, as Marathe and Sundar highlight, in demarcating the system 
as the primary ‘gatekeeper’ or ‘decision-making agent’, system-initiated personalisation ‘places 
control outside a user’s hands’ (2010: 313, my emphasis). Imbuing the system with such control and 
decision-making agency thus opens up critical considerations concerning the ‘entangled state of 
agencies’ (Barad, 2007: 23) that personalisation creates between user and system. Barad’s term 
‘entanglement’ is useful here as it encompasses the performative productions that emerge from 
the co-existence of agencies – that is, her work describes the relationships between both 
human and non-human actors (and also epistemologies) that work to produce and constitute 
the world as they exist in it. I will expand on the performative capacities of algorithmic 
personalisation later in this chapter, however here I would like to stress that as system and user 
have the capacity to act with and on each other (in performative ways as I will explore), the 
relationship between personalisation system and user can be considered an ‘entanglement of 
agencies’ (Barad, 2007: 18).  
 
I believe that the terms ‘system-initiated’ and ‘user-initiated’, though valuable in demarcating 
the two poles integral to contemporary commercial personalisation practices, are somewhat 
unhelpful distinctions, because they place user and system in binary opposition. In fact, the 
entanglement between user and system means that the relations between these two agents is 
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much more nuanced than this binary suggests – both user and system inform the 
personalisation process. More crucial for this thesis, by becoming performatively entangled, 
both user and system co-enact and co-constitute the selfhood(s) being anticipated, as I will further 
expand on in the following sections. 
 
The distinction between ‘UIC’ and ‘SIP’ is unhelpful; and yet, calling contemporary 
computational commercial personalisation practices simply ‘personalisation’ (as scholars such 
as Bodle and Pariser do) does not seem specific enough, given that mobile media, politics or 
healthcare could be personalised without any intervention by a computational system. Here then, 
the term ‘algorithmic personalisation’ seems most fitting. This term still captures the 
entanglements of user and system implicit in contemporary online commercial personalisation 
practices, and yet acknowledges the crucial interventions that algorithms make in the 
personalisation process. As the next section makes explicit, I am not the first researcher to 
critique the online, commercial, algorithmically-implemented personalisation practices that 
thesis explores; however other scholars such as Pariser (2011), Bodle (2014) and Fuez et al 
(2011) call this process ‘personalisation’, whilst others critique similar processes using terms 
such as user ‘anticipation’ (Gillespie, 2014) or ‘intention’ (Jarrett, 2014). The term ‘algorithmic 
personalisation’ is intended to bring these theorisations together, whilst acknowledging the 
specificity of algorithmic interventions into contemporary online personalisation practices as 
distinct from the ‘personalisation’ of politics, healthcare and even mobiles.  
 
Algorithmic personalisation: Instrumental studies 
Algorithmic personalisation systems have attracted huge amounts of attention in fields such as 
the computer sciences, education and business studies. Businesses and e-marketing scholars 
such as Arora et al (2008) and Vesanen and Raulas (2006) focus on improving personalisation 
strategies for businesses looking to target their users for marketing purposes.  In the computer 
sciences, there is ‘The Journal of Personalisation Research’ (also called ‘User Modelling and 
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User-adapted interaction’) that publishes research on topics such as ‘Personalised Information 
retrieval systems’ (Vicente-Lopez et al, 2015), ‘Personalised community recommendations’ 
(Kim et al, 2013) and ‘Personalisation and behaviour change’ (Mashoff et al, 2014). There are 
other related terms such as ‘user adaptation’ (Khriyenko, 2015; Kulif et al, 2015), ‘predictive 
analytics’ (Mai, 2016), ‘collaborative filtering’ (Kappor et al, 2014; Zhu, et al. 2014) and 
‘recommendation systems’ (Pazanni, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2013) that also have attracted 
attention in these academic fields.  
 
Work on algorithmic personalisation in the computer sciences tends to treat personalisation as 
an instrumental practice, rather than one that requires critical scrutiny. That is, many studies 
assume that the application and development of personalisation softwares is unarguably 
‘beneficial’ or ‘necessary’ to the users bound up in and subject to it. For example Mashoff et al. 
state that ‘personalization plays an important role in [changing user behaviour], as the most 
effective persuasive motivational strategies are likely to depend on users characteristics such as 
the user’s personality, affective state, existing attitudes, behaviour, knowledge and goals’ (2014: 
344). It is proposed thus that personalisation is ‘effective’ in changing user behaviour, yet the 
question of whether personalisation should be deployed in such a manner, what constitutes 
‘effectiveness’, and for whom ‘effectiveness’ operates is not broached. Similarly Vicente-Lopez 
et al. state that ‘due to the information overload we are faced with nowadays, personalization 
services are becoming almost essential’ (2015: 1). Such studies therefore approach algorithmic 
personalisation from an instrumental perspective rather than a critical one.  
 
Theoretical critiques 
The works of critics such as Bodle (2015) and Pariser (2011) seek to critique algorithmic 
personalisation practices, along with writers such as Stalder and Mayer (2009), Turow (2011) 
and Fuez, Fuller and Stadler (2011). These commentators have sought to criticise the 
potentially detrimental consequences of personalisation of the web for users – Pariser coins the 
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term ‘the filter bubble’ to describe the reductive and fragmenting effect that personalisation can 
have on users’ web practices. He describes a hypothetical ‘You-Loop’ that is created by only 
viewing personalised web content that is tailored to your pre-existing habits and preferences. 
He writes:  
Personalization can lead you down a road to a kind of informational determinism in 
which what you’ve clicked on before determines what you see next—a Web history 
you’re doomed to repeat. You can get stuck in a static, ever narrowing version of 
yourself—an endless you-loop (2011 :16). 
 
Stalder and Mayer also propose a similar argument in their analysis of Google’s personalised 
search results –they propose that ‘[i]f future search engines operate under the assumption that 
everyone’s world is different, this will effectively make it more difficult to create shared 
experiences’ (2009: 113). They present a further critique of personalisation, one which focuses 
on the effect of anticipation on the user. They argue:  
 
A search engine can never ‘know’ a person in a social sense of knowing. It can only 
compile data that can be easily captured through its particular methods. Thus, rather 
than being able to draw a comprehensive picture of the person, the search engine’s 
picture is overly detailed in come aspects and extremely incomplete in others… Any 
conclusion derived from this incomplete picture must be partially incorrect, thus 
potentially reinforcing those sets of behaviours that lend themselves to data capturing 
and discouraging others (2009: 112). 
 
Their argument here draws some parallels with Jarrett, who, as I will explore in the following 
sections, proposes that Google’s ‘database of intention’ (2014: 22) can only ever be an 
incomplete profile of users. Jarrett goes on to stress however that despite this fragmented and 
incomplete capture processes, Google’s compilation of ‘database subjects’ can still act on the 
users they reflect none-the-less (2014). I return to this point later and in Chapter Six, but here I 
would like to note that Stalder and Mayer’s argument is useful for thinking not just about what 
personalisation does to a users’ worldview, but how a user’s own selfhood intersects with 
algorithmic personalisation. I would add to this however that even if Google could ‘know’ a 
user in the ‘complete’ ‘social sense’ as Stalder and Mayer suggest (and knowing anyone 
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completely in a social sense seems problematic given work on identity performance and 
performativity, explored shortly), there remains room for critique. That is, even if Google’s 
profiling was somehow complete, or if it could correct those ‘partial incorrections’ on which it 
is currently built, the company’s discursive frameworks, computational discourse and ways of 
knowing a user would still hold critically implications for how that user is known, as I will 
explore in Chapter Six.  
 
Bodle’s work on ‘predictive algorithms and personalization services’ echoes many of these 
scholars’ sentiments. He outlines the ‘unintended consequences, biases and costs including 
social discrimination, political polarization and the erosion of personal autonomy and human 
volitions’ (2014: 130) that online personalisation can create. He reinforces Pariser’s argument 
that personalisation algorithms ‘limit one’s exposure to information outside one’s range of 
knowledge and experiences’ (2014: 131) and also argues that ‘data-driven personalization 
practices reveal the fundamental inequality between members, advertisers and companies’ 
(2014: 131) by awarding more power, control, and value (social, monetary or otherwise) 
generation to advertisers and platform providers than the users. Bodle also argues of Facebook 
that ‘with the developments of analytical services based on predictive algorithms, Facebook 
pushes personalization beyond predicting to shaping what people want to do even before they 
realize it’ (2014: 137). I will expand of this theory shortly but here I want to highlight another 
of Bodle’s theorisations:  
Insights into the operational logics of Facebook’s algorithm reinforce an understanding 
of the company’s underlying business model that is predicated on tracking users and 
amassing data tied to fixed identities (2014: 137, my emphasis). 
 
I highlight the term ‘fixed identities’ here because although Facebook certainly looks to track 
users in the aim of revenue generation, the notion that algorithmic personalisation practices are 
predicated on the idea of ‘fixing identities’ is in fact complicated not only by the 
computational-marketing analyses undertaken by Schwarz-Andersson and Bolin (2015), but 
also but theories of identity constitution by Jordan (2013, 2015) and Cover (2012) as I will 
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explore shortly. Furthermore, my own research also complicates the notion the algorithmic 
personalisation looks only to ‘fix’ user identities, as I shall explore through this thesis.  
 
Scholars such as Van Couvering (2007), Pariser (2011), Gillespie (2014) and Hillis, Petit and 
Jarrett (2013) have critiqued the notion of ‘personal relevance’ that as aforementioned, is 
integral to algorithmic personalisation. As Gillespie argues, though ‘personal relevance’ is 
commonly assumed to be beneficial to users by the platform providers such as Facebook, 
Google and Netflix, he notes that ‘“relevant” is a fluid and loaded judgments, as open to 
interpretation as some of the equivalent terms media scholar have already unpacked, like 
‘newsworthy’ and ‘popular’’(2014: 174). Van Couvering takes this further, observing that over 
the past few decades since the conception of search engines, ‘relevance has changed from some 
type of topical relevance based on an applied classification to something more subjective’ 
(2007: 186). Differently put, contemporary notions of what is ‘relevant’, at least in relation to 
digital practices, are now measured in relation to individual users rather than in relation to an idea 
of ‘objective’ relevance. Furthermore, Hillis, Petit and Jarrett note that for Google ‘the perfect 
search engine would understand exactly what you mean and give you back exactly what you 
want.’ (2013: 55), arguing thus that ‘achieving perfect relevance would be akin to the 
technology seeming to read one’s mind’ (2013: 55). I will return to Google’s dream of perfect 
relevance in Chapter Six, but here I want to note that these critical interrogations help to 
complicate the idea that rendering something personally relevant via algorithmically means is 
an instrumentally beneficial act. 
 
There is some work in the fields of digital television studies that also relates to algorithmically-
implemented personalisation – for example Bennett’s (2008) work on i-television seeks to map 
the increasingly individualized ‘prosumption’ of television with developing digital practices, 
whilst Enli argues that digital personalisation can ‘cultivate a new form of communicative 
relationship’ between broadcasters and viewers (2008: 108). Finally my own work on 
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individualised television prosumption looks to critique the algorithmic intervention into 
narrowcasting and broadcasting techniques (Kant, 2014). I argue that algorithmic interventions 
in increasingly individualised viewing practices undermine the ‘consumer sovereignty’ 
traditionally championed by advocates of ‘narrowcasting’ (Kant, 2014). These works are 
relevant here because they emphasise that the individualisation of consumption/ prosumption 
is not new to contemporary online environments – rhetorics and frameworks of 
individualisation predate algorithmic personalisation by many decades, as I will explore below. 
However these critiques of earlier media systems also work to highlight the specificity of 
algorithmic interventions into the delivery of ‘personally relevant’ media and so have 
significance in regards to this thesis.  
 
Research by Hosanger et al. (2013) and Koutra et al. (2014), has sought to find quantitative, big 
data-based evidence (conducted through the data-scraping of sites) of the ‘filter bubble’ that 
personalisation might create for users.  On the one hand, Hosanagar et al. propose in their 
study of personalisation on iTunes that through the inclusion of popular content into 
recommendation systems (as well as content determined by the user themselves), 
‘personalization appears to be a tool that helps users widen their interests, which in turn creates 
commonality with others’ (2013: 1). On the other hand, Koutra et al.’s (2014) study regarding 
news consumption of the Sandy Hook shootings of 2012 supports Pariser’s arguments, 
concluding that ‘all in all, people use the Web to largely access agreeable information’ that 
ultimately ‘provides a myopic view’ (2014: 8) by directing web users to content that always 
already matches their existing socio-political viewpoints. The contrasting outcomes of these 
studies to me highlight the important of context-specific research, and suggest that algorithmic 
personalisation creates different ‘horizons of possibilities’ for users depending on the context. 
 
Software Studies theorists Fuez, Fuller and Stalder also take a quantitative yet critical approach, 
this time in relation to the effects of Google’s personalised search results. Their paper ‘tries to 
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assess the current reality of the personalization of search results’ (2011) by performing a total 
of 18,211 search queries under three fictional Google profiles. Their findings suggest that 
Google’s ‘promises of personalization’, including improved individual relevance, are in fact 
‘inverted’ by Google’s attempt to anticipate the user by demarcating them into identity 
categorisations. They state that due to Google’s group data aggregation and profiling 
mechanisms ‘[r]ather than seeing what is of most interest to the user as an individual, we are 
presented with a preselected image of the world based on what kind of group the search engine 
associates us with’ (2011: np). 
 
Fuez, Fuller and Stalder thus suggest that personalisation practices can ironically create deeply 
apersonal systems of homogenisation, through computationally structured frameworks which 
seek to socially classify the ‘person’ for whom personalisation is enacted. Their analysis not 
only highlights the problem with Fan and Poole’s definition that personalisation can be 
imposed on a ‘group of individuals’ (2011: 183) but also resonates with Bourdieu’s theories of 
social distinction, wherein the individual is classified and legitimised as ‘an individual’ via fields 
of collective social hierarchy and construction (1984). That is, ‘taste classifies and classifies the 
classifier’ ([1984] 1998: 73), but here taste is inferred and assigned via algorithmic and not only 
social mechanisms, that seek to ‘know’ a user’s habits and group them with others – thereby 
classifying the classifier nonetheless. I will expand on this in Chapter Five, as well as the ways 
in which personalisation structures ‘the personal’ at various points throughout this thesis. Here 
however I want to highlight that Fuez, Fuller and Stalder explore the apersonalising nature of 
personalisation through quantitative data-scraping methods, whereas I employ a qualitative 
method to approach similar implications.  
 
All of the above works have played an invaluable role in laying the critical foundations of this 
thesis. By critically interrogating the socio-cultural assumptions and structural operations 
inherent in algorithmic personalisation practices, they highlight that even when computational 
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systems successfully deliver ‘personal relevance’ (even from the perspective of the user), such 
systems can have complex socio-cultural implications for how users are understood, classified 
and delivered information. However, whereas these works employ theoretical or quantitative 
methodologies to explore the implications of personalisation in everyday life, I intend to add to 
these studies by approaching user engagements with algorithmic personalisation through a 
critical yet primarily qualitative and loosely ethnographic methodological framework, as I will 
explore in Chapter Three.  
 
Through this qualitative approach, my thesis looks to explore the further implications of 
personalisation for users – going beyond the headline effects of Pariser’s ‘filter bubble’.  Indeed 
I am interested in what is harder to see or take hold of: as my investigations highlight, the 
reductive effects of personalisation might largely remain unknowable and opaque to users 
themselves, and yet this does not mean that the lived experiences of users cannot contribute to 
research on algorithmic personalisation. For example, largely opaque and unknowable third 
party personalisation practices emerged in the accounts of the Ghostery users contained in 
Chapter Four. However the reported invisibility of algorithmic personalisation emerged not as 
absolute but partial – that is, these users knew they were being tracked and anticipated, but the 
specifics of how, when and to what end remained (potentially always) unknowable. 
Furthermore, by taking a critical yet qualitative approach, it becomes possible to theorise how 
users make sense of not just the world, but how users negotiate the ways in which their own 
identities are anticipated via algorithmic personalisation. In doing so it becomes possible to 
consider the nuances and complexities of how algorithmic personalisation must be navigated 
and understood as a process engrained in everyday life.  
 
The following two parts work out from this body of literature that refers directly to algorithmic 
personalisation. In Part Two I will expand on the data tracking practices introduced in Chapter 
One, but will also consider how theories of identity relate to my work – especially in relation to 
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the historical development of data tracking that has lead to the anticipated individuals that 
currently traverse commercial web platforms. 
 
Part II 
The opacity of data tracking  
As stated in Chapter One, the practice of tracking users is far from uncommon on the 
contemporary web. Data tracking is not only directly undertaken by first party platforms but 
also fuels a booming ‘back-end’ business of third parties who do not offer any front-end 
services yet are interested in ‘knowing’ web users for business-to-business and other 
commercial purposes, as explored at length in Chapter Four. In their investigations into third 
party tracking, Falagrastegar et al. ‘observed the presence of third-parties on over 80%’ of the 
Alexa top-500 websites, ‘in twenty-eight countries from all over the world’ (2014: 2).  
 
First and third party tracking has been critiqued by scholars such as Nissenbaum and Brunton 
(2011) McStay (2012), Berry (2013) Ruppert, Law and Savage (2013), Chan (2015) and Peacock 
(2015), who note that commercial data tracking is not only a ubiquitous feature of the 
commercial web landscape, it is also largely opaque and invisible to the users who are being 
tracked. Organisations and commentators such as The Day We Fight Back (2014), Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (2013) and Aral Balkan (2015) have called for greater transparency, user 
choice, and more opportunity for users to refuse third party data tracking, as I explore in 
Chapter Four. Nissenbaum and Brunton’s work on ‘data obfuscation’ (2011) in particular helps 
to highlight some of the critical implications of invisible yet commodifying data tracking 
practices. They identify two types of ‘asymmetry’ that commercial data tracking creates 
between users and platforms. One is ‘power asymmetry’ in that ‘we have little or no say when 
monitoring takes place’ and the other is ‘epistemic asymmetry’ (2011: 14, my emphasis). They state 
of epistemic asymmetry:   
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We are often not fully aware of the monitoring [by data trackers], and do not know 
what will become of the information produced by monitoring, nor where it will go 
and what can be done to it (2011: 14). 
 
The notion of epistemic imbalance between platform providers and users is important to this 
thesis because throughout my investigations there emerged in participant accounts what I term 
to be epistemic uncertainty created by that asymmetry. That is, the unequal distribution of 
epistemic knowledge production between the platform seemingly ‘knowing’ the user through 
data collection, compared to the unknowable ways that participants felt they were being 
tracked and anticipated, resulted in significant uncertainties for how users negotiated their 
sense of control, autonomy, expertise and identity. Furthermore, these epistemic uncertainties 
were generated in different ways depending on the context – at times, epistemic uncertainty 
was articulated as anxiety in some participant accounts (over how to protect oneself from the 
threat of data tracking) and yet also emerged as trust in other participant accounts (over what 
could be algorithmically personalised, how and when).  
 
As I will explore, by considering data tracking as a process that creates uncertainty in users, I 
can consider why some users of personalisation technologies (such as the Google Now users I 
interviewed) continue to embrace what seems to be a contradictory stance of caring about 
online privacy invasion caused by data tracking but take no tangible actions to protect it; and 
why other users (such as some Ghostery interviewees) embraced the perceived benefits of the 
personalisation practices whilst resisting the privacy-invading data tracking upon which these 
practices rely. More than this though, the invisible and opaque ways that data trackers identify 
users also have implications for how those users are constituted as ‘knowable’ entities, through 
mechanisms that seek to know and anticipate the identities of users. The following section 
therefore turns from data tracking towards the constitution of (algorithmic) identity.  
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(Algorithmic) identities  
Theories of identity 
As processes of algorithmic personalisation involve ‘knowing’ and ‘anticipating’ the user 
through the constitution of ‘algorithmic identities’ it is important to acknowledge and explore 
how such algorithmic identities have come about, and how they fit into wider theories 
surrounding identity constitution. After all, if ‘personalisation’ involves rendering something 
personally relevant, then what do we mean by ‘person’? To explore this question it is first 
useful to scrutinise not just ‘algorithmic’ or ‘online’ identity but more general concepts of what 
is meant by personhood, the self and identity. The following outline of theories of selfhood is 
only partial, but does give a brief foregrounding of some of the theories that form the 
foundation of my thinking around identity in this thesis. 
 
Scholars such as Stone (1995), Geertz (1993), Foucault (1988), Boellstorf (1988) and Rose 
(1991) acknowledge that ‘the notion of the self as we know it’ (Stone, 1995: 89) is largely 
underpinned by a particular formation of the self as inner, unique and unified. Rose asserts that 
the notion of the self as a ‘unique identity’ largely emerges from Christian doctrines, which 
‘furnished [Ancient Roman concepts of] juridical and political personality with an internal 
existence in the form of a conscience’ (1991: 221).18 Stone similarly recognises that this notion 
of selfhood developed into a ‘classic bourgeois worldview’ of the self, which emerged around 
the late 1600s and was part of a wider political and epistemological shift which saw the world 
structured ‘into the form of binary oppositions: body/ mind, self/ society, male/ female and so 
on’ (1995: 89). These binary oppositions, especially the Cartesian view that the mind existed 
metaphysically separate from the body, gave rise to the idea, developed through the 17th and 
																																																								
18	Foucault’s	work	on	the	‘technology	of	the	self’	(1988)	details	the	changes	to	how	the	self	was	formulated	and	
legitimised	through	historically	specific	operations	during	these	centuries.	However,	though	there	were	great	
developments	in	how	the	self	was	operationalised,	Foucault’s	works	suggest	that	these	historically	situated	
constructions	of	self	treated	the	self	as	an	inner	entity	that	inhabited	the	body	(1988).		
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18th Centuries that the body housed a conscious, rational and ‘unitary monastic identity’ (Stone, 
1995: 43). Geertz asserts that this ‘Western conception of the person’ is thus: 
 
[b]ounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic 
centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action organized into a distinctive whole 
(1989: 59).  
 
Scholarly scrutiny into the inner workings of the self continued in the development of social 
anthropology and psychology in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Matellart and Martellart, 1998; 
Boellstorf, 2005; Rose, 1991). However, these disciplines also began to acknowledge the role 
that social interaction had in the formation of this selfhood. These anthropological and 
psychological studies led to the development of ethnographic approaches by the Chicago 
School in the 1920s, which began to investigate how individuals as agents negotiate the 
structures that sought to govern them, especially at the level of everyday life (Matellart and 
Matellart, 1998). From the 1940s onwards, theorists such as Weber (1947) increasingly 
foregrounded their research in the importance of group and social interactions for constituting 
the identities of the individuals that formed that group. The work of writers such as Strauss 
recognised that: 
 
Group membership is… a symbolic, not physical matter, and the symbols which 
arise during the life of the group are in turn, internalized by the members and 
affect their individual acts (Strauss cited in Stone, 1995: 87).  
 
With the establishment of the notion that individual identities were constructed through group 
interaction came the increasing questioning of the long-standing assumption that the self was a 
unified whole that pre-existed such social interaction. Notably Goffman (1959) proposed that 
we ‘perform’ multiple selfhoods that are called on and enacted depending on a person’s 
specific social situation, and in doing so further questioned longstanding notions that the self 
was necessarily unitary and holistic.  
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Work on the self increasingly sought to interrogate the relationship between the agencies and 
identities of individuals and the structural operations, as well as discursive frameworks, that 
constituted and contextualised the individual. Foucault sought to position ‘the body’ as 
constituted (and disciplined) by and within specific historical socio-contexts, in which ‘the body 
is the inscribed surface of events’ (1988: 1480); that is, the body is a site of culturally contested 
meanings upon which discourses of governance and power are imposed, fought and written 
(1988a).  
 
Mattelart and Mattelart (1998) note that theorists such as Hall, Liebes and Katz sought to bring 
attention to the agency of the individual produced by discourse and engrained in structural 
formation. They note that such scholars ‘restored the activity of the reader’ (1998: 128) –      
for example, Hall’s work examines not just how dominant ideologies and producers      
‘encode’ meaning but the ways in which individuals decode meanings in negotiational,      
interpretational or even oppositional ways ([1980] 1999). Thus, the self, though still structured 
by social conditions, discourse and operations, was increasingly acknowledged as a 
negotiational agency.  
 
Other theorists such as Lasch focused on the increasing importance of individualism in late-
capitalist societies, emphasising both excessive consumption and self-centric ideologies that 
produced what Lasch called ‘the culture of narcissism’ (1979). The idea that the self constituted 
a highly individualised yet malleable performance thus led to further  – rather different – 
developments in how the self was theorised; for example Gidden’s work treats selfhood in 21st 
century Modernity as a ‘reflexive project of the self’, in which the self can be continuously and 
reflexively reworked (1991).  
 
Increasingly then, as Hall (1996) notes, in the late 80s and early 90s the very idea of identity 
began to be questioned. For example, Butler sought to build on Goffman’s notion that identity 
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can be considered as ‘performance’, but argues that such performances are not exterior to our 
sense of selfhood but produce and constitute that very selfhood. Butler’s work thus 
corresponds to Foucault in that the self is produced through discourse, but also marks a 
departure from Foucault in that ‘the body’ is not simply inscribed with it (for this, Butler 
argues, paradoxically suggests the body exists outside the discourse which produces it) but is 
instead intrinsically ‘performative’ (1988; 1990). In her now well-established theory of how 
gender identity might come to be constituted, Butler states: 
Gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses or disguises an interior 
‘self’… As performance which is performative, gender is an ‘act’, broadly constructed, 
which constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority. As supposed to 
a view such as Ervin Goffman’s which posits a self which assumes and exchanges 
various ‘roles’ within the complex social expectations of the ‘game’ of modern life, I 
am suggesting that the self is not only irretrievably ‘outside’, constituted in social 
discourse, but that the ascription of interiority is itself a publicly regulated and 
sanctioned form of essence fabrication (1988: 528). 
 
For Butler then, acts of identity performance are not just exterior acts but materialised and 
therefore constitutive of the very identity that they seek to perform. Butler’s theories thus 
throw the idea that identity is unified, stable and somehow pre-exists cultural construction very 
much into question. This thesis therefore takes Butler’s notion of performativity as a central 
concern, yet also recognises (as Butler herself does) that traditional notions of selfhood as 
holistic, inner and unified still strongly resonate in contemporary popular treatment of the self, 
as exemplified in Zuckerberg’s statement that ‘You have one identity’. With this in mind, it is 
useful to turn to how identity has come to be understood, constituted and theorised in 
computational contexts. 
 
The early net and online identity 
The development of the Internet in the late 1960s and subsequent World Wide Web in the 
mid-1990s (developments explored further in the next section) brought with it new 
opportunities to debate, discuss and theorise identity in a space that appeared to separate body 
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from self. Writers such as Turkle (1997), Stone (1996), Rheingold (1996), Roberts and Parks 
(1999), Kennedy (1999), O’Brien (1999), Donath (1999) and Bassett (1997) explored the 
potentials and problems of articulating, maintaining and (re)constituting identity in the 
‘meatless’ environment of the text-based ‘virtual communities’, MOOS, MUDs and other 
online forums that the web at that time facilitated. Turkle approached these forms of web-
based communication and community as an opportunity ‘for discovering who one is and 
wishes to be’ (1997: 184), stating that ‘when we step through the screen into virtual community 
we construct our identities on the other side of the looking glass’ (1997: 177). Turkle’s 
approach to identity thus treated the web as a space that opened up potentials for the 
reconstruction and reconfiguration of selfhood. Similarly, Rheingold also described these new 
‘virtual communities’ as ‘a place where identities are fluid… we reduce and encode our 
identities as words on a screen, decode and unpack the identities of others’ (1993: 61).  
 
In her work on gender identity in relation to online community LamdbaMOO, Bassett notes 
that the articulation of identity ‘beyond the flesh’ (but not necessarily ‘beyond the body’) created 
a ‘tension between gender play one hand, and a fairly rigid adherence to gender norms on the 
other – suggesting that as cyber-subjects, standing in a new relation to the body, which we may 
regard as potentially liberating, may also be understood to emerge through the power structures 
and gender asymmetries operating in Real Life’ (1997: 538). Such theorisations, along with 
those of Bulkhalter (1999) and Nakamura (2002), emphasise that though the self might be 
separated from the physical site of the flesh, the culturally-coded body continued to inhabit 
cyberspace.  
 
The debates concerning online identity in regards to the early web approached text-based 
online communication as a space that could potentially reconfigure identity – or at least that 
identities might have the opportunity to be reflexively reconsidered (Turkle, 1997), be made 
‘fluid’ (Rheingold, 1999), or ‘played with [as] multiple subjectivities’ (Bassett, 1997: 539). 
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However these writers also raised questions about the socio-cultural codes, pressures and 
ideologies that restricted and reinforced identity configurations both ‘online’ and ‘offline’. In 
this sense, the debates surrounding online identity at this point framed identity articulation, 
maintenance and performance as somewhat ‘up for grabs’ – that is, the text-based 
communication technologies at the time allowed for potentially anonymous refashioning of 
identity that demanded a reconsideration of how identity was theorised. 
 
As Cohen (2013) and Turow (2012) recognise and as I will explore below, at this point (the 
early to mid-1990s) individualised data tracking was still in its embryonic stages – internet users 
could not be tracked or implicitly identified by platform providers, and their individual habits, 
preferences and identities could not be inferred to the depth and complexity that they are in 
today’s landscape. It is here then I want to emphasise the historical specificity of this context: 
articulations of online identity in this era of the net’s history were debated with a socio-cultural 
situation in which individuals could not be computationally tracked and algorithmically categorised in the 
ways that they are now. That is, though platform providers actively sought to attract and in 
some ways commodify user interactions (as I expand on below), platform and content 
providers simply could not algorithmically identify individual users – they had to either 
categorise such users via traditional advertising demographics, or users had to (mis)identify 
themselves, or (mis)identify other users.  
 
The widespread implementation of commercial HTTP cookies in the early 2000s (Turow 2011; 
Peacock, 2015), combined with other data tracking technologies, can be seen as marking a 
crucial departure then in regards to online identity, in that the development of such technology 
marked the beginning of the possibility to identify users – often for revenue generating 
purposes – via algorithmic and computational means. I consider such a development crucial in 
regards to understanding why algorithmic personalisation has come to have such a vague yet 
persistent presence on so many contemporary commercial platforms, and so I would like to 
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expand on these developments now by turning from identity theory to political economy, in 
order to chart how users have been identified, anticipated and tracked in the last few decades.  
 
The commercial development of the data tracked individual 
How did today’s data-tracked individual come to exist? As is widely recognised and as stated in 
the introduction, the tracking and anticipating of users provides a key form of revenue 
generation for most of the large commercial free-to-use services (such as Google, MSN, 
Facebook and Yahoo) that currently dominate as content and service providers on the web. As 
such, it is worth briefly mapping the commercial development of the web and internet.  
 
Mapping this commercial development from the beginning is a complex task – as scholars such 
as Abbate (1997, 2007) and Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Schwartz (2013) note, though it is 
commonly accepted that the internet began with DARPA’s Arpanet in 1969, its subsequent 
development was driven by a ‘multitude of actors’ (Abbate, 2007: 11), some of which were US 
state-funded (such as the NSF) and others who were commercial enterprises (such as IBM) 
(Abbate, 2007). I feel that an in-depth historical analysis of the development of the early net 
and World Wide Web lay beyond the scope of this thesis, however there are some points that 
require acknowledgement. One is that though there are a number of narratives and counter-
narratives in circulation regarding how the commercial net came into being (Campbell-Kelly 
and Garcia-Swartz, 2013), most of these narratives agree that in the early 1990s, the internet 
was subject to rapid moves towards privatisation (Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz, 2013; 
Abbate, 1999, 2007; Curran and Steaton, 2010). Abbate argues that this privatisation may have 
been driven by ‘technical necessity’ (2007: 14) rather than commercial interest, yet the once US 
state-funded Net was increasingly privatised nonetheless. The second point I want to make is 
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that at the same time this privatisation was taking place, the World Wide Web19 was being 
made freely available and becoming increasingly popular. Abbate notes:  
The spread of the Web created new demand for Internet access among the general 
public just as commercial ISPs [internet service providers] were positioning to meet 
that demand. This makes it difficult to separate privatization’s benefits from those of 
the web (17: 2007). 
 
Here then Abbate observes that the freely available Web emerged on top of and in conjunction 
with the commercial ISPs that were also gaining popularity in the early/ mid 1990s. This leads 
to the third point to be made here; the net’s privatisation was accompanied at this time by an 
oppositional discourse that the Net should be a public, open and free resource. These discourses 
again emerged through different actors – US politicians such as Al Gore wanted the Net to be 
an open, widely-available pubic service (Abbate, 2007), the scientific networks that the Net 
originally fostered similarly wanted a collaborative, non-commercial network (Curran and 
Steaton, 2010), whilst some Net users themselves were also calling for the Net to remain a 
public service (Abbate 2007). Furthermore according to Curran and Steaton, founder of the 
World Wide Wed Tim Berners-Lee was also ‘inspired by two public service precepts: the need 
to create free public access to shared cultural resources… and the need to bring people into 
communion with each other’ (2010: 263). Such narratives thus emphasise the ‘publicness’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘commonality’ that the internet and world wide web could facilitate. Finally, 
inhabitants of virtual communities such as Rheingold (1996) also expressed impassioned pleas 
that such communities be left free from commercial encroachments.  
 
However, not everyone saw the increasing commercialisation of the web as a threat to the web 
and internet’s emancipatory and egalitarian power. Business scholars Hagel and Armstrong 
disagreed with Rheingold and others that virtual communities should be inherently ‘anti-
commercial’ and instead argued that ‘profit motives will in fact enhance’ both community 																																																								
19	The	World	Wide	Web	was	developed	in	1991	by	Tim	Berners-Lee	(as	explored	below)	and	is	described	by	Curran	
and	Seaton	as	‘a	software	program	that	enabled	people	to	access,	link	and	create	communications	in	a	single	global	
“web”	of	information’	(2010:	255).		
 53 
interaction and individual consumer power (1997: x), as I will explore below. Similarly, building 
on the ethic of individualism advocated by business innovators such as Brand (1988), web 
celebrants such as Negroponte (1996) and Gates (1995) advocated that the commercialisation 
of the web could bring about greater user power, increased individual freedom in the form of 
greater consumer choice and a more personalised interaction with content providers, 
businesses and services. For example, Negroponte (1996) envisioned that the web did not only 
function for the needs of the virtual community, but also the needs of the individual. By 
facilitating the creation of ‘boutique industries’ that could cater for individual needs and 
desires, Negroponte argued the web could bring about a new form of personalised media 
consumption in the form of ‘The Daily Me’ – an ideal of an acutely personalised newspaper 
that could deliver personally relevant news and entertainment to an individual in ways not 
possible with mass media. Other celebrants of the net’s individualising capabilities such as 
Gates saw similar potential in online services to provide computational ‘personal assistants’ 
(Gates; 1995) and personalised entertainment that would one day be able to automatically 
suggest and deliver ‘relevant’ content based on individual preference.20 In these arguments, the 
commercial benefits to the individual thus began to emerge alongside counter-discourses that 
celebrated the net as collaborative and public.  
  
As I will explore, ‘The Daily Me’, ‘personal assistants’ and personalised entertainment all came 
to be (problematically) realised in some form with the development of Web 2.0. However, 
despite these optimistic calls that a personalised web could bring great individual choice and 
generate profit, during the early to mid 90’s as Hagel and Armstrong (1997), Turow (2011) and 
Curran and Steaton note (2010), most companies were struggling to find ways to successfully 
monetise their online enterprises. To elaborate, Hagel and Armstrong note in 1997 that 																																																								
20	In	some	ways	these	discourses	of	individualism	and	personal	freedom	draw	parallels	with	some	of	the	non-
commercial	ideals	already	established	by	early	Net	users	–	for	example,	Barlow’s	Declaration	for	the	Independence	
of	Cyberspace	advocated	that	the	web	be	a	space	that	could	‘naturally’	advocate	individual	freedom,	free	from	state	
intervention	(1997).	
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‘commercial enterprises are relative newcomers to the online world, and so far few of them 
have made money’ (1997: 3). They state that: 
Most business on the Internet and other networks today do little more than 
advertise their wares on ‘billboards’ on the World Wide Web… these old-media 
advertisers, dressed in new-media clothes, are only one indication that marketers 
have yet to discover the secret to unlocking the revolutionary potential of the 
internet (1997: 3). 
 
Turow notes that at this point online banner ads sold to advertisers functioned largely the 
same way that traditional ads worked; however, they had the added benefit that advertisers 
could tell when someone had clicked on their ad (through the ‘click-through’ model). As such, 
data tracking began to emerge as a market practice, but as Peacock notes at this time ‘data 
exchanges between Internet users’ computers and a remote server were anonymous’ (2014: 5). 
This meant that online advertising strategies could not personally identify or anticipate 
individuals – instead, ‘online ad space was based on proximity to content’ (Cohen, 2013: 78) 
and it was the attention of the audience or demographics of a site that was sold as a commodity 
rather than individual attention. If platform providers such as AOL, Prodigy or CompuServe 
wanted to ‘know’ their users’ specific identity categorisations, they had to encourage users to 
explicitly input personal data about themselves through registration forms and self-constructed 
profiles, or through explicitly registered transaction data (Hagel and Armstrong, 1997). That is 
not to suggest that these explicit forms of identity registration, profiling and articulation did 
not come with critical considerations,21 however the anticipation of online identities could not be 
achieved through inferred determinations as with today’s algorithmic personalisation practices.  
 
However by the mid-late 1990s, these ‘old-media’ market models were changing. Hagel and 
Armstrong painted an optimistic picture of the potentials of the internet to transform media 																																																								
21	As	the	work	of	Bassett	(1996)	and	Killoran	(2002)	highlights,	the	restrictive	interface	and	computational	
architectures	provided	by	early	platform	providers	such	as	Geocities	still	sought	to	redirect	users’	actions	and	
trajectories	through	systems	of	governance	that	could	be	successfully	made	profitable.	However	though	such	
systems	of	registration	and	identity	articulation	can	be	considered	regulatory,	the	development	of	personalised,	
cross-platform	data	tracking	brought	about	fresh	implications	for	notions	of	identity	governance,	as	I	explore	
shortly.		
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marketing via data aggregation and extensive user profiling. They argue that these new online, 
cross-platform market models would bring ‘enhanced ability to target’ (1997: 11): 
Virtual communities will accumulate detailed profiles of members and their 
transaction histories, not only with a single vendor but with multiple vendors across 
an entire product category (1997:11).  
 
They go on to state that ‘[b]y aggressively using this information to tailor products and to 
create product and service bundles, vendors can both expand the potential customer base and 
generate more revenue from each customer’ (1997: 11). They thus envision a market model 
that looks something like the data tracking, anticipation strategies and personalisation of 
content and services that are being mobilised on the contemporary web. There is one point at 
which they mark a departure however – they speculate that ‘ownership of these profiles is likely 
to shift over time to the community members themselves and will be accessed by vendors only 
on terms established by individual members’ (1997: 11). As the works of Peacock (2014), McStay 
(2012), Andrejevic (2013) and Jordan (2015) highlight, ownership of personal data on the 
contemporary web lies very much in the hands of platform and service providers, and so Hagel 
and Armstrong’s latter prediction has not (yet at least) come to pass.  
 
I will return to the latter point regarding consumer control shortly, but here it is important to 
note a technological development that in some way realised Hagel and Armstrong’s vision: the 
development of the HTTP Cookie. First developed in 1994 and used commercially by 1998, 
the cookie is defined by Peacock as a small piece of code that facilitates ‘a way of storing 
information on the user’s computer about a transaction between a user and a server that can be 
retrieved at a later date by the server’ (2014: 5). The cookie became the primary data 
aggregation tool for commercial content and platform providers interested in knowing and 
anticipating their users. As Turow recognises, in the early years of data tracking, ‘the cookie 
allowed websites to quietly determine the number of separate individuals entering various parts 
of their domains and clicking on their ads’ (2012: 49), highlighting that cookies marked the first 
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move towards the individualisation of what was formerly audience or demographic data.  
Peacock’s historical analysis of the development of the cookie acknowledges that user consent 
and control was at first taken seriously by the cookie’s developers – in a draft paper that 
discussed the privacy implications for the tracking of users through cookie technologies, ‘an 
extensive section is devoted to privacy problems and discussions on the rights of users to 
remove or generally cap cookies’ (2014: 11).  She states that in these suggestions, ‘full agency is 
attributed to online users’ (2014: 5). Crucially however, she notes that the measures 
implemented to protect users’ privacy and agency were quickly removed – users lost the right 
to ‘remove and cap cookies’ (2014: 5) before the technology even became widespread.  
 
It is through the development of the cookie in the late 1990s, combined with a market model 
that favoured (targeted) advertising over pay-to-use service models that the contemporary web 
economy starts to emerge. As Curran and Steaton note, the development of a privatised web in 
conjunction with narratives of public access and freedom ‘had accustomed people to expect 
softwares and content to be free’ (2010: 253), rather than pay subscriptions or registration fees to 
access services, platforms or content (as with some TV satellite services or newspaper 
subscriptions, for example). In doing so the development of the web economy followed a 
market model that relied on advertising as a primary revenue generating strategy; but crucially 
in regards to this thesis, a strategy that increasingly sought to anticipate, track and target 
individual users rather than audience demographics. Through the implementation of this 
market model and the development of cookies, by the early 2000s the world’s most-used web 
sites began to feature some of the key players still in play today – companies such as Ebay, 
Amazon and Google. Such companies could – and still do – attract large numbers of users 
whilst still retaining the attractive free-to-use model implemented by earlier (but less 
commercially successful) sites such as Geocities and Netscape. Thus free-to-use web services, 
funded by (increasingly targeted) marketing strategies rather that pay-to-use mechanisms, can 
be considered one of the key economic models currently driving the contemporary web. 
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As this web economy has developed, data tracking has become more and more complex – 
since as Turow notes, ‘entrepreneurs looked to the cookie as the natural vehicle to learn more 
and more what people were doing’ (Turow, 2011: 54). Turow further highlights that the 
emergence of cross-platform tracking paved the way for users to be anticipated across sites (2011: 
58), and that ambiguous laws surrounding the legality of such tracking meant that trackers did 
not have to gain consent from users, meaning that user data could be harvested without the 
user’s knowledge (Turow, 2011). The Cookie Directive of 2011 means that at current, EU sites 
must alert users to the presence of cookies on their websites, however scholars McStay (2012), 
Turow et al. (2015) and Peacock (2014) argue that even these ‘alerts’ fall woefully short of 
awarding users full and informed consent, as I will explore further in Chapter Four.  
 
Peacock (2015) and Nikiforakis (2013) note that HTTP cookies marked only the first step 
towards data tracking – many more technologies have developed since the mid-2000s. Peacock 
states that at present ‘online users are dealing with embedded objects called “supercookies”, 
“zombiecookies”, ubercookies or evercookies and these tags are no exaggeration’ (2015: 6) 
since these new forms of cookies are ‘almost impossible to circumvent’ (2015: 6), even for 
those users equipped with tracker blocking technologies such as Ghostery. Similarly, 
Nikiforakis et al.’s (2013) study of web-based device fingerprinting reveals that commercial data 
trackers have a range of ‘cookieless’ methods for identifying and anticipating users that extend 
beyond traditional cookie aggregation. 
 
This historical development of the web’s market model is important to this thesis for two 
reasons. The first is that this model meant that commercial platforms could embrace the 
‘publicness’ championed by advocates of a ‘free’ web by providing cost-free services and yet 
still generating profit by commodifying user data and interactions. It is through this model that 
a data-for-services exchange between user and platform takes place: a user must permit themselves 
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to be tracked and anticipated if they want to have access to the platform’s free services and 
content. This data-for-services exchange is very much at the heart of today’s web economy, as 
a number of scholars (such as Bassett, 2007; Jordan, 2015; Andrejevic, 2011 and Van Dijck 
2009) have suggested and as I will expand on in the next chapter. The second reason why this 
market model is significant to my research is that current data tracking practices have 
implications for how users are made sense of by platforms, as I explore in the next section.  
 
Making sense of the data-tracked individual 
Like Cohen and Turow, Bolin and Andersson-Swartz (2015) recognise that data tracking has 
marked a shift from old models of media marketing, which relied on the compiling of 
audiences or demographics, to a new model in which user identifications and preferences are 
no longer anchored to traditional models of audience profiling. They state: 
While mass media intelligence was premised on socio-economic census data variables 
such as age, gender, ethnicity, education and media preference (i.e. categorises 
recognisable to media users and industry representatives alike), Big Data technologies 
register consumer choice, geographical position, web movement and behavioural 
information in complex ways that are too abstract for most lay people to appreciate the 
full consequences of (2015: 1). 
 
Though their use of ‘lay people’ is complicated by some of the participant accounts contained 
in Chapter Four, their analysis provides an explanation of how the data tracked individual 
comes to be identified, anticipated and made valuable. They argue that contemporary data-
mining techniques attempt to capture mass data sets that look not for representational 
information but for ‘pattern recognition’ in user behaviour, web movements, geographical 
movements, consumption habits and other trajectories. They argue that this contemporary data 
aggregation model thus ‘privileges relational rather than demographic qualities’ (2015: 3, my 
emphasis), and propose then that what was once a matter of ‘representation’ of audiences ‘by 
definition’ becomes a process of abstract ‘correlation’ (2015: 6). To elaborate: 
In this post-referential situation correlation becomes the main focus. The explanatory 
dimension of representational statistics (e.g. ‘this group of people like this due to their 
social composition and their habitus privileging certain kinds of action over others’) 
becomes less important than the establishment of correlation between (probable) 
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behavioural patterns. The socially explainable ‘who’ behind this pattern is less important 
than the algorithmically behavioural ‘how’ (2015: 5). 
 
To summarise their point then – audience identification is no longer a matter of ‘representing’ 
the audience using referents designed to mirror corresponding individuals or groups; instead, 
identification is now a matter of abstract correlation between users who comprise huge data 
sets collected under real-time, behavioural, and recursive data tracking strategies. Other 
scholars have identified similar characteristics to audience identification in data tracking – 
Jordan notes that user value now derives from correlation between users as nodes in a network 
(2015), and Stalder and Mayer also note that what was once a matter of knowing audiences is 
now a process of ‘mass individualisation’ (2009). Furthermore Ruppert, Law and Savage state 
that with such data collection methods, the notion of ‘knowing’ unitary and unique individuals 
becomes redundant: 
People... are being disassembled into sets of specific transactions or interactions. It may 
or may not happen that they are reassembled into people (2013: 36).  
 
Essentially then, this model of identification and anticipation no longer cares about who you are 
but how your behaviour abstractedly relates to others in the data set. Such models thus very 
much constitute web users not as individuals and yet not a masses either. In doing so they 
correspond to Delueze’s earlier (1992) theorisation that computational mechanisms work to 
turn us into ‘dividuals’; that is ‘[w]e no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual 
pair. Individuals have become “dividuals”, and masses, samples, data, markets or “banks”’  
(1992: 5).   
 
I will return to the concept of the ‘dividual’ at various points throughout this thesis. However, 
to build here on Ruppert, Law and Savage’s (2013) argument regarding the reassembling of 
‘people’, Bolin and Andersson Schwarz also make an important point – contemporary data 
tracking strategies are (by definition) so abstract that data must be translated back into the 
demographic models that marketers have long used to commodify audiences. They state that 
‘one can observe a felt need among media users and among media industry actors to “translate 
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back” the algorithmically produced relational statistics in “traditional” social parameters’ (1: 
2015). As I will explore in Chapter Six, this process is exemplified in Google Ad Settings, 
wherein user’s data trail is translated back into a user profile that lists their gender, age and 
interests. What I would add to Bolin and Andersson-Schwarz’s analysis is that this translating 
back of data likely also involves explicitly registered data aggregated from users themselves. As 
such the translating from correlation to representation is perhaps more complicated than they 
assert. However it is the relationship between correlation and representation that takes the 
interest of this thesis, as it is this process that opens up space to critically interrogate how 
identity must be ‘done’ in contemporary online contexts.  
 
To return to the early theories of net identity then, data tracking marks a shift in the ways in 
which identity can be articulated, performed and furthermore theorised.  The tracking of users 
for marketing purposes has in some ways foreclosed the possibilities for the potentials of 
‘doing identity’ in cyberspace; what was once only an ‘online identity’ – fluid, stable or 
otherwise – has become accompanied by an ‘algorithmic identity’ (Gillespie, 2014), ‘digital 
shadow’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2011) or ‘data double’ (Lyon, 2014). As Lyon states: 
[Big Data] makes up the data double, Delueze’s ‘dividual’ and that entity then acts 
back on those with whom the data are associated, informing us who we, are what we 
should desire, or hope for including who we should become (2014: 7).  
 
I want to stress though that according to Delueze, this dividual is ‘serpentine’ – that is, it is not 
simply a ‘shadow’ in the way that the shadows cast by the sun are fixed absolutely to their 
corresponding object/ subject. Rather, the serpentine entity that computationally follows and 
modulates us is ‘undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network’ (Delueze, 1992: 6). Whether 
‘shadow’ or ‘serpertine’, what we can take from Lyon’s analysis is that by ‘acting on users’ 
dividualisation becomes a critical consideration in how identity might by constituted, and one 
that takes into account algorithmic mechanisms as part of the constitutive process. Before moving 
on to the ideologies that accompany the contemporary web economy, in the next section I 
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would like to briefly explore some theories relating to algorithmic identity, especially in regards 
to performativity.  
 
Algorithmic identity, performativity and networked governance 
As Lyon suggests, acts of online identity constitution can be considered performative in the 
Butlerian sense – that is, online identity ‘enacts and produces’ the subject that it names (Butler, 
1994). Scholars such Bassett (1997), Stone (1995) Jordan (2013) and Cover (2012) examine the 
performative potentialities of online articulation for user self-expression. For example, 
describing the personal profiles of users of SNSs, Cover states that ‘the establishment and 
maintenance of a profile is not a representation or biography but performative acts, which 
constitute the self and stabilise it over time’ (2012: 181).  
 
However, as scholars such as Sauter (2013) note, with the increasing emergence of 
computational identity ‘tools’, it is not just the user themselves that performs their identity – 
multiple actants can now be responsible for the creation and maintenance of individual 
identity. For example, Jarrett notes that the ‘database subjects’ (2014) created to anticipate 
individuals intentions do not simply exist in a database, disconnected from the activities of the 
‘real’ identity to which they correspond. Instead these algorithmic identities are designed to 
intersect and interact with the identities of the users that they seek to replicate, and so can be 
considered actors in the process of identity constitution in that they ‘assume a capacity to act 
upon me and to potentially act against me’ (Jarrett, 2014: 25). Gillespie further notes that:  
These shadow bodies persist and proliferate through information systems, and the 
slippage between the anticipated user and the user herself that it represents can be either 
politically problematic, or political productive (2014: 174, my emphasis). 
 
Depending on the context, negotiations and tactics employed by system and user, the slippage 
Gillespie refers to can be productive or problematic, and at times both and neither, as I will 
explore throughout this thesis.  But here I want to highlight that these systems blur the line 
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between ‘user themselves’ and their algorithmic identity; the two become self-referential and co-
constitutional. 
 
This thesis takes the performative potentialities of these ‘database subjects’ to be a central 
concern, in that the performative ‘entanglements’ (Barad, 2007) that connect and produce the 
anticipated user and the user herself raise a host of critical questions: what does it mean to 
consider an ‘algorithmic identity’ – which is constituted primarily by the system, not by the user 
– as a performative entity? What sort of identity – ‘single’, ‘fluid’ or otherwise – can be 
articulated under a system that attempts to recursively anticipate the user through algorithmic 
protocols, and personalisation systems? What kinds of negotiations take place between the 
anticipated user and the user herself, and what are the performative productions of these 
negotiations? 
 
In this recursive, performative feedback loop between the identity of the user and their 
‘algorithmic identities’, Cheney-Lippold identifies the potential for Foucauldian forms of 
(bio)power to operate, which can ‘work to determine the conditions of possibilities of users’ 
(2011: 173). He writes of the inference involved in algorithmic identification: 
[a]lgorithmic inference works are a mode of control, of processes of identification 
that structure and regulate our lives online within the context of online marketing 
and algorithmic categorization (2011: 174). 
 
To turn to earlier theorisations, Agre acknowledges that these restrictive conditions of 
possibility operate not in online algorithmic identifications but through computational systems 
in general. Referring to Deluezian theories of control, Agre calls on computational ‘grammars 
of action’ that, through a ‘capture model’ (rather than ‘surveillance model’, as per Foucauldian 
models) of socio-technical, governance can determine, regulate and control the horizon of 
possible actions that web users can take. He writes:  
Once a grammar of action has been imposed on an activity, the discrete units 
and individual episodes of the activity are more readily identified, verified, 
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counted, measured, compared, represented, rearranged, contracted for and 
evaluated in terms of economic efficiency (1994: 119). 
 
According to Agre, in being more ‘readily identified…’ these activities are thus put through a 
process of ‘instrumentation that entails the reorganization of existing activities’ (1994: 122).  
 
However, it is important to note (as Agre himself recognises) that the regulatory effects of 
algorithmic personalisation practices should not be taken as a given. Rather, these practices 
create a horizon of possibilities (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013:1353) – rather than concretised 
‘conditions’ – for the end users implicated in them.22 By using qualitative and ethnographic 
methodological approaches, I hope to capture the nuances and complexities of user negotiation 
that might arise in the horizons created by algorithmic personalisation practices and the users 
‘entangled’ with and within them.  
 
In the final part of this chapter I would like to turn from algorithmic identities to the 
discourses of neoliberal individualism that have accompanied the development of the ‘Web 
2.0’. These discourses are important to this thesis because firstly, they support the idea ‘You 
have one identity’; that is, they frame identity as unique, fixable, singular and unitary. Secondly, 
these discourses champion the individual autonomy that algorithmic personalisation 
supposedly aids. However, as I argue below, the autonomy supposedly enjoyed by the 
networked individual is undermined by algorithmic personalisation even as personalisation 
systems purport to uphold it, thus creating the struggle for autonomy that emerges as a theme 
in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
 
Part III 																																																								
22	Butler’s	theory	also	corresponds	to	the	notion	that	conditions	produced	through	performative	articulation	
should	not	be	considered	completely	disciplinary	or	regulatory.	She	argues	that	the	performative	constitution	of	
identity	is	not	completely	determined	because	it	is	a	repetitive	and	iterative	process	–	and	in	being	this,	it	means	
that	the	fluidity	of	discursive	construction	leaves	room	for	identity	to	be	performed	in	ways	that	resist	dominant	
discursive	ideologies	(1993).		
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The networked individual and the ‘like’ economy 
As scholars such as Van Djick (2009), Houtman, Koster and Aupers (2013), Jenkins (2006) and 
Benkler (2006) note, the implementation of ‘Web 2.0’23 in the early 2000s brought with it a 
fresh set of apparent opportunities for identity construction. Jenkins (2006) and Benkler (2006) 
amongst many argued that the development of ‘Web 2.0’ could be popularly and critically 
celebrated as affording users more opportunity to ‘produce’ ‘prosume’ and ‘participate’ – users 
can ‘upload’, ‘create’, ‘share’, ‘like’ and comment on content in a number of different visual, 
textual and audio formats. In doing so, and crucially in regards to this thesis, Houtman, Koster 
and Aupers note that popular rhetorics of participatory web championed new possibilities for 
the exercise of autonomy for users: ‘agency, personal autonomy and (inter)active control over 
media content are at the heart of the new media’s participatory culture’ (2011: 54).    
 
From this participatory connectivity of ‘Web 2.0’ and onwards emerge new ways of 
understanding networks and their users. Rainie and Wellman’s ‘networked individual’ (2014) 
model for instance describes a situation in which traditional ideas of community (‘virtual’ or 
otherwise) based on kinship and collective interest become ‘segmented’ and ‘sparsely knit’ 
(2014: 135) in favour of the ‘network’ – in which the individual – ‘not the household, kinship 
group or work group… is the primary unit of connectivity’ (2014: 124). According to Rainie 
and Wellman, the ‘hallmark of networked individualism is that people function more as 
connected individuals and less as embedded group members’ (2014: 12). This move away from 
‘community’ and towards the individual embedded within a network is, according to these 																																																								
23	Web	2.0	was	widely	considered	to	as	the	‘next	stage’	of	the	World	Wide	Web.	The	term	refers	to	‘a	combination	
of	a)	improved	communication	between	people	via	social-networking	technologies	b)	improved	communication	
between	separate	software	applications…	and	c)	improved	web	interfaces	that	mimic	the	real-time	responsiveness	
of	desktop	applications’	(MIT,	2014).	Though	scholars	such	as	Keen	(2005)	contest	that	the	term	is	more	of	an	
ideology	than	a	set	of	tangible	technological	developments,	the	dawn	of	web	2.0	was	popularly	seen	as	a	departure	
from	the	text	based	forms	of	communication	commonly	mobilised	in	Web	1.0.	Bassett	notes	that	‘2.0’	is	
understood	by	Tom	O’Reilly,	who	framed	the	term,	as	a	technical	and	business	corrective	to	the	shortcomings	of	
the	early	Internet’	(2008:	np).	Bassett	considers	O’Reilly’s	framing	as	‘based	on	an	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	
the	system	(the	new	media	ecology)	in	use’	(2008:	np),	and	problematises	the	industrial/	practical	affordances	of	
Web	2.0,	but	also	its	‘cultural	stakes’	in	order	to	consider	the	‘participatory	dynamics	of	the	media	system	as	a	
whole’	(2008:	np).	
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writers, to be largely embraced – under this model, individuals are freed from the ties of 
traditional, institutional bonds (such as the neighbourhood), and through their own hard work 
can become the agents of their own networked success.24 Again crucially in terms of this thesis, 
the networked individual enjoys the autonomy of establishing their own individualised web 
experience – under networked individualism, ‘each persona also creates their own internet 
experience, tailored to her needs’ (Rainie and Wellman, 2012: 12).  
 
These tropes are reflected in popular discourse surrounding ‘participatory culture’ and web 2.0 
– for example, Time named ‘The Person of the Year’ in 2006 to be ‘You’ – celebrating not just 
the participatory nature of this new creative environment, but also the individualism fostered 
by that environment. This contemporary ideology of networked individualism does not exist in 
a vacuum, as Houtman, Koster and Auper suggests, this idea of the self corresponds to 
discourses of late-capitalist individualism (2011); discourses that, as aforementioned, scholars 
such as Giddens (1991) and Rose (1991) have also critiqued.  In relation to autonomy, post-
feminist critiques in particular have sought to describe and critique modes of subjectivity 
constituted by late-capitalist markets. As Ringrose and Walkerdine (2008), Probyn (1993), Jing 
(2006) and Tudor (2012) note, the neoliberal subject is constructed as an autonomous 
individual who is expected to be an ‘agent of their own success’ (Ringrose and Walkerdine, 
2008: 227). This autonomous subject is supposedly empowered not only by their productive 
capabilities (as with industrial socio-economic systems) but also by their consumption choices 
– they are free to choose what they like, when they like without suffering the interventions of 
the state or other socio-economic institutions. However these theorists point out that the 
promises of individualism are often revealed as ideologies through the lived experience of 
																																																								
24	That	is	not	say	online	communities	do	not	exists	at	all	–	subcultures	such	as	B3ta.com	(self	described	as	a	‘puerile	
digital	arts	community’)	certainly	suggest	that	some	sites	still	retain	an	ethos	of	community	–	and	poignantly	in	the	
case	of	B3ta,	do	not	track	their	users	(if	Ghostery	is	to	be	believed).	I	explore	the	mobilisation	of	terms	such	as	
‘community’	and	‘commonality’	by	SNSs	in	further	detail	in	‘Giving	the	Viewser	A	Voice’	(Kant,	2014),	wherein	I	look	
at	the	dual	deployment	of	both	‘individualism’	and	‘community’	by	sites	such	as	Facebook	in	the	name	of	
personalisation.		
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individuals – the social structures of late capitalism mean that one’s success is very much 
engrained in socio-economic structural hierarchies which uphold dominant class and power 
dynamics. My own research makes it ever more apparent that the ideologies embedded in 
algorithmic personalisation do not always correspond to the lived complexities of users’ socio-
culturally embedded experiences. However, it is the ideologies of autonomous individualism 
that I want to emphasise here, since it is these ideologies which underpin contemporary 
algorithmic personalisation practices, even as such practices seek to undermine individual 
autonomy, as I will shortly explore.  
 
The discourses of networked individualism fostered by the contemporary web have led 
scholars such as Marwick (2014), Van Djick (2006) and Bodle (2015) to argue that such 
discourses seek to fix, stabilise and unify user identities in order to efficiently commoditise 
them.  For example, Marwick notes, ‘the move to commercial social software such as social 
network sites, blogs, and media-sharing services has brought with it an impetus to adhere to a 
fixed, single identity’ (2014: 272). These arguments are certainly reinforced by the ‘real name 
policies’ enforced by platforms such as Facebook and Google – who insist that users log on 
with their ‘real’ names when using these platform’s services. Furthermore, Zuckerberg’s claim 
that ‘you have one identity’ (cited in Van Dijck, 2013) that could and should be articulated on 
Facebook seems to uphold a similar ideal – we should adhere to a unitary self that corresponds 
to an ‘authentic’ identification of ourselves, our tastes, preferences, habits and interests.  
 
This notion that we have ‘one identity’ had been problematised not only by Marwick and Van 
Djick themselves but by theorists such as Butler (1990, 1993), Stone (1995), Bassett (2007) and 
Cover (2012), as I have explored. Participants’ testimonies in the following chapters also 
suggests that identity cannot be so easily fixed and unified. More than this though, if we 
consider Bolin and Andersson-Swartz’s (2015) analysis as well as theories by Jordan (2015) and 
Ruppert, Law and Savage (2013), I would argue that the ‘one identity’ argument is also 
 67 
problematised by the contemporary model of user dividuation in itself. That is, the correlational, 
population-size, continuous-time, cross-platform and recursive nature of contemporary 
commercial data tracking does not only seek to fix the identities of specific individuals. Instead, 
commercial data tracking is premised on the idea that individual can be endlessly expressive 
and recursively worked on across platforms – if this were not the case, then the ubiquitous 
real-time data tracking would not be necessary. For example, once the platform ‘knew’ the 
preferences, tastes and demographics of an individual, ‘knowing’ the user and therefore the 
matter of identifying and anticipating them would be settled. But in actuality, the tracking of 
users by commercial platforms is continuous, and is intentionally open to recursion, inference 
and influence (as exemplified by Facebook’s ‘My Ad Preferences’ cited in the Introduction 
Chapter). This suggests to me that these mechanisms do not only seek to make fixable identity, 
but to also to rework identity in a process of continuous, correlationary, real-time flux.  
 
The struggle for autonomy between user and system 
In this final section of this chapter I want to briefly critique the role that autonomous-decision 
making plays in algorithmic personalisation. A number of scholars (such as Bodle, 2015; 
Turow, 2011; Bassett, 2007; McStay, 2012 and Peacock, 2014) note that commercial data 
tracking poses a threat to user autonomy. For example, Bodle states: 
Although Facebook provides real time insights to advertisers and brands to stimulate 
engagement, the company does not provide the same to members, revealing an 
important power differential. Access and control of one’s own data is an integral 
component of autonomy and without it self-determination is relinquished (2015: 137). 
 
Here Bodle suggests that algorithmic personalisation limits autonomous capacity because users 
have limited access to and control of their own data. Though I agree with this (and will return 
to similar arguments in Chapter Four), I propose that algorithmic personalisation is inextricably 
linked to user autonomy not simply through data tracking but in its very principle to ‘aid’ 
decision-making. That is, in purporting to ‘aid’ the user by acting on their behalf, algorithmic 
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personalisation practices actually create a displacement of individual autonomy that works to 
undermine the subject even as they claim to empower the subject.  
 
To elaborate, as was established at the beginning of this chapter, algorithmic personalisation 
practices involve a shift in control of decision-making processes to the system, rather than the 
user (Sundar and Marathe, 2010). Hallinan and Striphas stress that these algorithmic systems 
involve a new form of autonomous decision-making – focusing on Netflix, they state that these 
recommendation systems ‘render algorithmic information processing systems legible as forms 
of cultural decision making’ (2014: 119). Their analysis helps to highlight that these algorithmic 
recommendation systems, which are purported to aid user’s autonomous capacities, actually 
render cultural decision-making over to the system. It can be argued then that in ‘assisting’ 
users’ autonomous decision-making, algorithmic personalisation actually works to undermine 
components of a user’s autonomy even as it aids it. After all; the idea of asking the algorithmic 
system to act autonomously on your behalf is in some ways a paradox – the system cannot act 
autonomously for the user-as-agent without becoming an autonomous agent itself.   
 
It is these autonomous attributes of algorithmic personalisation that open up critical 
considerations in regards to the decision-making processes that are at times ‘given over’ to the 
system in the name of personalised convenience. I propose that the autonomous capacities of 
algorithmic create not just convenient ‘personal relevance’ but also a struggle for autonomy between 
user and system. I will return to this struggle at various points throughout this thesis but 
especially in Chapter Five, where the autonomous capacities of Facebook’s autoposting apps 
actually work to undermine and disrupt participants’ self-performance on Facebook. I conclude 
this chapter then by stressing that the contemporary data-tracked individual is not just 
anticipated and acted on, but also acted for by algorithmic personalisation in ways that create 
space for negotiation between user and system in regards to knowledge production, control, 
(the struggle for) autonomy and identity articulation.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Methodological approach and design 
 
It is easy to theorize, but substantially more difficult to document how users may shift their 
worldviews to accommodate the underlying logics and implicit presumptions of the algorithms they 
use regularly 
 (Gillespie, 2014: 187). 
  
Introduction: bridging the gap  
This chapter seeks to make transparent the methodological framework I have developed for 
exploring the relationships manifest between algorithmic personalisation practices and the 
users who negotiate, engage with and understand such practices. As explained in the previous 
chapter, these explorations are informed by the works of scholars such as Gillespie (2014), 
Agre (1994), Jarrett (2014), Gerlitz and Helmond (2013) and Cheney-Lippold (2011), who 
propose that algorithmic processes which seek to ‘know’ and ‘anticipate’ users create ‘horizons 
of possibility’ for the users who are anticipated; conditions which, as I have sought to assert, 
have critical significance for those who encounter algorithmic personalisation practices in 
relation to their autonomy, control, epistemic knowledge production and identity.  
 
With these assertions in mind I want to highlight Gillespie’s above statement that it is ‘easy to 
theorize but substantially more difficult to document’ the ways in which computational logics 
shape the worldviews of users themselves. Such a statement begs the question: how can one go 
about ‘documenting’ the theorised ‘horizons of possibility’ created by contemporary 
algorithmic personalisation practices and experienced by users of those practices? As 
established, this thesis looks to make its central contribution to research regarding algorithmic 
personalisation practices by trying to bridge the gap between ‘theorizing’ and ‘documenting’ by 
engaging with the users themselves. This chapter outlines how I acknowledge, approach and 
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bridge this gap, and explores some of the methodological considerations that have arisen 
throughout the design and implementation of my research. 
 
I will consider how qualitative analysis might be used to research notions of the ‘everyday’ and 
of ‘lived experience’, as well as explore some of the methodological and ethical implications of 
engaging with human subjects as a researcher who is also always-already an invested subject. I 
will then outline how I use political economy and critical analysis to inform and underpin my 
qualitative research. Finally I will acknowledge another methodological consideration pertinent 
to this thesis: namely, the implications of studying the effects of ‘Big Data’ without utilising big 
data methods themselves. 
 
Three sites of investigation 
At present, the examples of personalisation that could potentially fall within the remit of this 
thesis exist in innumerable manifestations all over the web – and beyond, to web-supported 
technologies and even ‘smart’ hardware such as household appliances that use user-generated 
data to inform algorithmically personalised functions. Clearly attempting to analyse the 
engagements, experiences and responses of all individual users to all technologies that in some 
way incorporate algorithmic personalisation would stretch the resources available to this 
doctoral project far beyond their limits. Instead I have chosen three specific instances of 
algorithmic personalisation as a basis for my research, which I believe share enough similarities 
to algorithmic personalisation as market-driven principle, but which also differ enough to allow 
me to explore how different contexts create specific horizons of possibility for the individuals 
that encounter them. By considering specific sites, it is possible also to consider political 
economic, social and user-orientated conditions that such horizons might incorporate.  
 
The three sites of investigation chosen for this thesis are: tracker blocker tool Ghostery, where 
the focus is on exploring personalisation and privacy, Facebook’s autoposting apps and the 
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moments of identity disruption for users of apps, and the ‘predictive powers’ of Google Now 
in relation to the lived trajectories of those who engage with the app. While the following 
chapters outline in far more detail the ways in which each of these sites relate to this thesis, I 
would here like to explain briefly some of the motivations for choosing these sites.   
 
Ghostery and its users were chosen for investigation because the tracker blocker’s relation to 
personalisation is two-fold. Firstly, as an online privacy tool this tracker blocker renders 
transparent the extensive third party data-tracking practices on which many algorithmic 
personalisation practices rely, and therefore presents a valuable opportunity to explore the lived 
experiences, accounts and negotiations of web users who for a variety of reasons, resist being 
tracked by data trackers. Secondly, Ghostery offers users a chance to personalise their use of the tool 
by allowing a high degree of choice regarding which trackers are blocked and on what sites. 
Ghostery is therefore in itself an example of user-initiated customisation. Thus, Ghostery 
accommodates the study of individuals’ engagement with practices such as data mining, 
personalised advertising, control through customisation and user anticipation. In doing so it 
allows for the exploration of critical implications of algorithmic personalisation in relation to 
user agency, privacy, identity and epistemic uncertainty. 
 
Facebook’s autoposting apps were chosen as a site of investigation because autoposts mark a 
moment of interaction between user and system wherein the system not only makes decision 
on behalf of the user but also quite literally acts on behalf of that user. As I detail in Chapter 
Five, autoposts by third party apps on Facebook (where an app automatically posts to a user’s 
Facebook audience a status update on behalf of a user) represent a somewhat crude example of 
algorithmic personalisation in that although only the user’s name and profile picture is mined in 
this action, in autoposting a user’s ‘algorithmic identity’ performs an identity articulation in the 
user’s stead. In doing so autoposts create the possibility for the struggle for autonomy between 
user and system; a key theoretical implication of algorithmic personalisation that, as outlined in 
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Chapter Two, is one of the focuses of this thesis. In exploring individuals’ engagement with 
Facebook app autoposts, the chapter looks to critically scrutinise themes such as identity 
performance, control and algorithmic governance. 
 
Finally, Google Now was chosen because it exemplifies most explicitly algorithmic 
personalisation by attempting to algorithmically deliver the information ‘you need throughout 
your day, before you even ask’ (Google Now, 2014). In doing so, Google Now facilitates the 
exploration of user engagement with pre-emptive personalisation strategies that not only attempt to 
build a comprehensive ‘algorithmic identity’ of the user but actually use that identity to shape a 
user’s every day trajectory and socio-cultural interactions. The predictive promises of Google 
Now therefore open up a space to explore participant negotiations with a personalisation 
technology that are undertaken not through a framework of resistance (as with Ghostery) or 
identity performance (as with autoposts) but with personalisation in the name of cost-free 
‘convenience’. Thus, notions of user trust, expectation and (mysterious) technological failure 
are here interrogated.  
 
Qualitative methods and everyday life  
As stated this thesis looks to critically engage with users’ lived experiences of algorithmic 
personalisation within the context of users’ everyday lives. Research that looks to engage with 
the everyday lives of individuals enjoys a long tradition in Media and Cultural Studies. For 
example Williams ([1958] 2001) emphasised that it is the ‘ordinariness’ of daily experience that 
creates and facilitates the ‘common meanings’ (Williams, [1958] 2001: 11) that individuals use 
to make sense of the world. De Certeau ([1984] 2002) sought to consider ‘everyday 
interactions’ in order to ‘bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical and 
makeshift groups or individuals’ ([1984] 2002: xvii) and in doing so interrogate the complex 
power relations between agencies/ collectives/ individuals, and institutions/ structures. 
Silverstone argues that it is the socio-cultural structures responsible for creating the 
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complexities of meaning-making in everyday life that ‘become the site for, and the product of 
working out significance’ (1994: 184). My thesis aligns with this research in that it looks to 
explore the socio-cultural ‘significance’ of algorithmic personalisation as a practice that 
structures, manages and potentially governs some components of everyday experience. My 
work also aligns with the qualitative and ethnographic research undertaken by internet scholars 
such as Bakardjieva (2003), Livingstone (2008), Best and Tozer (2012) and Kennedy (2015) 
who use methods such as qualitative interviewing, participant observation and ‘technology 
tours’ (Kennedy, 2015) to understand how users incorporate the use of online and digital 
technologies into their daily and domestic routines. As such the next section outlines some of 
the work on research methodologies that have informed my own approaches.  
 
Qualitative interviewing and ethnographic underpinnings 
As Warren recognises, ‘qualitative interviewing has long been linked to ethnographic fieldwork, 
a traditional staple of anthropological research’ (2001: 85). As I will explore, though my 
research can be considered more qualitative than ethnographic, Warren’s statement highlights 
the importance of briefly acknowledging the role of ethnography in my work.  
 
As a methodology, ethnography and ethnographically-informed approaches have been 
established in anthropology, social sciences and cultural studies for many decades (McNeill and 
Chapman, 1989; Geertz, [1973] 1993). Scholars such as Warren (2001), McNeill and Chapman 
(1989) and Boellstorff (2008) have noted that as a methodology ethnography involves the in-
depth, interpretative study of how meaning is constructed and maintained by social subjects in 
community environments and in apparently mundane ‘every day’ contexts. By observing the 
seemingly natural, ‘common sense’ utterings and communications of social subjects, as well as 
recording the seemingly anecdotal testimonies of individuals situated within a culture, the 
ethnographer’s task is to apply ‘methods attuned to the banal dimensions of human life’ 
(Boellstorff, 2008: 72) in order to create ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1993); that is, to ‘draw out 
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large conclusions from small, but very densely textured facts; to support broad assertions about 
the role of culture in the construction of collective life by engaging them exactly with complex 
specifics’ (Geertz, 1993: 28).  
 
In a strict anthropological sense, the extent to which my research is ethnographic can be 
questioned – my work does not really involve ‘fieldwork’ or longitudinal participant 
observation on a particular site or sites,25 nor does it look to observe detailed social interactions 
in a specific community. Instead, my work looks in detail at moments of lived experience, and 
looks to explore specific themes related to algorithmic personalisation practices. As Warren 
notes, ‘researchers often choose qualitative interviews over ethnographic methods when their 
topics of interest do not enter particular settings but their concern is with establishing common 
patterns or themes between particular types of respondents’ (2001: 85). For example, although 
Facebook constitutes a virtual ethnographic field site26 and although net ethnographies have 
increasingly challenged the idea that ethnographies have to be ‘located’ at all (Wittel, 2000), I 
believe my investigations into user engagements with Facebook’s autoposting apps would not 
have been more fruitful if I had used traditional ethnographic methods. This is because 
instances of autoposting are so few and far between that ethnographic observations of 
Facebook app user interactions would have produced no more relevant data than interviews. 
However, since ‘ethnography’s lens is that of lived experience’ (Warren, 2001: 87), I believe 
that researching even these ephemeral moments can be considered in some sense 
ethnographic; after all, as I explain in Chapter Five, such moments constitute a moment of 
identity slippage and negotiation that can only be reached through the lived experience of users 
themselves.  																																																								
25	As	Marcus	(1995)	and	Falzon	(2009)	argue,	cross-site	ethnographies	are	possible	and	are	useful	for	‘the	study	of	a	
social	phenomenon	that	cannot	be	accounted	for	by	focusing	on	a	single	site’	(Falzon,	2009:	1).	However	as	my	
investigations	do	not	look	at	social	interactions	between	individuals	on	any	physical	site,	but	rather	the	data	tracked	
individual	in	different	moments	of	personalisation,	I	do	not	believe	that	site-based	methodologies		(multi-	or	single)	
particularly	suit	my	research	aims.		
26	See	Koosel	(2014)	for	work	on	Virtual	Ethnographies	on	Facebook.	Hine’s	seminal	work	on	Virtual	Ethnography	
(2000,	2015)	provides	a	robust	overview	of	how	ethnography	might	be	conducted	online	and	on	social	networks.		
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My role as researcher 
All three investigations used interviews and focus groups as the primary method of data 
collection. In using these methods, I looked to interact with users who encounter algorithmic 
personalisation at an ‘experiential level’ (Maynard, 1994: 16) and in doing engage in a form of 
knowledge production that looks to ‘unveil the distinctive meaning-making actions of interview 
participants’ (Warren, 2001: 86).  
 
However in using qualitative methods to attempt to ‘unveil’ so-called ‘meaning-making 
actions’, some pressing methodological questions arise. Firstly, in ‘asking questions and getting 
answers’ (Boellstorff 2008: 34), are qualitative researchers really simply ‘uncovering’ some sort 
of hidden or inherent meaning from participant responses? As feminist approaches to 
qualitative methods have emphasised (Cotterill, 1992; Maynard, 1994; Stanley & Wise, 1990; 
Haraway, 1992) and as Warren herself notes, all research is always-already embedded, ‘situated’ 
(Haraway, 1992) and informed not only by a researcher’s academic interests, but also by their 
own gendered, classed and raced (amongst other socio-cultural identity markers) subjectivities.  
Therefore the quest to find meaning in participant encounters must be reflexively – or to use 
Barad’s terminology ‘diffractively’ (2007)27 – addressed as something not just created and 
shaped by the participant but by the researcher.  
 
As Cotterill (1992) and Maynard (1994) recognise, analysing qualitative data is a complex task 
that must try to respectfully acknowledge the validity of the experiences reported by 
respondents whilst also accepting that ‘an emphasis on experience is not however, 
unproblematic’ (Maynard, 1994: 15). As Maynard states, ‘to begin with there is no such thing as 
																																																								
27	Barad	(2007)	and	Haraway	(1992)	use	the	term	‘diffraction’	rather	than	‘reflection’	in	relation	to	methodological	
approaches	to	knowledge	production.	Barad	argues	that	‘for	all	of	the	recent	emphasis	on	reflexivity	as	a	critical	
methods	of	self-positioning	it	remains	caught	up	in	geometries	of	sameness;	by	contrast,	diffractions	are	attuned	to	
differences	–	differences	that	our	knowledge-making	practices	make	and	the	effects	they	have	on	the	world’	(2007:	
72).	I	believe	that	for	the	purposes	of	this	methods	chapter	both	of	these	terminologies,	despite	their	nuanced	
differences,	sufficiently	emphasise	that	the	role	of	the	researcher	does	not	lie	outside	the	meaning-making	process.		
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“raw experience”…. the very act of speaking about experience is to culturally and discursively 
constitute it’ (1994: 15). Thus, engaging with the ‘lived experiences’ of participants is always an 
act of also constructing that experience, of framing participant accounts and testimonies 
through a framework informed by the researcher’s own research goals, cultural context and 
theoretical underpinnings. However, as Maynard argues, it is this very framework that allows 
the researcher to ‘go beyond citing experience in order to make connections which may not be 
visible from the purely experiential level alone’ (1994: 23/24). In the case of my own research, 
this assertion seems very apt; I am attempting to situate the everyday engagements of users 
who encounter algorithmic personalisation within a theoretical framework informed by my 
status as a Media and Cultural Studies researcher and within a wider critical and political 
economic context.  
 
However this does not by any means suggest that researchers should not ‘take [participant] 
experience seriously’ (Maynard, 1994: 58); as Cotterill notes, it is the researcher’s responsibility 
to allow participants to ‘speak about themselves’ (1992: 40).  In an attempt to do so I tried to 
ensure that participants had a clear idea of how their words would be used in my research, as 
well as ensuring all participants were given time to ask any questions they had about my 
research. All participants were given information sheets and consent forms prior to the 
interviews (see Appendix B) and I have invited participants to see excerpts of any work that is 
being published in which their responses are featured. Taking participant experience seriously 
is not just a matter of transparency however – it is also a matter of how data is gathered and 
made sense of. With this in mind, interview questions were informed by and designed to 
answer my research questions, but also be semi-structured in a way to allow participants to 
respond as open endedly as possible (see Appendix C). Interview responses were then reviewed 
and re-reviewed a number of times to identify themes and strands that emerged from and in 
response to interview questions (themes such as user control over data, self-expression on 
Facebook, knowledge of personalisation practices – these themes are explored in the following 
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chapters and are specific to each study).  In drawing on these this I was eager to allow for a 
range of different responses but also acknowledge responses that did not necessarily fit 
recurrent themes across interviews, and yet still merited critical attention. Ultimately it seems 
important to note, as Kvale and Brinkman do, that ‘the research interview is not a conversation 
between equal partners, because the researcher defines and controls the situation’ (2009: 6). 
Thus, I hope to do justice to participants’ accounts whilst contextualising their responses 
within my own critical framework.  
 
It seems pertinent to also briefly acknowledge that the relationship between participant and 
research is not universally applicable to all interviewees and across all scenarios; a huge number 
of factors – even things such as interview location, as Sin (2003) points out – can affect the 
research-interviewee dynamic, and Cotterill (1992) states that such changeable dynamics mean 
the researcher does not necessarily always enjoy more authority than the participant during an 
interview. To draw on my own research experiences, many of the Ghostery interviewees’ 
technical knowledge of data tracking far outstripped my own, highlighting that the researcher is 
not always more knowledgeable on the research subject than the participant. Conversely, in the 
Google Now interviews I felt very aware of the authority bestowed on me as a researcher; in 
this case the participants were first year undergraduate students who (understandably given that 
I had delivered a lecture to them as part of my call for research participants) recognised me as a 
tutor, and therefore looked to me to ‘teach’ and ‘lead’ them. I explore this further in the 
subsequent chapters, but here I want to emphasise that qualitative research is filled with 
considerations such as these, which should be at least acknowledged and accounted for even if 
they cannot be completely resolved.  
 
Another methodological consideration that comes with attempting to analyse ‘meaning-making 
actions’ through interview methods is that this approach seems to work on the assumption that 
‘people are able to articulate the various aspects of the various culture that shape their thinking’ 
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(Boellstorff, 2008: 68). Boellstorff argues that ‘like language, many aspects of culture are only 
imperfectly available for conscious reflection’ (2008:167), thus suggesting that some participant 
engagements that may be important to the researcher will be left unarticulated by the 
respondent.  
 
 This is particularly pertinent to this thesis if we consider Fan and Poole’s statement that ‘the 
concept of personalisation is slippery yet intuitive’ (2011: 183). The slipperiness of 
personalisation became apparent in my investigations – for example, on its website and other 
marketing platforms Ghostery rarely if ever frames data tracking as a matter of personalisation. 
By extension, it was at times difficult to bring up personalisation as a topic worthy of debate 
with some Ghostery participants, who, in keeping with Ghostery’s discourse and wider public 
debates on data tracking, framed their use of Ghostery as a matter of privacy.28 Furthermore, in 
other interviews, participants were unaware that third parties were tracking their data on 
Facebook, thus supporting boyd and Crawford’s claim that, ‘many social media users are not 
aware of the multiplicity of agents and algorithms currently gathering and storing data for 
future use’ (2011: 11), which added another barrier to the articulation of their engagements 
with personalisation practices. This was compounded by the black-boxing techniques that 
commercial enterprises employ to ‘protect’ user data – as I explore below and in Chapter Four.  
 
However, the fact that at times participant articulations regarding personalisation were limited 
transpired to be a valuable insight in itself; for example, some Ghostery users interviewed 
strongly articulated that they wanted to protect their online privacy – yet simultaneously said 
they enjoyed consuming algorithmically personalised content; other participants displayed a 
great deal of awareness and expertise of data tracking, yet reported that they could never know 
the true extent of who was tracking them, when and how, as I detail in Chapter Four.  																																																								
28	I	want	to	stress	that	participants	not	seeing	Ghostery	as	a	matter	of	personalisation	does	not	mean	they	did	not	
‘understand’	the	tracker	blocking	process	–	after	all,	public	debates	on	data	tracking	often	revolve	around	the	
subject	of	privacy,	and	it	is	I	as	a	researcher	who	is	bringing	personalisation	to	the	table.			
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Participant recruitment 
In total, this thesis draws on the accounts of thirty-four interview participants29 – twelve for the 
Ghostery project, sixteen for the Facebook project and six for the Google Now project. As my 
three investigations sought to map different engagements with different algorithmic 
personalisation practices, my recruitment methods varied from study to study, and were 
complicated by some practical and methodological implications.  
 
For the Ghostery study, participants were primarily recruited through the Ghostery blog – after 
a preliminary call for participants via my own Twitter account, Ghostery picked up on the 
tweet and replied, saying that ‘they might be able to help me out’. I found this offer both 
relieving and disconcerting – I had chosen to study Ghostery partly because it is a 
commercially profitable tracker blocker for users and ‘privacy compliance company’ for data 
trackers themselves, and therefore open to political economic critique. I was therefore 
apprehensive that accepting their help with participant recruitment might lead to a demand for 
data or findings in exchange. However, after careful deliberation and upon clarification that 
Ghostery did not in fact want any part in the research process or ask for any findings, I 
accepted their offer. Upon reflection, I am glad I did; as Arksey and Knight note, one of the 
problems with doing qualitative research is ‘not being able to find anyone to talk to’ (cited in 
Warren, 2001: 87). I encountered this problem in recruiting for all three investigations, and it 
																																																								
29	At	least	four	more	people	participated	in	an	interview	for	this	thesis,	but	these	interviews	were	not	formally	
incorporated	into	the	research	for	a	variety	of	reasons	–	one	interviewee	was	discounted	from	the	Google	Now	
study	as	they	only	attended	one	of	four	interview	sessions,	while	a	Ghostery	interview	was	similarly	discounted	as	it	
transpired	that	the	interviewee	did	not	actually	use	the	add-on,	but	rather	had	a	general	interest	in	online	privacy.	
The	other	two	interviewees	were	interviewed	for	their	technical	knowledge	of	personalisation	practices	(on	
Facebook	and	The	Guardian)	but	these	were	treated	a	pilot	interviews	as	they	provided	general	knowledge	on	data	
tracking/	personalised	marketing	rather	than	their	everyday	engagements	with	personalisation.	Furthermore,	
around	fifty	other	people	took	part	in	initial	surveys	(for	the	Google	Now	and	Facebook	autoposting	apps	projects)	
but	as	requests	for	follow-up	interviews	were	not	successful	this	data	was	also	discounted	–	I	felt	that	that	data	
gleaned	from	these	surveys	was	never	quantitatively	broad	nor	qualitatively	deep	enough	to	be	considered	
sufficiently	robust	for	analysis.	
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transpired that the Ghostery blog was a very successful way of finding participants – with eight 
out of twelve participants recruited through the blog.30 
 
In response to Arksey and Knight’s assertion that participant recruitment can be an issue, 
Warren states that ‘this can be a problem when the topic of the interview is stigmatising or 
when the occurrence of needed respondents is rare in population’ (2001: 87). Although 
undoubtedly an issue in some research, in the Facebook apps study I found I had problems 
recruiting for the opposite reasons – using Facebook apps appeared to be so widely-spread and 
normalised that my call for research participants generated very little interest. For example, I 
attempted at first to recruit participants via public social media platforms – I set up a research 
blog on Wordpress, created a public ‘Plugged-In Profiles’ page on Facebook, and tweeted calls 
for participants using Facebook, Instagram, Candy Crush and other app hashtags. I also posted 
calls for participants on popular news stories on online identity, apps and privacy that I hoped 
would appeal to some people interested in talking about their app use. Despite this promotion, 
I garnered very little interest on any site external to Facebook. Instead by far the most 
successful form of recruitment transpired to be ‘snowball sampling’ (Browne, 2005; Skeggs et 
al., 2008) via my own social network – in the end I gained sixteen participants through the 
‘sharing’ of my call for participants via my friends, and friends-of-my-friends. As Browne 
(2005) notes, snowballing can sometimes lead to ‘sameness’ in participants (as acknowledged in 
Chapter Five) – however, snowballing became the most viable option. 
 
For the final investigation – which analysed Google Now – participants were recruited from a 
first year undergraduate Digital Media Studies course. Participants were chosen from this 																																																								
30	The	other	participants	were	recruited	through	‘snowball	sampling’	(Browne,	2005)	my	own	social	network,	and	
through	recruitment	through	Brighton-based	privacy	events	such	as	‘Cryptoparties’.	I	decided	to	use	this	method	as	
I	felt	that	only	interviewing	individuals	who	responded	to	the	blog	call	might	mean	that	respondents	would	be	
essentially	‘fans’	of	Ghostery,	whereas	I	wanted	to	try	and	capture	the	experiences	of	those	who	were	not	as	
engaged	with	Ghostery	so	as	to	follow	their	blog.	This	proved	valuable	–	for	example	Chris	and	Claire,	who	were	
both	recruited	outside	of	the	blog,	offered	some	interesting,	perhaps	more	cynical	views	on	the	tracker	blocker	
than	some	of	the	other	participants.		
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course as this investigation sought to engage with individual who did not necessarily identify as 
users of this particular personalisation technology. I go into more detail in Chapter Six, but as 
with the other two studies participant recruitment was difficult and in the end I recruited six 
participants. In contrast to the other studies, participants were offered the chance to win one of 
two £50 gift vouchers for their participation. Such incentives are commonly used in the social 
sciences and psychology and although Cobanoglu & Cobanoglu (2003) highlight that using 
prize incentives should be approached with caution in regards to research bias, in this case I 
felt it was important to offer an incentive, because a) I was asking for a considerable amount of 
participants’ time and effort and b) as disengaged users, their participation in the study was not 
motivated by their use of the technology (as it might have been with Ghostery or Facebook), 
and therefore asking them to give up so much time without the opportunity of a reward 
seemed to me to be unfair.  
 
The participants: ethics and privacy 
As a project involving human subjects, my doctoral research was granted ethical approval by 
the C-REC for Social Sciences/Arts Ethics Review Board at the University of Sussex. As part 
of the board’s recommendations, all participants were aged eighteen or over, and, after reading 
participant information sheets (see appendix), all granted written consent for their interview 
responses to be used in the project. In addition all participants were told that they were free to 
withdraw from the project at any time, with the understanding that some materials may at 
some point be published.  
 
Israel and Hay recognise that the researcher has a responsibility to ‘guard a confidence’ (2006: 
78) when it comes to asking respondents to speak about a topic, especially ones that are 
sensitive.31 Such considerations apply to my own research: for example, through their very use 																																																								
31	Israel	and	Hay	note	that	their	may	be	times	when	offering	participant	confidentiality	is	inappropriate	–	for	
example	for	participants	‘who	are	in	public	office	or	involved	in	public	work’	(2006:	78).	
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of Ghostery, it can be safely assumed that most Ghostery users care about their privacy. 
Therefore it seemed very important to ensure I respected their privacy concerns and not 
disclose any information that could be used to identify the participants. Similarly in the 
Facebook autoposting project, some instances of autoposting involved the disclosure of 
sexually suggestive materials or content that participants saw as ‘embarrassing’, and so treating 
participant responses with confidentiality was again very important. Even when participant 
responses do not seem especially controversial, as the Ethics Committee of the AoIR highlight, 
‘individual and cultural definitions of privacy are ambiguous, constant and changing’ (2012: 15). 
As such even though at the time of the interview some topics were not perceived by 
participants as sensitive, all participant responses are anonymised, and so all participant names 
featured throughout this thesis are pseudonyms. However, in a bid to try and afford the 
participants some autonomy and self-recognition in this process, participants were given the 
option to self-select pseudonyms if they so preferred.32  
 
Participant identities: demographics-based analysis   
As Warren and Maynard highlight, no participant response exists in a vacuum – ‘people’s 
accounts of their lives are culturally embedded’ (Maynard, 1994: 23) and ‘the respondent is… 
raced, classed and gendered as well as being situated in the present moment’ (Warren, 2001: 
40). As such, like all respondents the participants of this research can be considered to be social 
subjects whose social identities have a part to play in their responses to my questions. 
Furthermore identity categories such as gender and age influence how an individual is 
‘anticipated’ as part of algorithmic personalisation processes – for example Google’s and 
Facebook’s personalised advertising strategies both take age and gender into account when 
displaying ‘recommended’ content to users. It seemed important therefore to try to recognise 																																																								
32	Even	the	self-selection	of	pseudonyms	can	potentially	pose	a	confidentiality	breach	–	for	example	if	participants	
chose	to	use	a	unique	‘username’	than	they	commonly	use	online,	this	could	potentially	lead	to	them	being	
identified.	However,	all	self-selected	pseudonyms	in	this	thesis	have	been	checked	to	ensure	that	this	is	not	the	
case.		
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participants as social subjects; by myself, by others and by the personalisation algorithms that 
look to anticipate them.  
 
However, as Skeggs et al. note, gathering and taking into account social categories such as 
gender, race and class in research design can be problematic – for example, asking a participant 
to self-define their class can make the respondent feel ‘morally judged’ (2008: 8) and therefore 
lead to inconsistencies in class-based analyses. Furthermore, Warren notes that asking 
respondents too many personal questions can make the participant so uncomfortable that they 
withdraw from the research all together (2001). The latter consideration was especially 
pertinent to the Ghostery project as I was very conscious that asking people who were 
concerned about their privacy for too much demographic data would be at best counter-
productive and at worst hypocritical. As such, I only asked participants to confirm their gender 
and provide occupation and country of residence, if they felt comfortable. Some did not feel 
comfortable giving me this information, such as the self-named ‘Participant’, who declined to 
volunteer any demographic data about themselves. Despite – indeed, because of – this lack of 
demographic information I believe that Participant’s answers remain valuable; the fact that they 
did not want to give me any personal data indicates their position as someone unwilling – in all 
circumstances – to function as a ‘data provider’ (Van Djick, 2009).   
 
For the Google Now and Facebook project participants, in addition to the above demographic 
data I also asked them for their age. Such data did at times prove valuable – for example, 
gathering some demographic data was important for the Google Now study, as it proved that 
Google Now got the gender of the participants ‘right’ and therefore opened up space for 
discussion about how the participants felt about being ‘known’ by the algorithm. Furthermore, 
as Morley recognises, occupation can potentially be a signifier of class (cited in Skeggs et al. 
2008), which may play a part in the taste performances explored in the Chapter Five; 
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occupations (where provided) also add to the richness of the data in the Ghostery study, as 
occupation may contribute to how ‘expertise’ functions in being a data-tracked subject.  
 
Here however I want to make a very important point: the accounts of my participants do not 
reflect the plethora of possible identities that might encounter these algorithmic personalisation 
practices, nor do my analyses look to make claims about how participants’ social categories 
effect their use of personalisation technologies. For example, my research only gathered 
information from English-speaking participants, who were largely based in the UK (with some 
in the US, Netherlands and France), and so I want to acknowledge this thesis does not include 
analyses drawn from anyone outside of these dominant language and nation-state boundaries. I 
hope however that future research can base itself in other linguistic and national socio-cultural 
contexts, not to ‘speak for’ those languages and countries (my analysis does not ‘speak for’ the 
UK’s, Netherland’s or France’s web users) but to add to a field of research already dominated 
by Anglo-centric studies. To further exemplify: this thesis does not make claims that female-
identifying participants negotiate personalisation practices in particular ways because they are 
gendered as female. Though I think such notions could be explored, for this thesis to make 
such claims I would require a different theoretical framework (for example one that draws on 
explicitly feminist theoretical body of literature) and by extension be directed by different 
research questions, and by further extension produce different data sets. As algorithmic 
personalisation practices continue to develop, the opportunities to pursue such avenues are 
becoming more and more apparent, and so I hope however that future projects into 
algorithmic personalisation do mobilise such frameworks.33  																																																								
33	For	example,	in	the	final	three	months	of	my	doctoral	research,	when	surfing	YouTube	I	have	been	repeatedly	
bombarded	with	adverts	for	‘Clear	Blue’	fertility	tests.	The	epistemic	uncertainties	inherent	in	algorithmic	
personalisation	mean	I	cannot	know	for	sure	that	these	ads	are	delivered	to	me	because	I	identify	as	female	and	am	
30	years	old,	yet	the	frequency	of	the	ads	suggest	that	Google	assumes	that	fertility	tests	are	‘personally	relevant’	
to	me	at	this	time.	YouTube’s	personalised	advertising	strategy	here	exemplifies	that	though	such	inferences	are	
deeply	apersonal	and	can	be	strikingly	incorrect	(I	am	not	in	fact,	interested	in	fertility	tests	right	now),	the	
categorisation	of	my	subjectivity	as	gendered	and	aged	has	a	potentially	profound	effect	on	the	ways	and	means	in	
which	I	am	anticipated	and	acted	on	by	Google’s	personalisation	algorithms.	It	seems	that	algorithmic	
personalisation	might	doubly	entail	‘women’s	work’	(Jarrett,	2013:	14)	–	wherein	the	domestic,	reproductive	and		
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Instead, the research here attempts to explore participants’ accounts that are always-already 
situated within socio-cultural normative tastes and practices – practices that are specific to their 
lived experiences and are therefore contingent on context-specific parameters of taste, class 
and cultural preference (amongst other factors). That is, in my analysis ‘there is no attempt to 
claim an ability to generalize to a specific population, but instead the findings are relevant from 
the perspective of the user of the findings’ (Bailey cited in Rudestam & Newston, 2007: 106). 
Thus, participant responses that inform this thesis should not be taken as representative of 
Ghostery, Google Now, or Facebook users as a whole – rather their testimonies are explored 
here to highlight the ways in which algorithmic personalisation intervenes in identity 
performances, negotiations and socio-cultural practices that are always-already embedded in 
pre-existing frameworks of socio-cultural and economic norms, negotiations and practices.  
 
Political economy 
As Chapter Two explored, the wide-spread implementation of algorithmic personalisation 
practices across many contemporary web platforms is motivated by business logics and 
revenue generation: many free-to-use platforms look to anticipate their users in some way in 
order to make their sites profitable. As such, it is important to acknowledge that web users are 
situated within a framework that positions them as ‘data providers’ (Van Djick, 2009) in wider 
set of socio-economic relations. A political economy is useful as a methodological approach for 
this research because as Murdock and Golding (2005), Martellart and Martellart (1998) 
Greenstein & Esterhuyan (2006) and Bettig (1996) emphasise, political economy is useful for 
identifying the ‘underlying social relations’ between market logics and individual needs and 
interactions (Greenstein and Esterhuyan, 2006: 15).  																																																																																																																																																																		
affective	labour	traditionally	performed	by	women	has	tangible,	explicit	exchange	value	as	affective	digital	
consumer	labour.	Again,	though	I	feel	this	is	a	valuable	avenue	for	further	research,	this	thesis	has	not	taken	up	a	
framework	that	examines	gender	specifically	for	a	number	of	reasons,	one	of	the	most	pressing	being	that	these	
clearly	gendered	ads	were	not	nearly	as	prevalent	in	the	time	I	was	designing	my	fieldwork	and	critical	questions	
(2012-2014)	as	they	are	today.		
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Political economy interrogates the ‘wider structures that envelop and shape everyday action’ 
(Murdock and Golding, 2005: 61), and in doing so it is useful for situating the responses of 
users of everyday technologies within a macrocosmic set of social practices. By acknowledging 
these macrocosmic frameworks, it becomes possible to consider how economic drives to 
algorithmically personalise user experience might intersect with user engagements, negotiations 
and entanglements at the level of everyday lived experience.  
 
Furthermore, political economy approaches allow for a framework that considers how 
neoliberal ideologies of individualism explored in Chapter Two intersect with the monetisation 
strategies employed by commercial platform providers. By considering algorithmic 
personalisation as a) market-driven practice and b) underpinned by ideologies of individualism 
(even as it works to ‘dividuate’ users), it becomes possible to formulate and ask critical 
questions about how users must negotiate and navigate algorithmic personalisation practices in 
everyday life; how Google Now’s personalisation strategies attempt (yet fail) to interpellate (or 
indeed interpolate34) the user as a worker, a commuter and sports fan and stocks fanatic; or 
how privacy tools like Ghostery might help users resist the economy of data tracking, and yet 
simultaneously support that very same industry.  
 
Bettig (1996) notes that in capitalist markets the social relations created between media 
institutions and media consumers often involve value extraction and commodification of 
consumer interactions; he states therefore that ‘with its focus on institutional structures and 
practices the political economy of communications is poised to help explain these processes’ 
(1996: 1). Referring specifically to algorithmic personalisation practices, Bodle argues that 																																																								
34	Though	Google	Now’s		‘interpellation’	of	individuals	in	the	Althussurian	sense	that	they	are	‘hailed’	as	ideal	users	
by	Google	Now’s	computational	architecture,	individuals	can	also	be	considered	to	be	interpolated	into	
personalisation	practices	from	a	political	economic	viewpoint,	in	that	they	are	inserted	as	data	point	into	mass	data	
sets	(Bolin	and	Andersson-Schwarz,	2015).		
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political economy affords ‘an analysis of asymmetrical relationships between online services, 
advertisers, and users’ in ways that make visible ‘a process of commodification of social labour 
where personal information is turned into product, reconfiguring social relations a result’ 
(2015: 132).  
 
The ‘asymmetrical relationship’ Bodle describes here can also be considered as an (unequal) 
exchange of data-for-services introduced in Chapter Two – that is, web users are required to allow 
their data to be mined, harvested and subsequently commodified in exchange for the use of 
free (at the point of use) and convenient online services. A number of other scholars such as 
Terranova (2000) Andrejevic (2011), Dean (2005), Ekbia (2016) and Fuchs (2010) have 
critiqued this commodification of user data as a form of unjust exploitation. Such analyses are 
valuable for considering how users who encounter personalisation might be commodified as 
data providers; however, I would like to briefly outline why questions of exploitation do not 
provide the central underpinning of my own qualitative research.   
 
Critical political economy and user exploitation 
In his critique of online value extraction, Andrejevic notes that the corporate owners of 
apparently ‘free-to-use’ social networks such as Facebook seek to exploit the ‘immaterial 
labour’ (2011: 89) that individuals perform in the way of both content and data production. 
Although Andrejevic notes that ‘users clearly enjoy and benefit from online activities even as 
they generate value for commercial websites’ (2011: 87), he argues that the value extraction 
from user data equates to a form of exploitative asymmetrical social relations between 
commercial platform providers and web users. Others such as Terranova (2000), Dean (2005) 
and Fuchs (2010) have employed similar critiques, arguing that the contemporary web 
economy mirrors and supports the unequal power and labour relations between labourers and 
production owners in late capitalist markets.  
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Jarrett (2014a) notes that value extraction from user interactions is often framed as a form of 
exploitation of ‘immaterial labour’, which can therefore be explored through Marxist feminist 
frameworks that have long-sought to critique ‘women’s work’ – that is, domestic, relational and 
emotional labour traditionally enacted by women. However, Jarrett notes that such feminist 
works have ‘barely featured’ in contemporary arguments surrounding user exploitation in 
online platforms (2014a: 14). Jarrett argues that by considering these feminist frameworks, it 
becomes possible to critique user interactions on social media not just in regards to 
exploitation, but also in regards to inalienable social relations. For example, she proposes that 
the process of ‘liking’ something on Facebook is commodified because the social relations 
involved ‘are alienated from the user’s individual lived context and rendered into complex 
formulae for the ascription of advertising formats’ (2014a: 20). However, this commodification 
process is only possible because ‘before it becomes user and (usable) data, ‘the “like” is first a 
manifestation of an (already existing) set of social affinities, affective interactions or personal 
desires that satisfy nonmaterial need’ (2014a: 20). Here then, Jarrett argues that ‘the affective 
intensity associated with exchanges on Facebook does not lose its capacity to build and sustain 
rich social formations even if, later, it enters into the commodity circuit’ (2014a: 20).   
 
Jarrett’s arguments strike some chords with my own research because I am not primarily 
interested in if users are exploited – though I agree for the most part that they are exploited – 
but how users negotiate and engage in the largely asymmetrical data-for-services exchange that 
also commodifies their experiences and socio-computational interactions. I am reluctant here 
to describe these experiences as pre-existent or inalienable from the commodification process 
because algorithmic personalisation creates a possibility for a performative and co-
constitutional relationship between user and system. What I would stress however, is that 
though user experiences are being commodified under algorithmic personalisation, how they 
engage with algorithmic personalisation is not simply a matter of exploitation, or indeed fair 
exchange. As Jarrett states: ‘The agency of users is not in simple opposition to the exploitative 
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relations of capitalism but is deeply implicated in their maintenance in ways that require 
rigorous disentangling’ (2014a: 24). This thesis looks to acknowledge the structuring relations 
of capitalism (after all, participants were well aware that they were undertaking some form of 
exchange of data-for-services, as I will explore) whilst at the same time avoiding the binary 
oppositions of exploitation and fair exchange. My research suggests that given the context, user 
negotiations of their positions as data providers can be nuanced, complex and at times 
contradictory.  
 
Studying the effects of data analysis without using Big Data analysis  
Algorithmic personalisation practices relate to the elusive matter of ‘Big Data’ in that they rely 
on massive data sets in order to anticipate the user and infer what is personal to them. Kitchin 
draws on extensive literature to argue that ‘Big Data is characterized by being generated 
continuously, seeking to be exhaustive and fine-grained in scope, and flexible and scalable in its 
production’ (Kitchin; 2014: 2).35 However Lyon notes that ‘Big Data occurs in a variety or 
contexts… one big mistake is to imagine that similar kinds of ends and possibilities of success 
are in view whatever the context’ (2014: 2), and so this subsection explores only Big Data 
analysis in relation to commercial data tracking. Boyd and Crawford’s assertion that Big Data 
produces ‘new… methods of knowing’ (2011: 3) applies to algorithmic personalisation research 
– as mentioned in the critical context chapter, Hosangar et al. (2014) have used big data 
analysis to research iTunes personalisation system. However though Big Data has proved 
useful for some explorations of algorithmic personalisation, this thesis does not utilise big data 
analysis as part of its methodology. I would like to spend some time explaining the reasons 
behind why such a methodology has not been chosen.  
																																																								
35	Kitchin	also	defines	Big	Data	as	‘huge	in	volume,	consisting	of	terabytes	or	petabytes	of	data;	high	in	velocity,	
being	created	in	or	near	real-time;	diverse	in	variety,	being	structured	and	unstructured	in	nature;	exhaustive	in	
scope,	striving	to	capture	entire	populations	or	systems	(n.all)	fine-grained	in	resolution	and	uniquely	indexical	in	
identification;	relational	in	nature,	containing	common	fields	that	enable	the	conjoining	of	different	data	sets	
flexible,	holding	the	traits	of	extensionality	(can	add	new	fields	easily)	and	scaleability	(can	expand	in	size	rapidly)’	
(2014:	2).	
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The first reason is access to data sets – or rather lack of it, due to ‘the logic of commerce’ 
(Chan, 2015; 1078) that limits academic engagement with some commercial big data 
aggregation. Attempts to access commercial data for my own research mean I have experienced 
this problem first hand. For example, during my investigations into Google Now I tried to gain 
access to a number of APIs36 that would make available to me the mass data sets processed by 
the app. However, further investigations revealed that these APIs were designed solely for 
developers interested in developing new Google Now cards for commercial purposes. As Lomborg 
and Bechmann note, ‘the usefulness of APIs for researchers is very much dependent on the 
developers and commercial providers of the service’ (2014: 260), who can ‘freely decide’ to 
impose whatever restrictions they require to commercially protect their dataset. Using Google’s 
APIs would thus have meant reorienting my research to suit the governing logic of Google – 
and considering that one of the aims of this thesis is to explore how the ‘horizons of 
possibility’ created by algorithmic personalisation might govern individual interaction, to 
reorient my methodological approach to suit the APIs on offer felt antithetical, even 
hypocritical, to the research aims of this thesis.  
 
The restricted research capabilities of APIs leads to my next methodological consideration of 
big data analysis: that is, ethics. As Lomborg and Bechmann note, the collection of mass data 
sets, especially through social media, give rise to a host of ethical issues surrounding sensitive 
information and informed consent (2014: 261–262). They write ‘the issue of whether to ask 
participants for their consent does not per se disappear just because the data are made publicly 
available’ (2014: 261). Therefore, even if I could access Google Now’s databases, the question 
																																																								
36	Lomborg	and	Bechmann	define	an	API	as	‘an	interface	of	a	computer	program	that	allows	the	software	to	“speak”	
with	other	software.	This	enables	the	development	and	enhancement	of	the	core	social	media	services,	for	
example,	by	allowing	for	third-party	companies	to	develop	their	own	software	clients	for	using	Twitter	or	
integrating	Facebook	with	other	social	media	service’	(2014:	256).	
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remains of whether I should access them; to do so would be to access individual users’ 
(anonymised) data without their consent.  
 
Finally, it seems important here to consider the argument, notably raised by Manovich (2011), 
that those users who provide the data for platforms have neither control nor insight into what 
happens to their data once it has been harvested (a point raised by many of this thesis’s 
participants). In using qualitative methods, my research thus looks to explore algorithmic 
personalisation not just through the lived experience of those users who lack both insight and 
control, but also from their perspective. As boyd & Crawford claim, big data analysis brings 
with it not only different data but a potentially ‘profound change at the levels of epistemology 
and ethics – and as such Big Data creates new ways of knowing that must be reflexively 
criticised to combat the assumption that “the numbers speak for themselves”’ (boyd & 
Crawford, 2011: 3-4). A number of Software Studies theorists have echoed this notion – Berry 
suggests that the increasing reliance on Big Data for forms of knowledge production demand 
we critique the modes of ‘rationalisation’ that such knowledge production creates (2014); whilst 
Brunton and Coleman argue we need to ‘get closer to the metal’ when it comes to hardware and 
software, not in the sense of ‘materiality’ but through interrogation of the ‘dynamics of the 
machine’ (2014: 97) to understand what we ontologically take to be the ‘object’ of study in 
contemporary research practices. 
 
Such theorisations highlight that ‘the numbers’ never ‘speak for themselves’ – the forms of 
knowledge production facilitated by Big Data demand interrogation at an ontological level that 
does not assume that numbers equate to knowledge. To return to my methodology then I want 
to emphasise that although the numbers may not ‘speak for themselves’, those users implicated in 
personalisation practices can and do. Ruppert, Law and Savage seem to argue that Big Data 
research methods allow us to circumvent the ‘self-eliciting’ bias of qualitative data collection, 
because ‘digital devices are modes of observation that trace and track doings. In the context of 
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people, instead of tracking a subject that is reflexive and self-eliciting, they track the doing subject’ 
(2013: 35). I would argue that though data tracking might attempt to know the ‘doing subject’, 
Ruppert, Law and Savage’s own analysis actually problematises how and why the dividual (not 
necessarily the subject) is constituted as a ‘doing’ entity – as outlined in Chapter Two, the 
methods employed by data trackers are often not interested in tracking individuals as ‘people’ 
(Ruppert, Law and Savage, 2013) but rather as assemblages of nodal correlation. Such methods 
to me thus throw the pursuit of knowing the ‘doing subject’ very much into question. 
 
In contrast to Ruppert, Law and Savage, Couldry, Fotopoulou and Dickens argue that ‘equally 
important [in regards to Big Data analysis] is the study of how social actors themselves deal with 
the increasing embedding of quantification, measurement and calculation in their everyday lives 
and practices’ (2016: 3).  Furthermore, the works of Livingstone (2010), Lapenta and Jørgensen 
(2015) Best and Tozer (2012), and Kennedy (2015) incorporate analysis of technology users as 
reflexive subjects, and increasingly projects such as the Oxford Internet Institute study on 
‘Learning and Interaction in MOOCs’ (Gillani and Eynon, 2014) are (re)recognising the value 
of collecting ‘small-scale’, user-articulated data alongside big data sets in order to build a more 
robust epistemological picture of how online environments are used by individuals. The 
agential capacities of users as ‘reflexive subjects’ give them a voice outside of and alongside big 
data analysis, and this voice allows researchers to ask and answer a different set of questions 
from those facilitated by big data analysis alone. Thus, as this thesis hopes to highlight, there is 
great value in analysing the accounts of these so-called ‘doing subjects’; after all, they might be 
traceable but they are certainly still reflexive.  
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Chapter Four  
 
Personalisation and privacy: how do Ghostery users negotiate their 
positions as ‘data providers’? 
 
‘The fact that people monitor everything you do takes away the ability to be you in a sense’ 
          (Chris, unemployed/ activist/ digital miner up the North-West Passage,37           
UK, in interview, 2013). 
 
Part I 
Introduction: Ghostery, the ‘window to the invisible web’ (Ghostery, 2013) 
This chapter is the first of three to focus on a specific site of investigation, as well as draw on 
qualitative interview materials, to scrutinise the horizon of possibilities that personalisation 
creates for those who engage with and negotiate specific algorithmic personalisation practices. 
The site of investigation that takes the focus of this chapter is Ghostery – an online privacy 
tool which allows web users to track and block commercial data trackers that are tracking them 
as they surf the web. The qualitative materials that form the basis of my analysis are drawn 
from semi-structured interviews with twelve Ghostery users. Taking Ghostery’s own rhetorical 
sum of ‘Knowledge + Control = Privacy’ (Ghostery, 2014) as a conceptual starting point, this 
chapter looks to explore the relationships between data tracking, privacy and personalisation, 
and in particular asks how web users who are concerned about their privacy might understand, 
engage with and negotiate these relationships. A number of themes emerged from participants’ 
interviews; for example the notion that though Ghostery affords a degree of ‘control’ to some 
participants, the ‘knowledge’ that Ghostery promises emerged as ‘but an illusion’ for other 
																																																								
37	As	soon-to-be	unemployed	activist,	campaigner	and	non-university	affiliated	intellectual,	participant	Chris	was	
reluctant	to	give	himself	a	job	description	–	in	the	end	we	settled	upon	‘activist’,	‘unemployed’	and	‘digital	miner	up	
the	north	west	passage’,	though	none	of	these	descriptions	fully	encompass	Chris’s	multi-faceted	occupational	
positions.	
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participants, and especially produced what I describe as epistemic anxieties in some participant 
accounts (particularly those who would in HCI terms be classed as ‘power users’). The chapter 
also explores the data-for-services exchange participants have to negotiate, which at times 
emerged as a juxtaposition of data tracking as ‘creepy’ and ‘wrong’ but algorithmic 
personalisation as ‘convenient’ in some participant accounts. Finally, the chapter interrogates 
the discursive framing of identity by participants as a pre-existing and inner formation that 
must be ‘protected’ from the ubiquitous surveillance of data trackers, wherein (as the title quote 
suggests) data tracking ‘takes away the ability to be you’. I will argue that this framing exists in 
tension with other identity formations that algorithmic personalisation demands; that is, 
identity as a flexible, correlational, endlessly expressive and recursive entity that can be 
continuously re-configured and worked on. 
 
As Chapter Two examined, there are thousands of first party web platforms that use personal 
data aggregation as a primary monetisation strategy. However it is not just well-known first 
parties that use data tracking – a host of third parties (Quantcast, Adbrain, Omniture, Audience 
Amplify, Outbrain, Gravity, Audience Science, Optimizely - the list goes on) also use data 
tracking as part of their analytics, advertising, traffic monitoring and behavioural profiling 
services. These services use various computational mechanisms to profile track and target 
users, drawing information from their site-to-site movements, their online purchase and 
browsing histories, their profiles, and their consumption habits (McStay, 2012; Turow, 2011; 
Peacock, 2015).   
 
As noted in previous chapters, marketers that once sought to identify audiences/ individuals 
through representational demographics now use algorithmic processes of behavioural 
identification and abstract, computational correlation (Bolin and Andersson-Schwartz, 2015; 
Savage, Ruppert and Law, 2013). The two thousand third party trackers that Ghostery claims 
to track and block include some of the key players in this newly developed process of user 
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anticipation. Many of these data tracking companies specifically cite the personalisation of 
content and services as the primary reason for the tracking of users. For example ‘content 
discovery platform’ Outbrain ‘recommends personalised links based on each individual’s 
content preference’ (Outbrain, 2014), whilst ‘personalisation engine’ Gravity ‘understands 
people’s interests so that our partners can create more relevant experiences for their users’ 
(Gravity, 2013). Other notable data trackers include the Experian Marketing Service, owned by 
credit report company Experian, Google’s DoubleClick, more than three Facebook data 
tracking subsidiaries, Full Circle Studies, who claim to ‘better understand the likes and dislikes 
and consumers’ (Full Circle Studies 2014), and the highly successful Quantcast who help 
advertisers ‘connect with the people who matter most to them’ (2013).38  The objectives of 
these third party data trackers reflect a far-reaching drive to personalise advertising, content, 
services and interfaces that is currently fuelling a successful, sprawling and largely opaque 
business-to-business industry constituted by thousands of companies.  
 
In the wake of Snowden’s allegations that commercial platforms such as Google, Facebook 
and BT have been aiding the state dataveillance of millions of web users worldwide (Guardian, 
2013; Lyon, 2014), popular and academic debates surrounding online privacy have proliferated 
and have increasingly both spanned and blurred the line between state surveillance and the 
commercial dataveillance strategies deployed by third party trackers. Critics such as Lyon (2015), 
Lovink (2016) and Seeman (2014) have identified a ‘post-Snowden’ state of ubiquitous, 
totalitarian surveillance in which the line between commercial data aggregation and state 
surveillance seems to have collapsed. I believe notions of a ‘post-Snowden’ era of surveillance 
can be complicated and contested – for example by the lack of sustained change in user data 
sharing practices, which suggests the Snowden scandal has had little lasting impact in terms of 																																																								
38	Quantcast	are	one	of	a	number	of	third	party	data	trackers	endorsed	by	‘online	privacy	management	services	
provider’	Truste	(Truste,	2016).	Such	endorsements	highlight	that	despite	criticism	from	factions	of	the	public,	
industry-facing	privacy	compliance	companies	such	as	Truste	continue	to	endorse	the	tracking	of	users	by	third	
parties.		
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user behaviour towards commercial data tracking;39 by The Guardian’s condemnation of state 
surveillance as they simultaneously subject their own online readers to extensive commercial 
dataveillance (Cesca, 2014); or by scholarly work that predates the Snowden scandal, such as 
Bassett’s (2007), but that highlights similar state/ commercial collapses in surveillance-related 
state actions. I will explore the relation between state and commercial dataveillance in latter 
sections of this chapter, but here I want to acknowledge that the conflation of commercial data 
tracking with state surveillance was reflected in the testimonies of participants, and it is 
therefore important to highlight that interviews for this study are historically situated within the 
wake of the Snowden scandal – all interviews were carried out in late 2013, shortly after the 
scandal broke.  
 
Though research by Turow et al. (2015) and Ofcom (2015) suggests that in the US and UK, 
web users’ resistance towards commercial data tracking remain muted (see footnote 39), a 
number of tracker blocking applications have become publicly available to those web users 
who are interested in ‘protecting their privacy’. The browser add-on Ghostery is one such piece 
of software.40 Claiming to function as a ‘window to the invisible web’, Ghostery is a cost free 
browser add-on that displays and blocks the third party trackers that monitor a user’s site-to-
site (and indeed page-to-page) movements as they traverse the web. Ghostery monitors the 
movements of over 2,000 data trackers – ‘ad networks, behavioural data providers, web 
publishers and other companies’ (Ghostery, 2013) – and, through a pop-up ‘purple box’ (see 
figure 1.) that appears on every web page, indicates to a user how and when trackers are 																																																								
39	For	example,	Ofcom’s	most	recent	report	on	UK	web	users’	online	privacy	concerns	suggest	that	‘[t]he	majority	of	
internet	users	say	they	would	share	personal	information	online’	(2015:	14).		The	report	suggests	that	though	web	
users’	privacy	concerns	have	increased,	this	is	geared	towards	fear	of	fraud	or	user-to-user	data	sharing	rather	than	
user-to-company	data	sharing	–	for	example,	the	report	states	‘seven	in	ten	(68%)	say	they	are	happy	to	provide	
personal	information	online	to	companies	as	long	as	they	get	what	they	want’	(2015:	14).	A	recent	report	by	Turow,	
Hennesy	and	Draper	finds	that	though	the	US	public	do	care	about	privacy,	they	are	habitually	‘resigned	to	giving	up	
their	data’	to	commercial	platforms	(2015:	3).	Such	research	highlights	that	through	privacy	concerns	may	have	
increased,	there	has	been	little	change	in	the	behaviour	of	web	users	in	regards	to	submitting	to	data	tracking	on	
the	grounds	of	privacy.	
40	As	Mayer	notes,	Ghostery	is	just	one	‘self	help	tool’	available.	Mayer	lists	Abine’s	Do	Not	Track,	Easy	Privacy,	
Privacy	Choice	and	Easy	List	as	other	tracker	blocking	tools	(2013).	Other	notable	tracker	blockers	include	Tor,	Ad	
Block	Plus	and	LightBeam.		
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harvesting data from their online trajectory. Perhaps most importantly, Ghostery gives users 
the opportunity to block these trackers, either on particular sites or on the web as a whole. 
Users can choose to block as many trackers as they wish, or conversely, block none but still be 
notified when a tracker is identified by Ghostery. As I explore later in this chapter, despite 
attracting criticism for being owned by commercial ‘privacy compliance’ company Evidon 
(Simonite, 2013), Ghostery now claims to have over 20 million users worldwide (Ghostery, 
2014).  
 
Figure 1. Ghostery’s ‘purple box’ (right hand corner). The box displays and blocks commercial trackers that are present 
on the site the user is visiting (2013–2016). Please note the ‘purple box’ format was replaced by a different interface c. 
April 2016, however at the time of interviews Ghostery used the ‘purple box’ design. 
 
 
 
By acting as a ‘window to the invisible web’, Ghostery’s functionality seeks to make explicit 
web users’ position as ‘data providers’ (Van Djick, 2009) to commercial online platforms. As 
Van Djick notes, despite popular rhetorics that champion user content-generation as a form of 
value (for both users and platforms), web users are worth the most as ‘data providers’ for platforms 
and advertisers interested in their value as potential consumers (2009: 47). The positioning of web 
users as ‘data providers’ is especially significant in relation to Ghostery in that, in the context of 
this case study, Ghostery users can be considered to emphatically reject the subject-position of 
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‘data provider’ – implicitly through their use of Ghostery and, for the users I interviewed, 
explicitly through their testimonies, understandings and reported experiences. However, even 
as this position is made explicit to users by Ghostery, it is simultaneously also called into 
question – by Ghostery’s capacity to block trackers from accessing users’ data. This raises some 
interesting questions, especially in relation to notions of privacy and understanding of 
personalisation: how do Ghostery users negotiate their (apparently unwanted) position of ‘data 
providers’? How does their unwilling provision of data to data trackers intersect with popular 
ideas of privacy – and the invasion of it? Finally, what role, if any, does algorithmic 
personalisation play in Ghostery users’ negotiations with data tracking? The discussions, 
testimonies and insights provided by participants offer a range of responses to these questions, 
as I will explore.  
 
Ghostery in relation to personalisation  
Ghostery offers its users the opportunity to ‘personalise’ their web experience by giving 
individual users a high degree of choice in blocking whichever commercial third party trackers 
they wish;41 as such Ghostery can be considered as an example of a service that employs some 
form of personalisation. However, the personalisation practices that Ghostery offers to its 
users differ from the algorithmic personalisation practices that constitute the focus of this 
thesis in that Ghostery affords control of that choice to the user, rather than the system. Thus, 
Ghostery can be considered a form of user-initiated customisation rather than system-initiated or 
algorithmic personalisation. Marathe and Sundar align user-initiated personalisation with the 
power to grant users agency – they write: ‘clearly, the ability to act as a gatekeeper is likely to 
imbue users with a sense of agency, identity and investment in both the process of 
customization and consumption of customized content’ (2010: 299). It is important to note 
however that though Ghostery appears to grant users a high degree agency and control through 																																																								
41	That	is,	those	third	party	trackers	listed	in	Ghostery’s	database,	which	as	Ghostery	themselves	admit,	may	not	
include	all	third	party	trackers.		
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its functionality, the participant accounts that follow suggest that for some Ghostery users, 
such control might be ‘but an illusion’. I explore this in detail below but here I want to 
highlight that the supposed control and agency granted by Ghostery mean that it can be 
considered as a form of user-initiated customisation.  
 
Ghostery’s relevance to my project is twofold however in that Ghostery is not only an example 
of user-initiated customisation in itself but actually renders transparent the ‘back end’ of the 
algorithmic personalisation practices with which web-users are confronted. Ghostery thus 
functions to accommodate the study of user control and choice that user-initiated 
customisation supposedly affords, and also facilitates an examination of how users understand, 
negotiate and engage with the back-end data tracking and anticipation strategies upon which 
algorithmic personalisation practices rely in order to render users’ web experiences ‘personal’.   
 
The framing of Ghostery by Ghostery: ‘Knowledge + control = privacy’  
Though the front page of the Ghostery website has changed a number times (at least five) 
since early 2013 when I first began this research (see figures 2-6), at the time when the 
interviews were conducted in late 2013/ early 2014, Ghostery’s front page was emblazoned 
with the following header: 
 
   ‘Knowledge + control = privacy’ (Ghostery, 2013). 
 
Though a rhetorically convenient ‘sum’ for Ghostery, these terms also represent a useful 
foundation for approaching the critical frameworks relevant to this exploration of algorithmic 
personalisation. As I will explore, in relation to data tracking these terms are commonly 
mobilised as topics of debate (whereas ‘personalisation’ is less so), and can also be used to 
structure a relevant literature framework. I will consider ‘knowledge’ in relation to data tracking 
as it as been critiqued by scholars such as Brunton & Nissenbaum (2011), Berry (2013), De 
Certeau (2002), Gillespie (2014) and Seeman (2014); ‘control’ (or rather the lack of it) in 
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regards to data tracking as broached by McStay (2012), Bodle (2015), and Sandar and Marathe 
(2010); and finally ‘privacy’ as examined by the above scholars and Agre (1994), Lynch (2013), 
Mai (2016) and Jordan (2014) as a concept that demands re-examination in the age of 
networked communication and individualisation.  
 
Not only apparent in rhetorical, popular and critical contexts, the parts of Ghostery’s sum 
(‘privacy’, ‘control’, ‘knowledge’) were also frequently mentioned by Ghostery users 
themselves. Given that Ghostery’s marketing materials mobilise the add-on within and through 
popular paradigms of online privacy, it is perhaps not surprising that ‘privacy’ featured as 
persistent topic throughout the interviews. However, given that the data tracking Ghostery  
Figure 2. Ghostery’s front page, early-mid 2013.                 Figure 3. Ghostery’s front page, late 2013–mid 2014.   
 
users seek to resist is performed in the name of ‘personalising’ user experience, I want to go 
beyond the paradigm of privacy and instead consider Ghostery users’ understandings of data 
tracking in relation to algorithmic personalisation. In other words, if ‘Knowledge + control = 
privacy’, then where does ‘personalisation’ fit in? This chapter looks to answer this question 
through the accounts and testimonies of Ghostery users themselves.  
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Figure 4. Ghostery’s front page mid-late 2014.                             Figure 5. Ghostery’s front page early-mid 2015. 
 
Method  
My methodological approach set out to explore respondents’ opinions, desires and experience 
of Ghostery, data tracking, online privacy and personalisation – a form of knowledge that 
according to Kvale and Brinkman represents doxa, ‘that is, it is about the interview subjects’ 
experience and opinions’ (2009: 36). In addition to this ‘experiential’ component however, my 
enquiries sought to underpin respondents’ rationale behind their privacy concerns in relation to 
data tracking and personalised services – that is, not only how they engage with Ghostery, 
personalisation and data tracking, but why they chose to use Ghostery, and why privacy matters 
to them. As such the chapter also attempts to accommodate a form of knowledge that 
represents respondents’ episteme – ‘knowledge that has been found to be valid through 
conversational and dialectical questioning’ (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009: 36). This became 
particularly important in teasing out participant tensions between perceived and ‘real’ control 
over their data trails, as well as trying to unpick why privacy was framed by some participants 
as an individual ‘right’ that must be protected, whereas personalisation was treated as an 
acceptable and convenient practice.  
 
In sum, I have undertaken twelve interviews with Ghostery users: seven of these were face-to-
face, undertaken in London, Guildford or Brighton, UK, and ranged from thirty-five minutes  
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Figure 6.  Ghostery front page: mid 2015–present (May 2016). 
 
 
to two and a half hours. Two interviews were conducted via Skype, with respondents calling  
from the US and Canada and with both interviews lasting approximately one hour. The final 
three interviews were conducted via email, with respondents completing an interview sheet 
comprised of questions matching the questions presented to live respondents (see Appendix 
C). Respondents were all English speaking, though for some English was their second 
language. Email interviews were preceded by a series of follow-up questions tailored 
specifically to further engage with the respondent’s initial comments. By following the email 
interviews with further questions, these email exchanges sustained a dialogical quality 
comparable to the live interviews. As the previous chapter stresses, it is important to emphasise 
that the participants interviewed here are not necessarily representative of the whole Ghostery 
user-base: instead user accounts are here analysed within the context of their own specific 
negotiations with Ghostery and third party data tracking/ personalisation practices.  In keeping 
with Ghostery’s own assertion that ‘control + knowledge = privacy’, I have thematically 
arranged the following analysis to fit their sentiments.  
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Part II 
‘Control’:  Ghostery as a tool for consent & control 
As previously stated, ‘control’ is rhetorically presented by Ghostery’s marketing materials to be 
a required part of the sum, that together with ‘knowledge’ equates to ‘privacy’. How then did 
interview participants understand and negotiate notions of ‘control’ in the context of the data 
tracking that Ghostery not only reveals but also attempts to block? 
 
For almost all respondents, the lack of control over their data emerged as a central topic of 
concern. For respondents such as Yoda (IT user support officer, UK), Gyrogearsloose 
(unemployed, Canada), Katherine (Managing Director, Netherlands) and Mary (web developer, 
US),42 Ghostery was (at least initially) framed as an opportunity to intervene and respond to the 
data tracking involuntarily imposed on these web users. For example, when I asked Mary why 
she used Ghostery, she replied: 
I use quite a few add-ons to try and prevent tracking and things… you know, 
[Ghostery] was just another way to have more control over what was going on in 
the browser… it sort of allows you to be a little bit more in control of things.   
 
She added she felt she ‘had absolutely no control over this data’ (that is, the data that 
third parties, without Ghostery, could potentially collect), whilst Gyrogearsloose’s 
interview started with a very positive description of Ghostery: ‘I love it, it shows me what 
it is that’s tracking... and it allows me to turn it off and on at will’. Similarly, Yoda stated 
in regards to his Ghostery use that ‘it’s all about control and who has that control’ and 
Katherine, as part of her explanation of her motivations for downloading Ghostery, 
stated: 
You want to be in control of who accesses whatever you are doing on the internet, and 
currently you aren’t so you don’t know exactly what will happen with the data, especially 
when firms like Ad Track [one of the trackers Ghostery flags] start to sell it to 
merchants or try to amass huge amounts of data about you. 
 																																																								
42	See	Appendix	A	for	full	interview	list	and	further	interview	details.	
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These accounts thus suggest that the high degree of control, rendered possible by a large 
number of customisable settings, was a clear motivation for use of Ghostery. The works of 
scholars such as Turow et al. (2015), Peacock (2015) and McStay (2012) suggest that on the 
contemporary web, ‘people have little control of their everyday data’ (Turow, 2015: 5), and so 
web users with privacy concerns are increasingly turning to tracker blocking tools to attempt to 
‘take back control’ of their data trails (Peacock, 2015). In some ways then, the finding that 
Ghostery gives these participants a sense of control is perhaps unsurprising: as its own 
marketing sum exemplifies, this is what Ghostery sets out to do. 
 
What I do want to highlight here though is that, if we consider Ghostery to be an example of 
user-initiated customisation, it becomes apparent that the high degree of user choice written 
into Ghostery’s functionality resulted in some participants feeling more ‘in control’ of a 
situation in which the third party trackers has afforded them none. This increased degree of 
perceived control afforded through Ghostery highlights the crucial difference between user-
initiated customisation (here represented through Ghostery) and system-initiated 
personalisation (here represented by third party data tracking practices). As Sundar and 
Marathe note, ‘customizable systems’ inherently ‘gives high priority to user control and 
involvement, and therefore place users in the “driver’s seat”’ (2010: 301). In doing so Sundar & 
Marathe argue that UIC practices afford respondents a ‘greater sense of control’ (2010: 312), 
which is certainly what Ghostery seems to be doing here. However, in the next section I want 
to complicate this by exploring participant acknowledgements that this sense of control might 
be just that: a sense rather than a tangibly effective tool for taking ownership of their data trail. 
The perceived control that Ghostery affords as an example of UIC is very much problematised 
when considered alongside the second part of Ghostery’s sum – that is ‘knowledge’.  
 
‘Knowledge’: Ghostery as a tool that creates uneasy insight   
‘Ignorance is bliss’ (Gyrogearsloose, in interview, 2013). 
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 ‘Ghostery has given me a false sense of security’ (Claire, in interview, 2013). 
‘In reality, I have no illusion that my data trail is covered up’ (Christopher, in interview, 2013). 
 
Though ‘control’ was discussed by the Ghostery users I interviewed in relatively 
straightforward terms, the ‘knowledge’ that Ghostery affords revealed a complex and nuanced 
set of negotiations for many participants. In his paper ‘The Social Epistemologies of Software’, 
Berry explores the ‘computational social epistemologies that we have increasingly grown to 
take for granted in computational society’ (2012: 381). Referring specifically to Ghostery, Berry 
examines the impact of data tracking on web users’ experiences of the internet. He recognises 
the opacity of the data tracking industry in relation to the web users it seeks to track:  
[W]eb bugs, beacons, pixels and tags, as they are variously called, form part of the 
darknet surveillance network43 that users rarely see even though it is profoundly 
changing their experience of the internet in real time by attempting to second 
guess, tempt, direct and nudge behaviour in particular directions (2012: 384). 
  
Mirroring Brunton and Nissenbaum’s (2011) notion of ‘epistemic asymmetry’ defined in 
Chapter Two, Berry here recognises the lack of epistemological insight afforded to users in the 
context of ubiquitous and sprawling data tracking. Berry invokes Ghostery to shed some light 
on the ‘subterranean depths’ of commercial data tracking, arguing that tracker blockers such as 
Ghostery can be used as tools to make visible the actions of data trackers. My question here 
then is, do participants use Ghostery in a similar way? To what extent can Ghostery create 
pathways for new epistemological understandings?  
 
For some participants, Ghostery’s capacity not just to block but actually make visible third 
party trackers resulted in an increased feeling of ‘insight’ for many participants. For participants 
such as Christopher and HelloKitty, Ghostery’s capacity to render visible previously invisible 
third party trackers was relatively welcome and straightforward – for example, Christopher, 																																																								43	The	term	‘darknet’	is	also	used	to	refer	to	specialised	and	usually	conspicuous	internet	networks	that	can	be	only	
be	accessed	through	specific	softwares	(BBC,	2006).	However	here	Berry	uses	the	term	to	refer	to	the	commercial	
third	party	data	tracking	networks	that	Ghostery	seeks	to	render	visible	and	block.			
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(Senior Systems engineer, USA) stated that he finds the trackers that Ghostery displays ‘mildly 
interesting; when I see them, I think “nice try, evil marketing company”’. Similarly HelloKitty 
(unemployed, UK), stated that ‘I enjoy it so much to see all these names [in Ghostery’s blocked 
list] and they are blocked’. Christopher’s and HelloKitty’s sentiments here suggest that there is 
affective pleasure to be found in the knowledge that these explicitly unwelcome trackers have 
been successfully thwarted, blocked by Ghostery’s software – hence Christopher’s reply of 
‘nice, try evil marketing company’.  
 
However, for other respondents, Ghostery’s capacity to enlighten the user was seen as 
something of a double-edged sword. For example, Edward (occupation undisclosed, France) 
actively stated that one of the reasons he disliked Ghostery was because of the insight it 
provides; when asked what he didn’t like about Ghostery, he stated – ‘The only thing I don’t 
like is that it has forced my [sic] to open my eyes to what is happening and I feel overly self-
conscious.’ Similarly, when asked what she liked about Ghostery, Claire (student, UK) replied: 
It gives me a false sense of security in terms of having data tracking… I like the fact 
that you can see, I just think it’s interesting to see who’s trying to harvest my 
information, say Facebook for example, I’m not even on Facebook and yet 
they’re trying to steal my stuff [my emphasis]. 
 
In contrast then to Christopher and HelloKitty, who see the display of trackers by Ghostery as 
a welcome insight into a practice to which they were formerly unaware, Claire’s response to the 
insight that Ghostery affords is more ambivalent – welcome, in that is offers a sense of 
‘security’, yet met with scepticism because this security may be false. Claire was not the only 
participant to suggest that the insight Ghostery provides is a mixed blessing. For example, 
Gyrogearsloose’s initial enthusiasm for Ghostery became increasingly nuanced throughout our 
interview. Despite his earlier assertion that he ‘loves’ Ghostery because he can see who is 
tracking him, when asked ‘what does he know about the trackers that are tracking him’, 
Gyrogearsloose replied that:  
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I know nothing about them, er, some of them are kind of self-evident by their 
name but most of them I know nothing and very few do I actually get curious to 
see what they are, I don’t know anything really about the trackers themselves… 
Ignorance is bliss [laughs]. 
 
Gyrogearsloose’s insights suggest that Ghostery’s initial ability to make ‘visible’ tracker 
blockers does not necessarily equate to increased ‘knowledge’; although Ghostery does 
provide some information about the trackers it blocks, Gyrogearsloose does not feel 
‘curious’ about them to find out what or who they are. However, Gyrogearsloose has a 
general idea what the trackers do with his information – he stated when asked what he 
thinks trackers do with his data that:  
Well the most obvious is ads directed y’know, to the individual based on their 
searches and y’know the sites that they visit, the rest of the information I assume is 
probably passed on… That’s probably what it is, you know compiling data on 
demographics and you know interest preferences and things like that. 
 
This somewhat uncertain knowledge sits in uneasy relation to his assertion that he 
‘knows nothing about trackers’ – Gygrogearsloose does indeed know something about 
them in a universal sense, but without further and specific details about how, when and 
why his data trail is monitored, his trajectory as a ‘data provider’ cannot be fully plotted, 
pinpointed or revealed. 
 
Gyrogearsoose’s self-perception as someone ‘who knows nothing’ regarding data 
tracking is a telling marker that notions of ‘expertise’ have a role to play in resisting data 
trackers as I will explore shortly, but here I want highlight that Edward, Claire and 
Gyrogearsloose express an uncomfortable uncertainty over the kinds of knowledge that 
Ghostery can and cannot provide. Though they are well aware that Ghostery can render 
the fact of data tracking apparent, the precise trajectory of their personal data remains 
hidden and unknowable – and so, it seems, despite Ghostery’s very functionality of 
making visible data trackers, ignorance is still bliss.  
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In these accounts, the ‘epistemic asymmetries’ (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011) that, as 
outlined in Chapter Two, are in created by data tracking between user and provider – 
produce what I term an epistemic uncertainty for the user who is implicated in this 
asymmetrical relationship. Ghostery allows a form of knowledge production that creates 
the ambivalent feeling that, sometimes, as Claire suggests, Ghostery in fact offers a ‘false 
sense of security’. As such this uncertainty is here articulated as a kind of epistemic 
anxiety. I stress anxiety here because the epistemic uncertainties expressed by participants 
featured in this thesis did not always emerge as a cause for concern; for example, the 
epistemic uncertainties of how Google Now tracks, anticipates and acts on users were 
expressed by Google Now project participants as a form of trust in Google, as I explore 
in Chapter Six. However, for these Ghostery users, notions of ‘control’ of their data fall 
short against the sheer complexity and opacity of the data tracking they face, forcing 
them to take up anxious positions as data providers that, through a pressing lack of 
insight, can lead to the sense that control is but an illusion.  
 
Questioning the ‘power’ of ‘power users’ 
I will return to why these users continued to use Ghostery despite the epistemic anxieties it 
creates shortly, but first I would like to examine the responses of other participants in relation 
to the ‘knowledge’ that Ghostery affords: that is, those participants that could be classed as 
‘power users’.44 Sundar and Marathe suggest that ‘technologically efficacious individuals’ – ‘so-
called power-users’, are more likely to enjoy user-initiated customisation tools because their 
																																																								
44	The	term	‘power	user’	is	used	by	the	computer	sciences	to	distinguish	between	those	users	who	‘need’	and	
‘expect’	more	from	their	technological	tools	than	the	‘average	user’	(see	Sunder	and	Marathe	(2010;	Bhargarva	and	
Feng,	2004).	The	term	has	an	interesting	double	meaning	in	that	‘power	users’	are	treated	as	both	those	that	need	
more	‘powerful’	computers	(Bhargarve	and	Feng,	2004)	and	which	are	more	‘powerful’	in	the	sense	that	they	are	
more	skilled	than	‘average’	users	(Sundar	and	Marathe,	2010).	Though	I	would	argue	the	idea	that	having	more	
‘skill’	and	‘needing’	more	powerful	computational	tools	should	by	no	means	equate	to	the	idea	that	a	user	is	more	
‘powerful’,	it	is	nonetheless	useful	to	use	this	term	in	the	context	of	data	tracking,	as	the	‘knowledge’	that	usually	
equates	to	‘power’	in	the	term	‘power	user’	is	thoroughly	problematised	by	the	epistemological	impossibility	of	
‘knowing’	in	any	robust	sense	what	happens	to	your	data,	as	explored	below.		
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skill set allows them to feel more in control of their situation (2010: 304). They make this 
distinction between ‘power users’ and ‘non-power users’:  
Power users spend a lot of time using different gadgets and browsing the internet... 
They may be classified as “experts” requiring less navigational support than 
novices… Non-power users, on the other hand, lack the expertise and interest in 
adopting newer technologies and interface features (2010: 305).  
 
To apply these statements to my own research, a number of my participants seem to 
comfortably fit the category of ‘power user’ – Mary, (web developer, US) Katherine (managing 
director, Netherlands), Yoda (postgraduate student, UK), Robkifi (machine learning researcher, 
UK) and Chris (unemployed/ activist/ digital miner up the North-West Passage, UK) all 
recounted high levels of expertise and ‘technological efficaciousness’, and all made references 
to their extensive knowledge of commercial data tracking – often acquired through their 
occupation. The above descriptions and the very use of the word ‘power’ in the term ‘power 
users’ suggests that the high levels of expertise afforded to these individuals make them more 
‘powerful’ than other web users; their skills, interests and insight will lead to a more robust 
sense of control and understanding over the technologies with which they engage. In light of 
this expertise then, can Ghostery offer a form of knowledge that leads to a more robust form 
of epistemological certainty? Can Ghostery afford more ‘knowledge’ – and perhaps by 
extension more ‘control’ – to these ‘power users’ in ways not possible for non-power users?    
 
For many of the so-called ‘power users’ interviewed for this study, their expertise seemed to 
actually increase rather than decrease their sense of epistemic anxiety created by data tracking. For 
example Robkifi explains that his work has led to a high level of understanding of data 
tracking, yet describes the ‘unheimlich’ feeling he himself experiences when he is being tracked: 
So for my work I do realise that a lot of information is traceable and that in order to 
say, to create a website, because of the way the web is organised, you do need to track 
people in order to see what they’ve been doing on the website. So I had a quite a 
good insight into seeing what sort of information you can collect and started noticing 
that more and more, say other entities started collecting other information while you 
were on the web, without ever being asked if it’s OK to collect that data. So it was 
more a general feeling of, the German word is Unheimlich, you don’t feel entirely 
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comfortable, that you would like to limit what is collected, and Ghostery seemed to 
be a fairly efficient way of doing that. 
 
Robkifi’s intriguing use of the work ‘unheimlich’ suggests then that although he may have a 
considerable amount of expertise regarding data tracking, he still feels an uncanny, unhomely 
sense of discomfort around the practice. The use of this phrase suggests that a psychoanalytic 
reading of Ghostery users’ engagement with tracker blocking is quite possible, however, to 
provide a psychoanalytical analysis here I feel goes beyond the theoretical scope of this 
chapter.45 What I would highlight though is that in describing the feeling of being tracked as 
‘unheimlich’, it is possible to consider that the anxiety created through data tracking is an 
epistemic uncertainty that has affective, ontological implications – that is, being anticipated via 
algorithmic personalisation practices in opaque and unknowable ways has implications for 
users’ ontological sense of self. I return to this in the concluding sections, however to address 
Robkifi’s so-called ‘power use’ for now, he goes on to explain that: 
The odd thing is that I work in this field so I’m fairly well aware of what’s out 
there, but I don’t have the feeling I’m on top of it, and I find that very, that 
bothers me and a tool like [Ghostery] probably gives you a false sense of security 
that you are on top of it.  
 
Robkifi’s engagement is thus far from straightforward – despite of his supposed ‘power 
user’ status, he still retains that ‘false sense of security’ that Claire reported earlier. 
Despite his expertise, knowledge and use of technologies like Ghostery to protect his 
data trail, Robkifi’s sense of power or control over his situation as a data provider for 
personalisation practices is very much called into question.   
 
Another potential power user was Chris. A long-term activist, digital critical theorist and 
online privacy campaigner, Chris’s technical knowledge of tracker blocking far 
outstripped my own. Not only highly technically accomplished, Chris was also happy to 																																																								
45	For	work	on	the	uncanny	and	cyberspace,	see	Zylinka’s	theorisation	of	cyberspace	as	‘intrinsically	uncanny’	(2001:	
161)	in	On	Spiders,	Cyborgs	and	Being	Scared,	Causey’s	analysis	of	uncanny	performance	in	cyberspace	(1999),	or	
Vidler’s	work	on	virtual	space	as	uncanny	in	relation	to	architecture	(1992).		
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share his intellectual and theoretical thoughts in exchange for my own. Despite his 
extensive knowledge and use of multiple tracker blocking tools, Chris used Ghostery 
because it was ‘straight-forward’ and ‘easy-to-use’ – though he stated also that he 
‘obviously doesn’t trust it’. Like Robkifi, Chris also acknowledged the difficulties of using 
Ghostery – or indeed any tracker-blocking or privacy protection tool – to completely 
protect your information. He showed me the presence of Ghostery on his browser, but 
added that Ghostery doesn’t seem to always block all trackers that he wants to block:  
I’m looking at The Guardian, I can find 14 trackers. Now The Guardian I regularly go 
through and I regularly block things but it’s obvious that they put different, different 
trackers appear, so I’ve blocked for example Quantcast hundreds of times so I don’t 
know what’s happening there.... So while I use it I don’t bet my life on it.  
 
To counter this reported unreliability, Chris told me that he uses a plethora of tracker 
blocking tools rather than just Ghostery, some of which required programming skills and 
a high degree of computational understanding to use. Yet despite his expertise, insight 
and engagement with a number of technologies, Chris concluded our interview by stating 
that he could never completely protect himself online. When asked if he could track his 
own data in the ways he is tracked online, he replied: 
No. For me to track my own data trail, no. I’m fairly aware, as aware as most non-
experts46... you can’t track your own data.  
 
Invoking state surveillance apparatus rather than the commercial third party trackers 
which Ghostery purports to block, he then stated that ‘if the NSA or GCHQ want to 
pawn you, they’re going to... maybe there’s two or three people in the world that are 
capable of not having that’. Chris’s engagement with tracker blocking then – despite his 
status as a ‘power user’ in HCI terms – reveals that he believes successful control over or 
even simply knowledge of his data trail is a near-impossible practice. The ‘knowledge’ 
																																																								
46	Chris	was	not	the	only	participant	to	identify	as	a	‘non-expert’,	despite	his	high	level	of	understanding.	
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then that Ghostery purports to provide to its users is seen by Chris to be an incomplete, 
fallible and fragmented.  
 
Participant accounts here raise two questions here: 1) Why doesn’t more expertise lead to more 
knowledge and therefore control, as HCI studies such as Marathe and Sundar’s (2010) 
propose? And 2) why do these participants continue to use Ghostery if it fails to provide a 
better sense of epistemic security?  I will return to the latter question shortly, but here I want to 
address the former question. To do so it is first helpful to consider what it means to be a 
‘power user’ or ‘expert’.  
 
As Bassett, Fotopoulou and Howland explore, the term ‘expert’, when used in the context of 
user engagement with digital technologies, can be (re)considered as a flexible and contestable 
term that has been largely neglected in favour of popular debates surrounding ‘digital literacy’ 
or ‘digital competency’ (2013: 10). They note that computer sciences have tended to treat 
expertise as a measurable; ‘to be an expert is to rise about a particular, and objectively defined 
level of competency’ (2013: 14), yet the forms of expert knowledge articulated by these 
Ghostery users cannot be measured in such a straight-forward manner.  
 
Instead, the expertise displayed by participants actually functions to increase their 
epistemological anxiety about what happens to their data trail, who controls it and how it might 
be used. Participants’ ‘expertise’ then is best understood not as a form of ‘power’ but as framed 
within a ‘techno-social system’ that considers expert engagement with digital technologies and 
practices such as tracker blocking to be ‘conditioned by material (code/ software), and by the 
political economy of computer industries and the social conditions of reception.’ (2013: 14). 
Differently put, ‘expertise’, when considered alongside the asymmetries that commercial data 
tracking creates, becomes something that cannot be quantifiably fixed or measured. Thus, the 
measurable expertise that apparently amounts to ‘power use’ in HCI terminology is exposed as 
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the just the opposite – that is, the ‘expertise’ demonstrated by these participants leads to a 
decreased feeling of power over their data trails in the face of ubiquitous and sprawling data 
tracking.47 Perhaps then this lack of ‘power’ felt by these so-called power users is why many of 
these participants described themselves as non-experts – they feel they cannot be experts in a 
process which they can never fully  ‘know’. 
 
I would add to this however, by stating that it is not just the ambiguity surrounding ‘where the 
data is, what it will do or what will be done to it’ (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011: 2) that 
leaves data providers such as these Ghostery users epistemologically ‘in the dark’, it is also the 
cross-platform, constant and endlessly recursive nature of data tracking (Ruppert, Law and 
Savage, 2013) that adds to the epistemological anxieties of ever meaningfully ‘knowing’ your 
own data trail. That is, even if one were able to pin down and control their data trail on one 
day, the constant feedback loops created by recursive data tracking mean that the future of 
one’s data trail would be endlessly altered from day-to-day. As Andrejevic point out, the 
‘infoglut’ wrought by ubiquitous and endless data production means that ‘staying on top’ of our 
data becomes an epistemological impossibility, despite the emergence of tools that allow users 
to ‘see’ who is watching them: 
[A]t the very moment when we have the technology available to inform ourselves as 
never before, we are simultaneously and compellingly confronted with the 
impossibility of ever being fully informed (2013: 2). 
 
Mai argues that the impossibilities of ever being fully informed about our data trails means that, 
when it comes to data tracking, ‘the privacy concern is reconfigured from which facts [data 
tracking] entities know about people to which facts the entities have produced about people’ 
(2016: 198, my emphasis). Mai’s argument highlights that data tracking produces new forms of 																																																								
47	Bassett	et	al.	also	note	that	in	contemporary	societies	there	has	been	an	increasing	‘automation	of	expertise’,	
wherein	computational	tools	are	‘designed	to	shift	the	burden	of	expertise	in	relation	to	using	from	the	human	to	
the	computer’	(2015:	336).	There	is	evidence	of	the	automation	of	expertise	at	work	in	Ghostery	–	as	a	privacy	tool	
it	is	designed	to	have	‘non-human	expertise’	(2015:	330)	in	what	commercial	trackers	exists	and	further	how	to	
effectively	block	them.	Here	however,	the	automated	expertise	is	clearly	failing	in	the	eyes	of	participants	–	and	
moreover,	I	would	argue	that	the	epistemological	impossibility	of	ever	holistically	‘knowing’	the	extent	and	reach	of	
one’s	data	trail	means	that	automated	expertise	in	this	case	can	only	fail.		
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knowledge about users, rather than just collects existing knowledge about them. It is this 
newly-produced (or indeed still-to-be produced, given that users cannot know what will happen 
to their data once it is harvested) knowledge that Mai contends produces new privacy 
considerations, and which I argue contributes to the epistemological uncertainty expressed by 
these Ghostery users.  
 
Thus, if we consider Sundar and Marathe’s (2010) proposition that user-initiated customisation 
is supposed to grant users an increased sense of control, it becomes clear that the ‘knowledge’ 
required to feel in control is not being produced or sustained by Ghostery as an example of 
user-initiated customisation. Though Ghostery is able to provide some kind of ‘knowledge’ 
they are being tracked, it is a knowledge that ultimately creates for my participants an epistemic 
anxiety that they might never know enough in order to protect themselves, no matter how 
‘powerful’ they might appear to be.  
 
Ghostery as a site of tactical resistance – or a site of belief 
To return to my second question: why do users – both so-called ‘power’ and ‘non-power’ – 
continue to use Ghostery if it only leads to epistemic anxiety? Why continue to use such a tool 
if, as Gyrogearsloose suggests, ‘ignorance is bliss’? Rather than use Ghostery as a concrete and 
infallible tool of knowledge production and privacy protection, Gyrogearsloose sees his use in 
more playful, resistant and emotional terms. Gyrogearsloose told me:  
Basically my motivation [for using Ghostery] wasn’t to establish privacy as so much 
as to make it more difficult for people who are tracking me, I mean I don’t doubt 
that I’m still being tracked, but now there’s an added degree of difficulty for 
Google, Facebook and the NSA and Canadian equivalent, you know, and they have 
to find workarounds and I don’t doubt that they are doing that it, but as I say my 
motivation is mostly an up yours gesture [laughs]. 
 
Other participants echoed similar sentiments; as mentioned earlier Christopher’s phrase ‘nice 
try, evil marketing company’ connotes a kind of pleasure in resisting unwanted data tracking.  
Here then, Ghostery is mobilised as a kind of tactical resistance in keeping with De Certeau’s 
 115 
theorisation of the distinction between tactics and strategies. Though both are ‘trajectories’, for 
De Certeau (1984) strategies are far more powerful manoeuvres than tactics. He states that 
‘strategic rationalization’ is the ‘typical attitude of modern science, politics and military strategy’ 
and that it ‘privileges spatial relationships’. He states that strategic rationalization is: 
[A] mastery of places through sight. The division of space makes possible a panoptic 
practice proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forces into objects 
that can be observed and measured, and thus control and ‘include’ them within its scope 
of vision (1984: 39). 
 
In the context of algorithmic personalisation, strategic rationalization appears to correspond 
with the strategies employed by the data trackers that Ghostery users attempt to block. By 
deploying strategies that reconfigure web users as data providers that can be categorised, 
profiled, sorted and anticipated – not just on a single web site but across the web – these users 
become objects of a pervasive panoptical gaze from which, as participants have suggested, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to escape. Conversely, Ghostery use can be framed as a ‘tactic’. As 
De Certeau notes, tacticians do not enjoy the same powerful position as that of strategists. He 
writes:  
Lacking a view of the whole, limited by blindness… limited by the possibilities of 
the moment, a tactic is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is 
organised by the postulation of power (1984: 39). 
 
If we treat Ghostery, as users are asked to, as a ‘window to the invisible web’, its status as a 
window thus here becomes problematic. As participants explained, the control and insight that 
it affords is limited – it is a window, but like all windows, ‘lacks a view of the whole’. Here then, 
the ‘up yours gesture’ that Gyrogearsloose describes is a tactic rather than a strategy.  
 
Other participants used Ghostery as site of tactical resistance not directly against data trackers 
but against other web users. For example, Robkifi also alluded to the idea that though Ghostery 
may not be particularly effective, it is still worth using, in doing so ‘you are probably left alone a 
bit more, because there’s too many, say, even more naïve users than I am that will provide the 
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data that people are looking for’. Robkifi here suggests that resisting trackers requires 
positioning oneself against other possible data providers, thus implying that resisting for him is 
a highly individualised tactic. Such sentiments reveal that though Ghostery cannot offer any 
robust epistemic insights into data trackers, what it can do is offer a what to ‘get ahead’ of 
other users.  In doing so Robkifi’s testimony becomes a kind of individualised response to a process of 
dividuation – that is by employing his powers of individuality, he can sacrifice the other users 
identified and dividuated by data tracking. Such a response thus echoes the neoliberal 
underpinnings of personalisation explored in Chapter Two, wherein the ‘networked individual’ 
(Rainie and Wellman, 2014) is discursively placed at the heart of the web’s current monetisation 
strategies. It seems in Robkifi’s case that the networked individual can also become an uneasy 
site of resistance in the fight against such monetisation strategies.   
 
Given that such tactics, as De Certeau suggests can only be partial against the panoptic 
strategies of data trackers, is resistance to data tracking futile? As Peacock (2015), Gillespie 
(2014) and Brunton and Nissenbaum’s (2011) work highlight, in the context of data tracking, 
resistance is difficult to effectively mobilise because the epistemic uncertainties inherent in 
contemporary personalisation mean that it is hard to discern who or what to resist, when and 
how.48 As such I agree with Gillespie when he states that in the face of information overload, 
users must at times resort to a belief that technologies can offer relief against ubiquitous 
dataveillance. He states:  
 
We want relief from a duty of being sceptical about information we cannot assure 
for certain. These mechanisms by which we settle (if not resolve) this problem, 
then, are solutions we cannot merely rely on, but must believe in (2014: 192).  
 																																																								
48	Scholars	such	as	Barad	(2007),	Hardt	and	Negri	(2012)	and	Best	and	Tozer	(2012)	have	deliberated	the	forms	of	
resistance	that	technologies	might	afford:	Barad	notes	that	technology	does	not	pre-exist	the	‘dialectics	of	
resistance	or	accommodation’,	(2007:	394),	and	Hard	and	Negri	(2012)	note	that	resistance	can	be	found	
everywhere	and	nowhere	–	even	in	structures	that	uphold	pre-existing	power	relations.	Such	responses	suggests	
that	resistance	to	data	tracking	is	indeed	possible,	however	in	light	of	the	epistemic	uncertainties	that	data	tracking	
creates,	pinpointing	the	where	to	resist,	how	or	when	can	be	difficult.		
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I will return to this faith in technology in the face of algorithmic personalisation in Chapter Six, 
but for these Ghostery users, perhaps simply ‘believing’ in Ghostery, despite its epistemic 
shortcomings, offers a form of resistance that might be futile, but provides a form of relief 
against ubiquitous dataveillance nonetheless.  
 
Privacy vs personalisation: the disconnect between invasion and convenience 
As stated earlier, though Ghostery looks to reveal and block data trackers pivotal to algorithmic 
personalisation practices across the web, ‘personalisation’ is not a term mobilised on 
Ghostery’s website or in its marketing materials. Conversely, the rhetoric of ‘privacy’ features 
heavily throughout the sites’ front page and social media interactions.49 It should not come as a 
surprise then that though many participants brought ‘privacy’ into our discussions of their own 
accord, most (though not all) were not immediately inclined to use terms such as ‘personalised 
services’ or ‘personalisation’. However, though Ghostery use was not generally mobilised by 
participants through discourses of ‘personalisation’, most participants recognised that the data 
tracking they resisted was connected to algorithmic personalisation practices – practices such as 
behavioural profiling, cookie aggregation, targeted advertising and automated recommendation 
systems. For example, when Christopher (occupation undisclosed, country of residence 
undisclosed) was asked ‘Why are trackers tracking you?’, he replied: 
The trackers are attempting to determine my interests and purchase history, and use that 
to specifically target me with advertising that aligns with my interests. The trackers 
themselves take my information and store it as cookies, or store information in the web 
logs used for regular reporting, use and sale. 
 
A number of participants responded with similar answers that connected tracking with 
practices designed to generate income. For example, Mary stated that trackers ‘are 
																																																								
49	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	as	exemplified	in	figures	2–6,	the	term	‘privacy’	seems	to	take	a	less	dominant	
position	on	Ghostery’s	home	page	as	the	page	as	changed	in	last	three	years.	Though	I	feel	a	thorough	analyses	of	
why	this	occurs	is	beyond	the	remit	of	this	chapter	(which	is	centred	around	participants	engagements	with	the	tool	
in	2013-2014),	it	seems	possible	that	the	down-play	of	‘privacy’	on	Ghostery’s	home	page	might	be	because	their	
front	page	seems	to	be	more	and	more	driven	towards	their	commercial	clients	(who	are	data	trackers)	rather	than	
web	users.		
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fundamentally trying to get money out of you somehow’, whilst Robkifi stated that trackers 
were ‘profiling you’ for ‘valuable’ information, and Claire stated that:  
I think [trackers] are just harvesting up everything they can... I think they are going 
to sell products and try to work out how to sell me things and they are probably 
part of the NSA [Laughs]. 
 
Claire’s comment, as her laughter suggests, was admittedly glib, yet she was not the only person 
to associate trackers with state surveillance, as I shall explore in the next section. Only Edward 
(occupation undisclosed, France) suggested that data tracking might be undertaken for the 
benefit of the user, rather than the corporation or the state; he stated that trackers were 
tracking individuals ‘to get a better understanding of how people navigate on the site’. 
 
Some participants, such as HelloKitty, Gyrogearsloose and Katherine claimed that they liked or 
did not mind the personalised services made possible through data tracking in some 
circumstances. HelloKitty said of personalised advertising and content:  
I like them, I like personalised content but only in such pages as Amazon... [the] 
‘Recommended for You’ section has some other products I haven’t seen that I 
didn’t intend to buy but I’m just browsing, I get an extra idea of what’s there 
according to what I like. 
 
HelloKitty here then trusts Amazon to suggest products to her that she likes – she believes that 
they are successfully providing her with products to be ‘relevant’ to her interests. Similarly, 
Christopher stated of personalised advertising: ‘I think it’s better than non-targeted advertising, 
but I do not like being bombarded by any kind of advertising.’  
 
Gyrogearsloose also stated that though he finds data tracking ‘infuriating’, he was not 
necessarily against algorithmically personalised services: 
I mean I don’t have an argument with personalised advertising it’s the fact that 
they’re tracking you to gear that advertising and that what annoys me. 
 
There seems to be a disconnect here between Gyrogearsloose’s treatment of algorithmic 
personalisation and his attitude towards data tracking – Gyrogearsloose finds personalised 
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advertising innocuous, but the data tracking in itself is annoying. However, considering that, as 
Chapter Two outlines, data trackers do not just ‘track’, they also seek to anticipate and act on 
users by personalising their experiences (in this case through advertising), then this statement 
seems to be something of a contradiction in terms. The embrace of algorithmic personalisation 
practices at the very same moment as advocating privacy protection to me highlights why 
public debates need to go beyond privacy to explicitly interrogate user anticipation; if not, this 
disconnect – between enjoying personalised services yet finding the data tracking practices on 
which these services rely invasive – cannot be fully worked through and addressed.  
 
The data-for-services exchange 
To return to HelloKitty’s response, though HelloKitty expressed a positive attitude towards 
algorithmic personalisation in some circumstances, Yoda, her partner who was interviewed 
alongside HelloKitty, took up a much more ambivalent position. Yoda first stated that he felt 
algorithmically personalised content was ‘sometimes alright’, yet he quickly highlighted the 
problems he had with some forms of personalised content. As a couple that described 
themselves as ‘marketers-to-be’ – at the time of the interview they were planning to use social 
media to start a marketing campaign for their up-and-coming business – they recognised that 
personalisation could be both convenient for web users as customers and yet presented a 
number of problems surrounding privacy, informed consent and control. Despite, or perhaps 
because of, these tensions, Yoda did not dismiss algorithmically personalised content as 
inherently wrong, but did signify the importance of ‘boundaries’:  
There’s a limit, as in, as a marketer-to-be, or whatever, from the marketing 
perspective, I mean was also try to get personalisation and help the customer to, OK 
we’ll provide the best environment for the customer and the experience for him or 
her to make a sale... on the other hand [marketers] need to understand there’s a 
boundary where people just need to be left alone. 
 
Yoda’s recognition of the efficiency of algorithmic personalisation is worth highlighting – there 
are times when the practices used to track users and anticipate them are beneficial to the users, 
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for example by speeding up an online purchase by storing a user’s account information, or by 
providing ‘relevant’ recommendations that build on a user’s pre-existing search histories or 
preferences. Even critics of personalisation acknowledge such benefits; for example Bodle 
states ‘the personalised web can provide convenience, efficiency, interestingness and relevance 
to users who are served with content that they themselves generate’ (2015: 13).  
 
However as noted in Chapter Two, even when personalised services do seem to provide 
relevance, efficiency and convenience, the implications of this success can still be critically 
interrogated. The reductive implications of personalisation on universal and collective 
consumption (Pariser, 2011; Kant 2015) evidence this, as does Bodle’s assertion that 
‘personalisation services benefit advertisers more than users’ (2015: 132). Bodle’s observation is 
reflected in Yoda’s attitude towards Google’s Autofill service, which uses a users’ individual 
search history to personalise search results. He stated:  
If I’m going to go in [to a website], I’m going to search for something, and I would 
prefer to actually search it, instead of having it served somewhere, not because I like 
typing on a keyboard, it’s because, why would, I just feel, I’m a freak, why would you 
have, why on earth would you, I know it’s for my convenience at the end of the day, 
but the fact of the matter is I know it’s not for my convenience, it’s for your 
convenience... and I don’t like it one bit.  
 
Yoda’s cautious, self-perceived ‘freakish’ response towards Autofill exposes a duality 
embedded in its functionality as a personalised service; that is, they are not only designed 
to offer efficiency to the user but they are efficient to the provider in that they are 
designed, either explicitly or implicitly, to generate income.  This might be an obvious 
point, but for Yoda and for a number of participants this duality revealed an ambivalent 
engagement with algorithmically personalised services, especially in relation to the data 
tracking that all participants sought, through their very use of Ghostery, to resist. Yoda 
feels that he is acting irrationally when he rejects the convenience of Autofill (‘I’m a freak, 
why would you, why on earth...’), not because he prefers the seemingly unnecessary extra 
labour of ‘typing on a keyboard’ when Autofill could easily complete his search request for 
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him, but because he believes that the Autofill function is not just convenient for him, but 
convenient too for Google. Yoda’s problem with this is rendered apparent in the 
following exchange:  
 
Yoda: Most people can’t understand how big big data is, they just cannot understand 
that. And how a third party can be sold on third party. 
 
HelloKitty: Yeah we sell ourselves. 
 
Yoda: Because in the end, we are the product. 
 
Interviewer: It might sound like an obvious question, but you guys aren’t comfortable being the 
product?  
 
Yoda: Well, if I were to be a product, I would’ve first of all liked to know about it, 
and second of all I would like to agree on it.  
 
Thus, Yoda’s status as a ‘product’ problematises his engagement with the personalised 
services that he knows fuels the data tracking he seeks to resist – again notions of knowledge 
(‘if I were to be a product, I would’ve first of all liked to know about it’) and control through 
consent (‘and second of all I would like to agree on it’) become significant.  
 
Yet these two problems surface through a third problem for Yoda and HelloKitty – that is, 
the commodification of the personal data which call them into being as not web users, but as 
products and also producers; they are the data providers that scholars such as Andrejevic 
(2011) and Fuchs (2010) claim are unfairly exploited through the extraction of value from 
their data trails. The value extraction that Yoda alludes to is not quite as simply summed up as 
unjust exploitation however – he knows he is being offered free and convenient services in 
exchange for his data; it is the lack of control and consent currently embedded in the 
conditions of his status as a ‘product’ that seems to cause the most ambivalence. Here then, 
the immaterial labour identified by Fuchs and Andrejevic starts to emerge, but is not explicitly 
framed as exploitation by these participants. Instead Yoda and HelloKitty accept that their 
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social interactions are being commodified, however their concerns lie on their sense of 
control (or rather lack of it) in the commodification process.  
 
Other participants also made similar distinctions to Yoda’s. For example, Mary was careful 
to make the distinction between unwanted algorithmic personalisation (such as that which 
was rendered possible by third party data trackers) and algorithmic personalisation 
practices to which she had explicitly consented. When talking about a form of 
personalisation she actively enjoyed – that is the recommended section of the GoodReads 
App – she states:  
[The Goodreads app] is something where I’m going out and I’m saying, I want to read 
books… it’s not like they are pushing this as in sending me constant emails about it, 
ooo, have you considered such and such a book, I go to the website and I look at the 
recommendations, I am the one in control here… [Yet] Mostly it feels like when [other 
sites] are talking about making things personalised to you, it feels like what they are 
doing is not a service to me, it’s a service to capitalism maybe.  
 
Similarly, Katherine went on to make a clear distinction between the forms of data 
tracking she feels that she has consented to, and the types she has not:  
 
When you sign up for a free service, that’s the choice you make, you go on 
Google and you sign up for an account, everything you do on Google, that is 
being tracked and they have this huge database and they know a lot about you. 
But that is a choice because they provide you with a service and you decide to do 
that. With all these trackers, you don’t know that they are there, you don’t know 
why they are gathering that information, they don’t know what they are going to 
do with it and that is basically what bothers me. 
 
Such sentiments thus suggest that data tracking is acceptable as long as it constitutes a form of 
‘exchange’ for a free service – many users perceive being tracked is ‘worth it’ in exchange for 
free services, convenience, or other pay-offs that in some way benefit the user (Ofcom, 2015). 
The epistemic uncertainty inherent in data tracking again emerges as a factor in this exchange – 
that is, in some instances it is unknown what data participants are expected to relinquish, and 
more importantly what (if anything) they are getting in return. Furthermore, it is with third party 
data tracking that this exchange becomes especially problematic: the fact that there are no 
 123 
front-end services explicitly being offered by these trackers, and no form of control over how 
these trackers anticipate users, renders the data-for-services exchange as inapplicable to third 
party data tracking, and therefore, understandably unwelcome by participants. Privacy 
advocates such as McStay have thus called for more transparency in third party tracking, since 
it is only through transparency that we can give informed consent. He states that ‘if we freely 
and voluntarily consent, behavioural advertising is acceptable, if not it is not’ (2012: 602).  
 
This data-for-services exchange is one that arose in all three of my investigations, and it is an 
exchange that has been explored by many scholars such as Peacock (2015), Gillespie (2014), 
McStay (2012), Lapenta and Jørgenson (2015), Jordan (2015) and Bassett (2013). For example, 
Bassett points out, this exchange is unavoidable in that in underpins the entire online economy 
operating in the marketised internet: 
The contract is very clear; social media demands personal data donation as the 
price for full engagements in those forms of communication that are becoming 
intrinsic to everyday life and that increasingly shape it. This exchange is the central 
component of what has emerged over at least a decade and a half as the standard 
model of the commoditized virtual community of all kinds (2013: 4). 
 
 I agree with Bassett that this exchange is a central component of the web economy – as 
Chapters Two and Three stress, the user data collected in this contract is what makes 
possible the drive to anticipate users in the name of a ‘personalised’ web. However, I 
would contend here that participant negotiations in this exchange suggest that the 
contract is perhaps not always ‘very clear’ – though participants’ accept some types of first-
party tracking, they reject or challenged others.  
 
In some ways these users’ negotiations are understandable – with only limited ‘tactics’ 
available to web users against data trackers’ ‘strategies’ (De Certeau [1984] 2002), the 
ambivalent and tentative acceptance of the data-for-services exchange might be the only 
viable option. I would argue however that users’ acceptance of this contract is justified 
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through a logic of individualism that accepts data tracking as a form of commodified 
exchange: users will relinquish data if they feel it is convenient and beneficial to their own 
web consumption. The benefits of this exchange are therefore recognised even by these 
privacy-concerned participants, who through tense negotiation seem to grudgingly accept 
the contract as long as they feel that ‘the price is right’. I will return to the ontological 
implications of accepting this tense and uncertain exchange in the concluding sections of 
this chapter; here though I want to briefly acknowledge Ghostery’s own position as a 
commercial, data-driven service provider.  
 
Ghostery’s own data-for-services exchange 
It is important here to consider Ghostery’s own position, because it is a cost-free 
service that offers tracker blocking tools to its users in exchange for data. As some 
participants were aware, Ghostery is owned by Evidon, which performs data tracking 
practices on its own users. This takes the form of an ‘opt-in’ feature on Ghostery called 
‘Ghostrank’, which tracks users as part of the privacy compliance packages that Evidon 
offer as a component of their commercial services. The tracking that Ghostery 
performs on its own users has been met by criticism, such as Simonite who points out 
that:  
Those who advocate Ghostery as a way to escape the clutches of the online ad 
industry may not realize that the company behind it, Evidon, is in fact part of that 
selfsame industry (2013: np). 
 
Evidon has repeatedly defended themselves by emphasising the fact that Ghostrank is very-
much ‘opt-in’ rather than ‘opt-out’ and that users are made fully aware that they don’t have to 
use it. Interview discussions of Evidon’s own data-for-services exchange produced a range of 
answers.  For example Robkifi stated that:  
I don’t know, if you want to do something like this right, you do need data, there’s no 
way around it. But they present themselves a little bit, when I first encountered them 
they presented themselves more as a not-for-profit organisation that just offered to, 
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more out of ideology than out of commercial motivations so I suppose it’s a little bit 
disappointing that that’s not the case. But then again I’m not too bothered by that.  
 
Chris, Katherine and Claire pointed out that it could be seen as hypocritical, or at least 
counterproductive, that Ghostery seeks to collect this data, yet Claire and Katherine, like 
Robkifi, felt this was understandable in order for Evidon to make profit to provide them with a 
free service. Other respondents such as Katie (activist, UK) actually decided to stop using 
Ghostery after finding out that they were owned by Evidon; for Katie, Ghostery’s commercial 
affiliations resulted in the decision to reject their services altogether.  
 
Most tellingly, all participants decided not to opt-in to Ghostrank. This included respondents who felt 
that Evidon’s need to generate profit from Ghostery was understandable. Here then, Ghostery 
in itself represents a site of uneasy negotiations for its users in that, even in the act of tracker 
blocking itself, they must weigh up the risks and benefits of exchanging certain types of data 
for a free service. Again the individualistic logic of choosing to opt-out of services that rely on 
the data of other web users is here implied; if all users decided not to opt-in to Ghostrank, then 
Ghostery would potentially not be available as a free service that these participants enjoy. Such 
tactics are understandable for these participants who feel increasingly powerless in the face of 
data tracking – in a tactical environment that limits resistance to data tracking, highly 
individualised responses might be the only option. Yet, the choice to protect themselves as 
individuals is a telling indication that the services-for-data exchange that underpins so many 
free-to-use services must be confronted and negotiated in all kinds of situations, even in the act 
of resisting data tracking itself.  
 
The sum of ‘knowledge’ and ‘control’? Personalisation and formations of the self 
You can no longer choose to present yourself to the world, because you can’t hide all the scuzzy 
bits. 
                                                                                                                          (Chris)  
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As previously mentioned, due in part to Ghostery’s own framing of their add-on, 
‘privacy’ was discursively pre-established as the primary vernacular through which to 
discuss participants’ engagements with tracker-blocking. It therefore seemed important to 
spend some times during interviews on the subject. However, the question of if privacy 
mattered to participants was already settled; the very act of installing Ghostery is a clear 
indication that to Ghostery users, online privacy matters. The question then was not if 
privacy matters, but to what extent did privacy matter? Why did it matter? And finally, 
given the context of my research, how does privacy matter in the context of 
personalisation?  
 
For all participants, the third party tracking that Ghostery exposes was unequivocally – and 
unsurprisingly – posited as unwelcome; data tracking is ‘disturbing’ (Mary), ‘evil’ 
(Christopher), ‘quite horrifying’ (Claire), ‘annoying’ (HelloKitty), ‘infuriating’ 
(Gyrogearsloose), ‘shocking’ (Katherine) and even ‘unheimlich’ (Robkifi). However, though 
privacy from data tracking mattered to all participants to some degree, the reasons given for 
why privacy mattered were more varied. As mentioned, the Snowden scandal was around six 
months old when interviews for this study took place, and Gyrogearsloose, Participant, Claire 
and Chris all mentioned Snowden in their discussions of privacy. For example, when asked to 
what extent data tracking effects his privacy, Gyrogearsloose answered:  
I think [data tracking] is highly invasive but it’s so subtle that frankly, you know, 
until Edward Snowden came out with his revelations I think people were subtly 
aware that it was going on but I think Snowden has made it clear just how extensive 
tracking is. 
 
Furthermore Gyrogearsloose told me that Google and the NSA as ‘probably on equal footing 
in terms of one being as bad as the other’. Similarly Claire speculated that data trackers are not 
only ‘trying to sell something’ but that were ‘also probably part of the NSA’. Furthermore 
during an exchange regarding commercial data trackers and their attempts to anticipate users, 
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Chris stated in response to my question of ‘what’s wrong with being anticipated by commercial 
data trackers?’:   
What’s wrong with being anticipated? … because then we go into the realm of 
thought crime, of people, that are being arrested or can potentially be arrested er for 
their thoughts because their thoughts are considered, they’re considered to be anti the 
state.  
 
So due to all this discussion recently of GCHQ etc etc by Snowdon, there’s been a 
redefinition of the terrorism act and now I’m not sure, don’t quote me on it that it’s 
been redefined because of Snowden but there’s a clause in there that extremist 
behaviour is anything which is a threat to the state.  
 
The conflation of state and commercial surveillance by Gyrogearsloose, Chris and Claire 
is understandable given that Snowden’s revelations uncovered the extensive co-
operations of commercial parties such as Google, Microsoft, Skype and Yahoo with state 
forces. However, it is worth highlighting that Ghostery claims only to block commercial 
data trackers: nowhere on its site does it claim to aid users in their fight against state 
surveillance. Nonetheless, Snowden is invoked here as a kind of touchstone in the fight 
against both state and commercial dataveillance.  
 
Here then the Snowden revelations seem to mark a historically-specific ‘moment’ in the turn 
towards totalitarian surveillance; as aforementioned scholars such as Lyon (2005) Lovink (2016) 
and Seeman (2014) claim we now live in ‘Post-Snowdon’ state of surveillance. However 
comparable moments of the totalitarian surveillance have been publicly marked and invoked 
before – for example Bassett points out a similar conflation of state and corporate surveillance 
in the aftermath of 9/11 and the London Bombings (2007). In some ways then, the relation 
between corporate and state surveillance is nothing new, and scholars such as Delueze (1999) 
and Bassett (2007) have deliberated the conflation of state and corporate surveillance as a kind 
of totalitarian regime wherein commercial surveillance tactics are deployed to fix and govern 
the subject.  
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I want to ask here: what kinds of distinctions/conflations were made by participants in 
response to state and commercial dataveillance? Were participants protecting themselves 
from state or corporate surveillance, or both? Finally how did they frame ‘themselves’ as 
subjects that must be protected from data tracking? 
 
To answer these questions I think it is first useful to turn why privacy mattered to them when 
they surfed the web. When asked why privacy matters in relation to data tracking, 
Gyrogearsloose replied:   
The primary response to that is principle, I mean a Peeping Tom is subtle too 
but you don’t really want somebody looking in your window. 
 
Thus privacy for Gyrogearsloose is understood as a principle that must be upheld – both 
online and offline. Similarly, Participant framed privacy as a right that is being 
undermined by corporate and state dataveillance practices. They stated when asked why 
privacy matters:  
Who in his right mind would question political privacy and secret ballot? Same 
goes for online privacy... If I have the right to vote in secret every so many years, I 
demand the right to live on and offline in private. 
 
Here then privacy is treated as a ‘right’ or ‘principle’ that must be upheld. Claire and 
Katie also framed privacy as moral right or principle; for example Katie told me that 
‘what you do on your own computer is your own business, that’s your right’. Lynch 
(2013) states that this mindset is reflected in popular discourses surrounding online 
privacy. He writes: 
[Public framing of data tracking] makes sense if you understand privacy solely as a 
political or legal concept. And its political importance is certainly what makes 
privacy so important: what is private is what is yours alone to control, without 
interference from the state (2013: np). 
 
Treating privacy as a political or legal ‘right’ is clearly valuable in protecting the sovereignty of 
citizens, however in this framing the question of why privacy matters remains somewhat 
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unanswered: that is, an individual might have the right to privacy, but why do they need this 
right?  
 
In many ways this is a highly complex question that is specific to different socio-cultural 
contexts: for example, as McGeveran recognises, ‘privacy’ means different things depending 
on European or US interpretations of what is legally and ethically meant by the term (2015).50 
Though an in-depth interrogation of the difference in how privacy is discursively constructed 
by nation-states lies beyond the scope of this exploration of algorithmic personalisation, I 
would like to highlight that both US and European conceptions of privacy are founded on 
the premise that ‘the concept of privacy is… intimately connected to what it is to be an 
autonomous person’ (Lynch, 2013: np). That is, privacy in relation to legal or political 
principles protects the rights of the individual to form a unique and autonomous selfhood 
(Lynch, 2013; Rose, 1991). 
 
To elaborate, Lynch draws on wider and well-established philosophical concepts of the self  – 
some of which are outlined in Chapter Two – to argue that to lose the capacity and space to 
think private thoughts means to lose the space to form an autonomous personhood away 
from the prying eyes of another. Lynch proposes that to be subject to the ubiquitous and 
pervasive gaze of another means to be objectified, ‘dehumanized’, and ultimately controlled 
and regulated by that gaze. Specifically in relation to the contemporary data tracking practices 
which Ghostery attempts to resist, Lynch notes that:  
[W]e would do well to keep the connections between self, personhood and privacy in 
mind as we chew over the recent revelations about governmental access to Big 
Data… To the extent we risk the loss of privacy we risk, in a very real sense, the loss 
of our very status as subjective, autonomous persons (2013:np). 
 																																																								
50	McGeveran	highlights	that	the	EU	and	US	have	strikingly	different	privacy	laws;	in	the	US,	privacy	laws	are	based	
on	the	idea	of	individual	freedom	to	act	without	encroachment	from	state	or	commercial	interventions,	whilst	the	
EU	based	its	privacy	laws	on	the	premise	that	an	individual	has	the	right	to	protect	and	control	information	about	
themselves.	McGeveran	argues	that	this	difference	has	led	to	legislation	that	treats	privacy	as	a	fundamental	
human	right	in	the	EU,	whereas	in	the	US	privacy	is	geared	more	towards	freedom	of	commercial	interest	(2015).		
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Though not expressed in the same terms, participants such as Chris, Mary and Robkifi echoed 
Lynch’s sentiments that privacy is a matter of maintaining, protecting and securing one’s 
personhood. For example, Mary talked of the detrimental effects that ‘erroneous’ data 
compiled by data trackers can have on an individual. Speaking about online behavioural 
profiling, Mary stated:  
I mean if some erroneous data point gets in there… [or] somebody has built a 
portfolio about you and your name resembles somebody else’s name… or you 
have a job interview and somebody thinks that you stole something at some point 
because of some erroneous piece of information that somebody has stored about 
you, but you have no idea that’s going to happen… you have no way of saying, of 
correcting these things. 
 
Here then, Mary expresses concern that data trackers might mis-identify and mis-profile her  – 
that is, the ‘algorithmic identity’ constituted through data tracking incorrectly represents her 
‘true’ and ‘correct’ self. Similarly, Robkifi stated that commercial data tracking in the name of 
personalisation has implications for his individuality. He stated of profiling by advertisers:  
You feel uncomfortable, [people] are being made predictable, only, because people 
with your profile use.... Apple Shampoo, that doesn’t mean that you want it, and if 
that’s being pushed on you then that’s not right... There’s a chance of your 
individuality being eroded I suppose.  
 
Though Robkifi emphasised that ‘your individuality being eroded’ was a strong way of putting it 
(he said ‘if you want to make a thing about it’), he suggests that data tracking and personalisation 
practices might result in his ‘individuality’ being diminished.  Finally, Chris framed privacy in a 
way that very much reflects Lynch’s primary argument:  
There’s a definition of privacy and one of them is it’s the way we selectively 
present ourselves to the world, so of course [data tracking] stops that, you can no 
longer choose to present yourself to the world, because you can’t hide all the 
scuzzy bits. 
 
Chris poignantly reiterates that:  
[Data tracking] takes away your agency... the fact that people can monitor 
everything your do takes away your ability to be you in a sense. 
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There are a number of points I want to make about Chris, Robkifi and Mary’s framing of 
selfhood. The first is that these responses go beyond simply framing privacy as a ‘right’; for 
Chris, Mary and Robkifi privacy in relation to data tracking is about protecting one’s 
personhood from being misprofiled, eroded or ‘taken away’ by the ubiquitous gaze of 
dataveillance. Here then data tracking and algorithmic personalisation becomes a kind of force 
from which a user’s sense of self must be protected. This to me suggests that the anxieties 
created by algorithmic personalisation are not just epistemic in that users cannot ‘know’ what 
data is being tracked and how they are being anticipated, but are also ontological in that users’ 
sense of self is open to destabilization or erroneous reconstitution through algorithmic 
personalisation.  
 
The second point I want to make here relates to how Chris, Mary and Robkifi frame themselves 
as individuals. The participants’ sentiments that the self must be protected echo Lynch’s 
argument – but they also configure the self as an entity that pre-exists the data tracking process 
and which can be kept from the data tracking network. For example, Chris and Mary’s words 
especially suggests that this pre-existing self is internal – Mary has a ‘true’ self that can be 
misprofiled, whilst Chris has ‘scuzzy bits’ that can and should be hidden. This existence of an 
inner, pre-existing and even ‘true’ self, as Chapter Two explores, has its roots in Cartesian 
models of the self that have persisted for many centuries  – as Lynch himself states, though 
many of Descartes’ theories of consciousness have long been rejected, ‘the idea that the mind is 
essentially private is a central element of the concept of the self’ (2013: np). 
 
Conclusion: dividuated data-tracked subjects 
As also outlined in Chapter Two, the Cartesian model of the self as inner, pre-existing, stable 
and holistic has and can be challenged; Butler and Stone’s work on performative identity 
constitution contests that the self is not inherently inner or pre-existing but is constituted by 
and through a discursive framework. I will explore this idea of identity constitution in the next 
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chapter but here I want to conclude by considering Jordan’s model of networked privacy in 
relation to social networks. Jordan (2015) notes that on social networks, the self is invoked 
both as an entity that pre-exists the network and is brought into existence by the network. To 
apply this theory to my analysis here, the participants seem to be invoking the former model of 
the private self – that is, these participants are protecting their ‘inner core’ (2015: 126) from the 
threat of data tracking – they frame themselves as ‘complex private beings… parts of which 
they are reveal or forced to reveal’ (2015: 128). Jordan makes an important about this 
conception:  
The core of a person is something that may be inconsistent, changeable and 
negotiated, it may be part of decentred subject, but it is still the complex inner core 
of a subject. Privacy in this conception is not the presumption of a self-consistent 
inner identity but of a complex inner identity that yet still remains each individual’s 
to dispose of (2015: 123). 
 
Such a formation ‘presupposes that a being exists prior to being read’ (2015: 128), rather 
than the self coming into existence through visibility. I will explore this further in the 
next chapter, here however I want to emphasise that these participants frame the self as 
an inner, private formation that must be protected from the dehumanizing threat of data 
tracking. What was articulated as an epistemic anxiety of not fully knowing the extent and 
reach of your own data trail emerges too as an ontological concern: that is, uncertainty 
over anticipation throws security of selfhood into question.  
 
The final point I would like to argue is that this model of the self as inner and pre-existing is 
complicated if we consider the differences between state surveillance and commercial 
dataveillance. Take for example Bolin and Andersson Swartz’s theory that unlike traditional 
ways of ‘knowing’ a media audience through demographic profiling of age, gender, etc., 
algorithmic profiling is more interested in ‘real-time’, recursive and correlational behavioural 
patterns, which then get translated back into traditional audience demographic categories (2015). 
Bolin and Andersson Swartz make explicit that traditional individual profiling helps to maintain 
and perpetuate traditional models of state surveillance. They state: 
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If the advertising industry and advertising-based tech companies such as Google 
have an ambivalent and complex relationship to [traditional demographic] 
categories, government security agencies definitely do care about the specific 
individual (2015: 9).  
 
To elaborate, state surveillance tactics ‘works in the reverse compared to market surveillance’ 
(2015: 9) by looking for individualised threats rather than dividualised patterns of consumption. 
Thus, the formations of selfhood that state and commercial dataveillance constitute and 
demand can be considered to be quite different – one looks to demographically profile the 
individual, the other looks to correlate the web user as a dividual in a mass data set.  
 
In conclusion, I propose that these participants’ framing of the self as pre-existent, inner 
and private largely correspond with traditional modes of profiling and by extension state 
models of surveillance, which traditionally seek to individually identify rather than 
dividuate. This framing of the self as an entity in which one must protect your ‘scuzzy 
bits’ if you are to remain ‘you’ somewhat ironically corresponds to Zuckerberg’s 
rhetorical, neoliberal idea that ‘You have one identity’ – the difference being for these 
participants that this ‘one identity’ should not be expressed through the network, as 
Zuckerberg claims. And yet this model of selfhood exists in tension with the other 
formations that algorithmic personalisation demands; that is, a self that is not only fixable 
and inner but can be continuously and recursively expressed and reworked, as I explore 
in the next chapter. As such, adding ‘personalisation’ into Ghostery’s rhetorical sum of 
‘knowledge + control = privacy’ reveals complexities and nuances regarding how the self 
is constituted by and through commercial data tracking in the name of personalisation, 
and how the self is framed by Ghostery users themselves.  
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 Chapter Five  
 
‘Spotify has added an event to your past’: (re)writing the self through 
Facebook’s autoposting apps  
 
 
‘The film you quote. The songs you have on repeat. The activities you love. Now there’s a new class of social 
apps that let you express who you are through all the things you do’   
              (Facebook Timeline, 2014). 
 
Part I 
Introduction: personalisation and performing the self  
The last chapter sought to explore Ghostery users’ negotiations with data tracking and 
algorithmic personalisation in relation to users’ ideas of privacy, control, epistemic knowledge 
production and the ‘protection’ of selfhood against data tracking. This chapter shifts focus 
towards algorithmic personalisation in relation to identity performance – and in particular 
identity performances that are anticipated and intersected by computational systems which seek 
to act for (and indeed on) the user. To do so the chapter focuses on the ‘autoposting’ activities 
of Facebook’s third party apps – that is, commercial applications that can automatically post 
Facebook status updates on the user’s behalf, and in doing so are discursively framed, as the 
above quote highlights, as tools that aid user self-expression. However, as this chapter 
proposes, if the accounts of Facebook users themselves are taken into account then such apps 
can be considered as personalisation practices which do not just ‘aid’ self-expression but can be 
deployed as actors capable of (re)writing users’ identity performances on Facebook – and 
beyond.  
 
What is a Facebook third party app? As Zuckerberg explained during the 2014 F8 conference,51 																																																								
51	Facebook	Inc.’s	international	developer	conference.	
 135 
third party apps are commercial lifestyle, gaming, entertainment and shopping applications 
designed to be ‘deeply integrated’ into Facebook’s operational and commercial ‘ecosystem’ 
(Zuckerberg et. al, 2014). As Zuckerberg repeatedly emphasises, these apps play an essential 
role in Facebook Inc.’s newest expansion strategy – that is, to become a ‘cross-platform 
platform’ (Zuckerberg et al., 2014) that connects not just friends, family and acquaintances but 
the millions of platforms, websites, ‘stacks’ and services that currently constitute the web. To 
date, the external products and services that apps integrate into Facebook include (but are not 
limited to) games, movies, books and music services, ticket and product purchasing programs, 
bookmarking software, photo editors, health and fitness trackers, events managers, comic strip 
creators, lifestyle forums, interactive cook books and stress relief programs – there are over 
seven million apps available on Facebook (Stasticbrain, 2016), which generate an income of 
around $3 billion a year for Facebook and its third party associates (Zuckerberg et al. 2014).52 
 
In situating Facebook as the ‘cross-platform platform’, Facebook apps have also apparently 
created more opportunities to facilitate user self-expression. Rolled out in 2011 along with 
Timeline, Facebook’s newest profile manifestation, apps were pitched to users as ‘the perfect 
way to express who you are’ (Zuckerberg, 2011).  As the introductory quote of this chapter 
suggests, apps are discursively framed by Facebook as tools that let users articulate – and more 
importantly publicise – ‘who they are’ by accommodating any user lifestyle preference, ‘interest 
token’ (Liu, 2008), socio-cultural taste, consumer choice or even affect; ‘your runs, your bike 
rides, your cooking, your eating, your sleeping, your happiness, your fashion, anything you want’ 
																																																								
52	Third	party	apps	are	not	the	only	‘applications’	incorporated	into	Facebook	–	Facebook	itself	also	uses	many	
internal	‘applications’.	For	example	Facebook	Messenger	and	News	Feed	can	both	be	considered	to	be	apps	in	that	
they	are	‘software	designed	to	do	a	specific	task’	(Fagerjord,	2012:	2).	In	focusing	on	third	party	apps	here	I	do	not	
mean	to	suggest	that	Facebook	first	party	apps	are	not	important	to	how	identity	performance	plays	out	on	
Facebook	–	Facebook’s	internal	applications	can	be	critiqued	as	both	facilitators	and	regulators	of	user	self-
expression	(as	noted	in	more	detail	below).	However,	it	is	third	party	apps	that	take	the	interest	of	this	chapter	
because	i.	these	apps	have	the	ability	to	automatically	post	on	a	user’s	behalf	and	ii.	The	apps	allow	for	cross-
platform	connections	–	they	are	used	to	carry	massive	amounts	of	data	produced	and	consumed	by	users	between	
‘integrated,	monopolistic	outlets‘	(Fagerjord,	2012:	4).	As	I	contend	throughout	this	chapter	these	two	attributes	
(which	apply	only	to	third	party	apps)	raise	of	host	of	fresh	critical	questions	in	regards	to	identity	expression	and	
constitution.		
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(Zuckerberg, 2011, my emphasis). Consequently, in order to promote and secure this cross-
platforms ecosystem, users are encouraged to ‘express themselves’ by connecting their 
favoured pre-existing services (such as the music streaming app Spotify or TV and movie 
service Netflix, established prior to Facebook’s app network) or newly-developed apps through 
and to their Facebook accounts, and in doing so secure a frictionless yet sticky connection 
between Facebook and the app. Facebook claim that this connection is beneficial to users as it 
conveniently circumvents the labour of having to ‘sign up’ or ‘log in’ to the app (Facebook 
App Centre, 2014).  
 
However, Facebook third party apps were not just rolled out as aids for self-expression – they 
were also celebrated for the ability to publicise and amplify those self-expressions through their 
ability to automatically post status updates on a user’s behalf. Differently put, Facebook’s third 
party apps have the ability to post automatically published status updates (herein referred to as 
‘autoposts’) to an individual’s Facebook friends network, at times without their knowledge or 
immediate consent (at the time of posting). Autoposts by apps can take on a number of forms, 
but most refer to an in-app action or achievement by a user and are written on behalf of a user 
in first or third person; for example, ‘xxx xxxx is listening to Serious Time by Mungo’s Hi Fi 
on Spotify’, ‘Batman & The Flash: Hero Run - I’ve just scored 22,323 points!’ or ‘I’ve just run 
5.99 miles on MapMyRun’ (see figure. 7).   
 
It is the ability of these apps to ‘express’ on behalf of the user some utterance of identity that 
relates to the central concerns of this chapter. This is because the capacity of apps to autopost 
in the user’s stead means they have the ability to autonomously act on behalf of the user; an 
attribute which, as the Introduction chapter and Chapter Two emphasise, is a key component 
of algorithmic personalisation. Although autoposting constitutes a somewhat ‘crude’ example 
of algorithmic personalisation in that only a user’s name and profile picture are tracked and 
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mined,53 autoposting presents a valuable site of investigation in relation to personalisation 
because in this instance what is being algorithmically ‘personalised’ is a user’s very own identity 
performance. By this I mean that in automatically posting status updates such as ‘I’ve just run 
5.99 miles on MapMy Run’ to a Facebook user’s friend network, autoposting apps constitute a 
moment of user anticipation that actively intervenes in a user’s identity articulation and 
performance on Facebook.  
 
Not long after rolling out third party apps it emerged that autoposting was overwhelmingly 
unpopular with the majority of Facebook’s users. After admitting that ‘people often feel 
surprised or confused by stories that are shared without taking an explicit action’ (Facebook 
blog, 2014), Facebook is now downplaying the significance of autoposts in users’ activity – 
autoposts now predominately take place in users’ Tickers, rather than the New Feed itself, and 
Facebook have tightened its regulations to ensure that users are not forced to consent to 
autoposting as a part of the terms of use for an app. However at the time that participant 
interviews for this investigation took place (between March and June 2014), most of these 
measures did not exist, meaning that autoposts (though still fairly rare) were not as infrequent 
as they are now. The transience of autoposting should not be taken as a reason to dismiss its 
critical significance: on the contrary, as I will argue throughout this chapter, the very 
ephemerality both of specific instances of autoposting and autoposting as a wider socio-cultural 
practice warrants critical interrogation.  
 
The ability of apps to algorithmically write in the user’s stead, as well as connect across 
platforms, gives rise to a host of fresh critical questions: what does it mean to use apps as tools 
																																																								
53	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	Facebook	apps	only	mine	a	user’s	name	and	profile	picture	as	part	of	their	data	tracking	
process	–	many	apps	actually	harvest	a	huge	amount	of	user	information,	such	as	a	user’s	Facebook	‘likes’,	
hometown,	friends	list,	any	other	socio-cultural	interests,	occupations	or	religious/	political	beliefs	the	user	has	
registered	on	Facebook	(Online	Permissions,	2015).	However,	this	information	is	used	in	the	‘back	end’	anticipation	
of	users	explored	the	previous	chapter	–	this	information	is	sold	on,	or	used	to	target	users	for	advertising	purposes	
in	or	outside	of	the	app,	rather	than	part	of	the	autoposting	process.		
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for self-expression? What does it mean for an app to automatically yet unintentionally give 
away our ‘guilty pleasures’ to our online audiences – our ‘trashy’ song preference or our 
pornographic pleasures? What kind of self can be constituted and performed under the logic of 
personalisation? Furthermore, if we treat the articulation of selfhood on SNSs as a 
performative act (as I explore further below) – that is, if as Cover proposes, ‘the establishment 
and maintenance of a profile is not a representation or biography but performative acts, which 
constitute the self and stabilise it over time’ (181: 2012) – then what does it mean to a have an 
app algorithmically perform an act of selfhood as part of users’ Facebook activity?  
 
Figure 7. Examples of autoposting by Facebook third party apps. 
 
 
Drawing on the accounts of sixteen Facebook users, this chapter explores autoposting as a 
socio-technical practice that creates critical implications in regards to performative articulations 
of user identity. Here I use ‘performative’ in the Butlerian sense; that is, that expressive 
utterances deployed by apps (in the form of autoposts) can be considered as acts that 
discursively ‘enact and produce’ the subject which they name (1993: 13). The theoretical 
framework of identity performance and constitution contained in this chapter (and in Chapter 
Two) underpins a qualitative methodology that attempts to get at how users engage and 
negotiate autoposting apps in everyday life.  
 
As the following sub-sections explore, participants recounted a number of complex, tense and 
often unwilling encounters with autoposting apps on Facebook – including apps disclosing 
‘guilty pleasures’ such as trashy songs or sexually suggestive content to participants’ Facebook 
friends, Spotify ‘adding an event’ to a participant’s ‘past’ and the framing of other people’s 
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game app posts and invites as ‘chavvy’.54 Participants’ accounts suggest that in many instances, 
autoposts by apps work to intervene and at times disrupt the carefully staged identity 
performances that users commonly enact on Facebook (Van Dijck, 2013). By considering 
critical notions such as ‘context collapse’ (boyd and Marwick, 2011), ‘taste performance’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Liu, 2008) and ‘grammars of action’ (Agre, 1994), I will argue that apps 
function as not just tools for self-expression, but as unwanted actors in the writing and 
performing of selfhoods on Facebook, in ways that complicate Zuckerberg’s assertion that 
Facebook users’ ‘have one identity’ (cited in Van Dijck, 2013).  
 
Identity, performativity and articulations of the self on SNSs 
As Chapter Two proposes and as Marwick (2013), van Zoonen (2013), Karppi (2012) and van 
Dijck (2013) note, contemporary SNS sites predominantly demand not only that users are 
identifiable and nameable but that they ‘have one identity’ (Zuckerberg cited in Van Dijck, 
2013). As noted in Chapter Two, this idea reflects traditional Cartesian models of selfhood, yet 
many scholars have challenged this unitary and singular approach to identity formation. For 
example, Van Dijck states:  
The mantra of people having one authentic or ‘true’ identity… betrays a fundamental 
misjudgement of people’s everyday behaviour. Ever since Goffman, it is commonly 
accepted that people put on their daily lives as staged performances where they deliber-
ately use the differentiation between private and public discursive acts to shape their 
identity (2013: 212).  
 
Despite these assertions that identity construction consists of a ‘staged performance’ rather 
than a single or ‘authentic’ identity, Facebook insists that their tools – such as apps – can assist 
users in ‘expressing who they are’, implying that users do not ‘perform’ their identity on 
Facebook; they are the selves they portray on Facebook. Marwick argues that Facebook’s 
emphasis on a unitary, singular identity is driven by profit. She writes: ‘the move to commercial 
social software such as social network sites, blogs, and media-sharing services has brought with 																																																								
54	‘Chavvy’	is	an	adjective	of	the	word	‘Chav’,	which	OED	defines	as	‘A	young	lower-class	person	typified	by	brash	
and	loutish	behaviour.’	(2016)	
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it an impetus to adhere to a fixed, single identity’ (2013: 368). Though I agree that Facebook 
discursively emphasises the ‘one identity’ approach to the formation of selfhood, the assertion 
that commercial gain drives this approach is problematised if contemporary algorithmic 
personalisation practices are taken into consideration – that is, the drive to indefinitely track, 
recursively anticipate and act on the user somewhat complicates the idea that a fixed and stable 
identity is the most profitable for the platform. After all, if a user’s fixed and stable identity was 
a commercial priority then the need to anticipate the user across platforms and on a daily basis 
would not be necessary. I will return to this idea throughout this chapter but here I would like 
to emphasise that the participants’ testimonies explored below suggest that their identity 
performances certainly do not fit the ‘one identity’ model, despite Facebook’s discursive 
construction of identity as a single, verifiable self that can – and indeed should – be expressed 
via Facebook.  
 
It seems important here to briefly clarify what can be meant by ‘identity performance’. As the 
quote by van Djick above suggests, Goffman’s (1959) theory that identity articulation can be 
considered a performance – that changes depending on the socio-cultural context and intended 
audience – have sought to challenge established Cartesian notions that identity is ‘inner’, 
unitary, whole and stable. Though I join Goffman in asserting that identity can be performed 
in multiple and context-specific ways, in terms of this chapter (and to a lesser extent this thesis 
as a whole) I am focussing on Butler’s crucial intervention into identity theory – and 
specifically her proposition that identities are not just performed but also ‘performative’. As 
detailed in Chapter Two, for Butler acts of identity performance are ascribed via discourse and 
therefore constitutive of the very identity that they seek to perform – the self is ‘constituted in 
social discourse, but that ascription of interiority is itself a publicly regulated and sanctioned 
form of essence fabrication’ (1988: 528). 
 
In considering identity performances as performative it is possible to theorise, as scholars such 
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as Cover (2012), Bassett (1997), Jordan (2013) and Stone (1997) have, how articulations of 
identity on SNSs – and the ‘material performatives’ (Jordan, 2013: 53) that produce such 
articulations – might not just be expressive but productive. I will examine the role that 
automated identity articulations (such as autoposts) play in this process in the next section, but 
here I want to emphasise that in considering identity performances on Facebook as 
performative it is possible to begin to think about how articulations of selfhood on Facebook 
might not just represent the self, but actively constitute the self.  
 
What possibilities does Facebook as a platform provide for the performance of user identity? 
As scholars such as Sauter (2013) note, a plethora of potential ‘technologies of the self’55 
(Foucault, 1988) are embedded within the operational structure of Facebook: status updates, 
videos, uploading photos, sharing links, location tagging and ‘likes’ (amongst other functions) 
all have the potential to facilitate facets of user self-expression. Though advocates such as 
Miller (2010) celebrate the articulation of user self-expression on Facebook as emancipatory, 
scholars such as Marwick (2013), Cover (2012), and Janier (2010) note that Facebook’s 
attempts to determine users interests can be critiqued as standardising and restrictive. For 
example Marwick states that:  
Facebook profiles cannot be altered and thus all adhere to the look and feel of the 
site. As a result, user customization is restricted primarily to filling out predefined 
fields, such as favourite books, music, television and films (2013: 14). 
 
Such criticisms highlight the homogenising influence of commercial interests on profile pages 
that work to restrict the modes of self-expression available to users of SNSs. These critiques 
suggest that Facebook’s operational architecture may provide a means for users to express 																																																								
55	Foucault	describes	‘technologies	of	the	self’	as	those	‘which	permit	individuals	to	effect	by	their	own	means	or	
with	the	help	of	others	a	certain	number	of	operations	on	their	own	bodies	and	souls,	thoughts,	conduct	and	way	of	
being,	so	as	to	transform	themselves	in	order	to	attain	a	certain	state	of	happiness,	purity,	wisdom,	perfection	or	
immortality’	(1988:	18).	It	seems	important	to	note	that	these	technologies	are	not	just	tools	but	also	techniques	–	
Foucault	notes	that	reflection,	penitence	and	self-disclosure	as	well	as	practices	such	a	diary	writing	all	constitute	
socio-historically	specific	operations	of	self-constitution/	expression.	Therefore	the	‘technologies	of	the	self’	that	
Facebook	offers	are	not	just	the	tools	(for	uploading	photos	etc)	but	also	the	operations	for	disclosure,	articulation	
and	‘self-knowing’	(Foucault	1988:	23)	that	these	tools	permit.		
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themselves, but do so under a technological regime that restricts the construction of identity to 
normative, regulatory and commercially viable frameworks. Furthermore, Software Studies 
theorists such as Agre (1994) and Kitchin and Dodge (2011) have proposed that such 
computational frameworks could have performative effects for the users that ‘act’ through 
them. Agre’s ‘grammar of action’ model proposes that the implementation of computational 
architectures such as Facebook can ‘constitute that reorganization of… existing activity’ (1994: 
11) suggesting that self-expression can be rearticulated, and therefore regulated, to fit the 
computational grammar embedded into technological frameworks, networks and interfaces. 
Through such grammar, as Karppi states, ‘impressions of the self are built according to the 
platform’ (2012: 293); or as Law puts it, such computational designs ‘configure the user’ (1991).  
 
The expressive potential of autoposting: considering apps as actors 
Can apps offer a way out of the restrictive grammars that Facebook impose on its users? 
Echoing the arguments outlined above, Gerlitz and Helmond argue that Facebook’s ‘like’ and 
‘share’ buttons commonly used to connect platforms, individuals and services (not just on 
Facebook but outside the platform) currently afford users a very limited ‘horizon of possibility’ 
(2013:1353) that only allows for the expression of positive – rather than negative or critical – 
sentiment.56 They speculate that apps might expand this horizon of possibility, as apps facilitate 
an expressive framework that extends beyond merely being able to ‘like’ or ‘recommend’ 
something. They note that: 
[W]hen creating an app, developers are prompted to define verbs that are shown as user 
actions and to specify the object on which these actions can be performed. Instead of 
being confined to ‘like’ external web content, users can now ‘read’, ‘watch’, ‘discuss’ or 
perform other actions (2013: 1353). 
 																																																								
56	In	early	2016	Facebook	introduced	five	new	buttons	to	accompany	the	established	‘like’	button	on	Facebook	itself	
(which	include	a	heart	and	‘emojis’	of	crying,	shocked	and	angry	faces).	These	new	buttons	do	slightly	extend	the	
expressive	spectrum	allowed	on	Facebook	(though	the	extent	to	which	these	buttons	facilitate	‘critical’	expression	
is	still	very	much	arguable),	however	in	addition	third	party	apps	continue	to	contribute	to	the	expressive	network	
in	and	beyond	Facebook.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	at	the	time	of	interviews	for	this	project	(mid-late	2014),	
only	the	‘like’	button	was	available	to	users.			
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The existence of over seven million apps certainly suggest that apps allow users to ‘express 
who they are’ by accommodating forms of expressive action that to go beyond simply ‘liking’ – 
and furthermore seem to offer forms of expressive potential that transcend the boundaries of 
Facebook. However, Gerlitz and Helmond highlight that ‘automatic posts’ by apps – that is, 
the autoposts that are the focus of this chapter – may problematise the expressive potentials of 
apps:  
These new apps come with the controversial feature of frictionless sharing and 
automatically post performed activities to the ticker once users have signed up (2013: 
1353). 
 
The ability of apps to autopost on a user’s behalf on friends’ Newsfeeds or Tickers57 certainly 
has sparked controversy amongst Facebook users – as mentioned, Facebook is phasing out the 
practice due to its unpopularity. Participants of this study echoed these sentiments – though 
many participants enjoyed using apps, experiences involving autoposting were overwhelming 
negative, as I will shortly explore. Furthermore, if the ‘performed activities’ of apps are taken as 
performative acts, then autoposts take on a far more profound significance than just being 
confusing. In being considered as technological actors rather than tools, apps (through 
autoposting) take on a performative power to actively constitute the self that they supposedly 
only aid in expressing.  
 
Is worth briefly clarifying here what is meant by ‘technological actor’. Though Butler distances 
her theory from the term ‘actor’ because its ‘theatrical resonance’ might suggest that 
performativity is a ‘Goffmanesque project of putting on a mask or electing to play a role’ 
(1998: 285), other theorists such as Barad (2007), Latour (2005), Haraway (1992) and Gillespie 
(2014) have used the term not for its theatrical connotations but because the term can be 
applied to any entity (both human or non-human) that has the capacity to act on, against or 
																																																								
57	The	Facebook	ticker	is	a	real	time	stream	of	‘friend’	activity	that	appears	on	the	upper	right-hand	side	of	a	
Facebook	user’s	Newsfeed	
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with a social assemblage of other actors. Latour states that ‘anything that does modify a state of 
affairs by making a difference is an actor’ (2005: 71), whilst Barad (2007) proposes that it is not 
only human bodies that come to be constituted through performative actions but non-human 
actors too (and indeed matter itself). In keeping with their sentiments, the following 
subsections consider apps not just as tools for self-expression but as actors that, when 
‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with the identities of those they seek to express, have the potential to 
intervene and disrupt individual identity performance on Facebook. 
 
Method: investing in the ‘like’ economy 
In total, sixteen participants were interviewed as part of this research project, all of whom took 
part in semi-structured, face-to-face interviews designed to explore participant engagement 
with third party autoposting apps on Facebook (see Appendix A for full interview list).58 
Participants were recruited through the ‘Plugged-in Profiles’ research page – a Facebook page 
established and maintained as part of the project, which gained eighty-nine ‘likes’ (that, is users 
who have subscribed to the page) and allowed calls for participants to be seen by over one 
thousand Facebook users. The page was accompanied by a research survey, which some 
participants filled out prior to their interviews.  
 
Establishing a Facebook page involved self-reflexively joining the ‘like’ economy that this 
project seeks in part to critique. As Gerlitz and Helmond note, the nature of the ‘like’ economy 
is grounded on social connectivity (2013) – meaning that many of my subscribers (and 
subsequent interviewees) were largely recruited from friend networks close to my own pre-
existing network on Facebook, leading to some methodological considerations explored below. 																																																								
58	Two	group	interviews	were	undertaken	as	part	of	the	project	–	Kevin,	Alice,	Rory	and	Daniel	were	interviewed	
together,	as	were	Rebecca,	Audrey,	Sophie,	Terry	and	Steve.	The	participants	taking	part	in	these	interviews	were	
not	strangers	to	each	other	–	they	were	housemates,	most	of	whom	were	friends	on	Facebook	and	therefore	
constituted	part	of	each	other’s	Facebook	networks.	Their	‘offline’	connection	as	house	mates	thus	added	a	
valuable	additional	dimension	to	their	interviews,	in	the	form	of	dynamic	exchanges	between	participants	(as	
exemplified	in	Kevin’s	accounts	of	autoposting)	that	highlight	how	the	intervention	of	apps	into	users’	Facebook	
profiles	does	not	just	affect	the	user	themselves	–	it	also	impacts	on	their	network.		
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Facebook pages can also be promoted through Facebook’s pay-to-use marketing mechanisms. 
This option – to pay to promote the page – though a tempting prospect, was not implemented. 
I felt that paying for ‘likes’ was at best counter-productive and at worst unethical in relation to 
my research aims; and as De Cristofaro et al. (2014) have highlighted, using such Facebook’s 
pay-to-use promotional techniques may well have led to ‘fake likes’ generated from legally and 
ethically dubious ‘like farms’,59 rather than viable (human) research participants.  
 
As a result of the social connectivity which structures the ‘like’ economy, participants shared 
some socio-cultural similarities in terms of their demographics – notably were all between 24-
30 years old when recruited and based in the UK.60 It is thus important to note that the 
accounts of my participants do not reflect the plethora of possible identities or demographics 
on Facebook; as is clear from the following analyses, participants’ accounts are embedded 
within socio-cultural normative tastes and practices that are specific to their lived experiences 
and are therefore contingent on context-specific parameters of taste, class and cultural 
preference (amongst other factors). Their responses should thus not be taken as representative 
of Facebook users as a whole – rather their testimonies are explored here to highlight the ways 
in which apps intervene in self-performances that are always-already embedded in pre-existing 
frameworks of socio-cultural and economic norms, negotiations and practices.  
 
Interviews were semi-structured in order to explore participant experiences of Facebook apps, 
and more specifically participant accounts of autoposting – that is, instances wherein 
automated status updates were implemented, produced and posted solely by the app on behalf 																																																								
59	‘Like	farms’	are	comprised	of	human	workers	paid	(nominal	wages)	to	generate	‘likes’,	or	non-human	‘bots’	who	
algorithmically	generate	‘fake	likes’.	Like	farms	are	actually	banned	by	Facebook	itself	–	it	is	third	party	marketers	
who	exploit	Facebook’s	‘legitimate’	promotional	mechanisms	to	benefit	from	these	practices	De	Cristofaro	et	al.	
(2014).	
60	Such	a	recruitment	process	echoes	‘Snowball’	recruitment	techniques,	which	drawn	on	participant/	researcher	
social	networks	to	find	participants	who	are	not	only	interested	but	suitable	for	interview	for	the	research	project	in	
question	(Browne,	2005).	The	problem	of	demographic	similarities	also	occurs	in	snowballing	as	a	recruitment	
method	–	however	as	Browne	notes	the	‘sameness’	of	participants	is	not	always	a	problem	if	such	demographic	
similarities	are	accounted	for	in	the	researcher’s	analysis.	
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of the user, rather than the participant themselves. Reflecting the wider unpopularity of 
autoposts, participant accounts of autoposts were almost wholly negative (with two exceptions 
explored below), often due to the fact that though the participant had inadvertently consented 
to autoposting as part of the Terms and Conditions for using the app, they had not realised 
that the app had autoposted in the specific instances featured in this chapter. That is not to 
suggest that participant engagements with apps in general (also covered as part of the 
interviews) were wholly negative – many participants enjoyed many benefits of engaging with 
the apps on their phones and networked devices. However, since autoposting apps as examples 
of algorithmic personalisation constitute the focus of this chapter, it is specific encounters with 
autoposting – rather than experiences with apps in general – that are here afforded the most 
critical scrutiny. 
 
 The following subsections explore participants’ engagements, negotiations and entanglements 
with autoposting apps as personalisation practices, and are largely structured around in-depth 
examinations of particular instances of autoposting. Though such an approach means that 
some participant accounts are awarded a larger proportion of scrutiny than others, I found in-
depth analysis of specific accounts of autoposting to be extremely valuable for unpicking 
participant negotiations with autoposting.  
 
Part II 
Who do you think you are? Carefully-crafted identity performance on Facebook  
Before detailing specific accounts of autoposting, it is first important to establish how 
participants constructed and maintained their Facebook personas. After all, if Facebook claims 
that apps help users ‘express who they are’, who did participants think they were? What kind of 
selfhood(s) did participants seek to articulate through their Facebook profiles? 
 
Despite Zuckerberg’s claim that ‘you have one identity’, the idea that our Facebook profiles 
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reflect a certain ‘type’ of staged selfhood – rather than an ‘authentic’, holistic or ‘fixed’ self – 
was reflected in the contributions of many participants. For example, Calum (duty manager, 30) 
was happy to admit that his Facebook use reflected a ‘version’ of himself – but an exaggerated 
version. When asked ‘Do you think your Facebook use reflects who you are?’, he replied: 
 
Yes and no – but maybe people see a version of me, a side of me that kind of, meta, 
hyper, you know, side of me... It reflects an aspect of my identity.  
 
Similarly, Sam (digital communications manager, 29) also suggested that her Facebook use 
reflected a certain type of self, rather than an ‘authentic’ identity. Sam seemed clear that her 
performance on Facebook constituted what she called a ‘constructed public persona’ rather 
than a ‘true’ self.61  She explained what she means by her ‘constructed public persona’: 
So it’s how I want the world to see me… so for instance, I’ve had depression, and you 
wouldn’t know that from what I said on Facebook… you wouldn’t know if I was 
having a really shitty day at work for instance. [My Facebook use] is like me, it’s not a 
completely different person, it is me, but it’s not all of me. And it’s yeah, it’s like my 
best self [my emphasis]. 
 
Sam and Calum reflect Van Dijck’s observations that ‘users have come to understand the art of 
online self-presentation and the importance of SNS tools for (professional) self-promotion’ (2013: 
200, original emphasis). That is, in performing a ‘best’ or ‘hyper’ self that downplays perceived 
negative aspects of their personalities, Sam and Calum highlight their awareness that their 
identity on Facebook is a carefully crafted performance. 
 
Though Van Dijck’s assertion that ‘users... have become increasingly skilled at playing the game 
of self-promotion’ (2013: 210) was echoed in part by some participants, it was clear that for 
some participants self-presentation on Facebook did not necessarily equate to self-promotion – 
professional or otherwise.  For example, participants such as Melanie (civil servant, 29), Kevin 																																																								
61	Sam	preceded	her	use	of	the	term	with	question	‘is	it	ridiculous	if	I	say	pretentious	media	studies	words?’,	
suggesting	that	her	mobilisation	of	this	somewhat	complex	phrase	can	be	explained	by	a	background	knowledge	in	
theories	of	identity	construction.	
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(accounts executive, 25), Calum and Sara (customer service manager, 29) were acutely aware 
that they were performing a constructed self, however this self was not maintained simply 
through a desire to perform their ‘promoted’ or ‘ideal’ self (Nagy et al. 2011), it was also 
contingent on an acute awareness of their ‘invisible audience’ (Sauter, 2013, McLaughlin and 
Vitak, 2012). ‘Invisible audience’ here refers to the network of friends, family, acquaintances 
and even strangers that could potentially view their performances of selfhood on Facebook. As 
Sauter notes, by posting to Facebook users are ‘submitting themselves voluntarily to a panoptic 
form of constant scrutiny’ (2013: 12) imposed by this audience. As accounts in this chapter 
highlight, this ‘voluntary scrutiny’ is complicated by the very invisibility and extent of a user’s 
Facebook audience. Though Facebook participation is indeed voluntary, users do not always 
know exactly what their ‘friends’ see, and must also be aware that these ‘friends’ can be close 
friends but also family, acquaintances, work colleagues, all of whom are perceived to potentially 
‘expect’ adherence to certain identity performances. For example, Calum explained that: 
I’m quite aware that, because I see friends who post lots of political things that like all 
the time, or petitions all the time and you do become a bit exhausted to see that kind 
of stuff, um so I don’t want to saturate somebody else’s Newsfeed with things that I 
don’t really think they’re necessarily going to be interested in. 
 
As Calum further states, he was aware that his interest in LGBT politics might not always be 
welcomed by his Facebook audience:  
I could easily just always go on about LGBT policies when people get bored ‘Oh there’s 
Calum going on about the gay shit again and again’. 
 
Thus, for Calum, posting content to Facebook is not simply about promoting his ‘ideal’ self, it 
was also about not ‘saturating’ his friends’ Newsfeeds with content that might not interest 
them.62 Similarly, Melanie’s performance was also contingent on the eyes of her Facebook 
network. She states in relation to her Facebook use that, ‘it’s about being able to be selective 
and thinking about who your audience is’. Sara also recognised that her Facebook use was 																																																								
62	Perhaps	Calum	was	right	to	be	wary	–	as	Beth	explained	in	her	interview,	the	only	friend	she	has	blocked	on	her	
Newsfeed	was	a	friend	who	posted	too	much	political	content.	
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affected by the scrutiny of her network – she stated that she only posts content that she deems 
is acceptable to her network and professional colleagues, saying ‘I have to restrict some of my 
personality I suppose’ in relation to the kind of content she posts, and later added that ‘I know 
I shouldn’t care what people think of me, but I do’. Calum, Sara and Melanie’s accounts 
suggests here that the performed self on Facebook does not always equate to a ‘promoted’ or 
‘ideal’ self solely from the user’s perspective; rather it is a selfhood also constituted through the 
perceived desires of their invisible audience. 
 
If for these participants the enactment of selfhood on Facebook is carefully considered and 
staged with an invisible audience in mind, what role do apps play in this performance? As the 
following subsections expand upon, the role that apps play in the construction and 
presentation of selfhood was revealed as complex, tense and often unwanted – apps disrupted 
and intervened in these performances in ways that call their status as simply instrumental ‘tools’ 
(or perhaps ‘props’ would be a more fitting term) for self-expression very much into question. 
 
Autoposting apps and the invisible audience  
As the previous accounts suggest, the performed self on Facebook is enacted under the gaze of 
‘the sprawling mass of contacts most people amass on Facebook’ (Marwick, 2013: 368). Kevin 
(accounts executive, 25) however, who was interviewed with his house mates Alice (researcher, 
28), Rory (sales manager, 30) and Daniel (graphic designer, 29), had such an acute awareness of 
his ‘invisible audience’ that his Facebook activity was very limited. Kevin called himself a 
‘lurker’ and explained that: 
 
I never post anything, I never do it… I feel sort of self-conscious. I feel like I don’t want 
other people to think that I’m fishing for likes or if I don’t get enough likes I’m like ‘oh 
that was so embarrassing I shouldn’t have put that one up’ [Laughs]. 
 
He explains later in the interview when asked if his Facebook profile reflects ‘who he is’ that ‘I 
don’t think [people] would really, like get very much from my profile, because I don’t really 
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contribute much’. Kevin’s performance on Facebook is thus very much restricted by a 
consciousness of how others might see him, and is not contingent on any notion of an ‘ideal’ 
or ‘promoted’ self.  
 
Given that Kevin’s awareness of his imagined Facebook audience leads to a reluctance to 
perform at all, how does his interaction with Facebook apps affect this limited self-
performance? Along with other participants such as Beth, Sara and Alice, it was Spotify that 
caused the most contention for Kevin in regards to his apps usage. The Spotify music 
streaming app on Facebook currently boasts over 10 million monthly users and as Facebook’s 
Apps Centre states, by connecting to Spotify via Facebook a user must agree as part of the 
Terms of Service to this somewhat ambiguous condition: ‘This app may post on your behalf, 
including songs you listened to, radio stations you listened to and more’ (Facebook Apps Centre, 
2014, my emphasis). There are a number of reasons why Spotify users might connect to Spotify 
via Facebook: for the convenience of using pre-existing log-in/ password details; because they 
want to see (on Spotify or on Facebook) other friends connected to Spotify; but also because 
for a time between 2011 and 2013, the only way of signing up to Spotify was through Facebook – new 
users could not use the service without signing up through their Facebook account (ZDNet 
2011, Spotify Community, 2013). A number of participants (including Kevin, Calum and Beth) 
connected their Facebook/ Spotify for the latter reason. Other participants could not 
remember why they had connected via Facebook, though told me they suspected they had to 
in order use Spotify. 
 
Upon signing up to Spotify via Facebook, a user’s songs (‘and more’) have the potential to be 
automatically posted to their friends’ via the Newsfeed or ticker. Spotify’s settings allow free-
account holders to listen to music as part of either a ‘public session’ – in which a user’s song 
choices are publicised to their Facebook audience – or a ‘private’ session – in which songs are 
not publicised. Perhaps unsurprisingly, listening on a ‘public session’ is the default option for 
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users connected to Facebook. Notably, even if set to a ‘private session’, the user’s session will 
switch back to a public session ‘after a period of time’ (Spotify Community, 2013) – which seems to 
be around 20 minutes – or will switch back to a public session every time a user logs in to 
Spotify.  
 
Kevin explains that though he is aware that his Spotify and Facebook accounts are connected, 
he has occasionally forgotten to switch to a ‘private session’ on Spotify, meaning that his song 
preferences are then published to his Facebook friends’ network. The following exchange 
between Alice and Kevin reveals the consequences of Spotify’s autoposting of Kevin’s listening 
choices:   
Kevin: If you forget [to switch to a private session on Spotify] then everybody’s like 
watching every song that you’re listening to, you could be listening to complete trash 
[Alice and Kevin laugh] really depending on what it is, it’s happened a few times to me, 
I didn’t even realise it was posting, I feel like, loads of people like it one time, like ‘what 
is this?’ 
 
Alice: And it’s like Dolly Parton. 
 
Kevin: Yeah it was Nickleback.  
 
Alice: No way – that’s so embarrassing! 
 
Here then, Kevin’s restricted Facebook performance is undermined by the Spotify app; even 
though Kevin consciously chooses to limit the amount of content he posts to Facebook, 
Spotify autoposts his listening preferences to his Facebook network without Kevin’s 
knowledge or consent, at least at the time of posting. In publishing his listening choices in this 
manner, the Spotify/ Facebook connection is working very much in contradiction to Kevin’s 
carefully performed identity on Facebook.  
 
Not only is the app working in tension with Kevin’s ‘lurker’ performance, the app is publicising 
songs that Kevin – and Alice – consider to be ‘trashy’ and ‘embarrassing’. Kevin and Alice’s 
sentiments suggest that listening preferences are here considered to be ‘symbolic markers’ of 
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identity (Marwick, 2014: 367) or as Liu frames in Bourdieu’s terms, ‘interest tokens’ that 
constitute a ‘taste statement’ (Liu, 2007). As Marwick and Liu note, identity is in part 
constituted by ‘interest tokens’ (such as songs) which ‘serve as symbolic markers that signal 
something about who [users] are’ (Marwick, 2014: 367). I will shortly return to how such taste 
statements can be considered as social classifiers of both the self and others (Bourdieu, 1989), 
but here I want to emphasise that Kevin’s music choices are framed as a taste performance that 
partially classifies ‘who he is’ (in Kevin and Alice’s eyes at least). Crucially however, unlike the 
symbolic markers of selfhood that Marwick describes, the songs Kevin is listening to on the 
Spotify app are not consciously ‘displayed’ by Kevin as markers of taste – they in fact function 
as unwanted markers that are automatically posted by the app, not by Kevin himself. Here then 
emerges an approach to identity formation that echoes Jordan’s analysis of how selves come to 
be made visible – and therefore come to exist on SNSs. Drawing parallels with Butler’s notion 
of performative identity constitution, Jordan notes that on SNSs the self comes to exist 
through visibility in that network. He states:  
The self will only maintain itself and have its own characteristics if it can continue to be 
read and be associated with its own characteristic kinds of posts. We can see this in the 
phenomenon of people logging on to someone else’s social media network and posting in 
ways that they would not normally post (2015: 128). 
 
In Kevin’s case it is not another human subject that disrupts his identity performance but a non-
human actor intervening on his behalf. In posting Kevin’s potentially ‘trashy’ or ‘embarrassing’ 
listening preferences, the Spotify app is performing a clearly unwanted utterance of selfhood – 
a moment of intervention into Kevin’s Facebook activity, wherein the app is revealed as a 
powerful, algorithmic ‘socio-technical actor’ (Gillespie, 2014: 179). By performing an act of 
self-articulation on Kevin’s behalf, Spotify thus reveals a power to actively (re)shape Kevin’s 
intentional representations of identity, rather than functioning simply as a tool for self-
expression. The ‘offending’ autopost reworks and rewrites the identity brought into existence 
via the Facebook network. 
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Performing in the ‘right’ kind of way: the ‘like’ button as a slippery signifier 
Kevin’s account also exposes the role of the ‘like’ button as a flexible signifier that does not 
necessarily denote that someone actually ‘likes’ the content that they have acknowledged. When 
Daniel later states that he makes sure his Spotify app is set to ‘private session’ when listening to 
embarrassing songs, Kevin states: 
Kevin: To be brutally honest I’ve done opposite, I’ve found a really good song and 
turned it off private and then played it to see who would comment [the group laughs] 
like five times in a row, like ‘I’ve discovered this amazing music’. 
 
Interviewer: Right and has it ever had the desired effect? Have you ever had any likes or anything? 
 
Kevin: No it only gets likes when it’s a terrible song. 
 
[Both laugh] 
 
Interviewer: Is that because people actually ‘like’ it you think?  
 
Kevin: No, no it’s because they’re ripping the piss, I think, otherwise they’re kind of like 
‘yeah whatever, you found some music, I don’t care’. 
 
The fact that Kevin believes that his friends only ‘like’ songs in order to ‘rip the piss’ not only 
highlights the discursive and affective limitations of the ‘like’ economy that Gerlitz and 
Helmond identify, it also reveals the complex strategies mobilised by individuals in order to 
subvert these limitations – according to Kevin, his friends are re-appropriating the ‘like’ button 
in order to signify their derision of Kevin’s song choices. In using the ‘like’ button to signify a 
form of ‘dislike’ (or at least derision), Kevin’s friends reveal what Latour calls ‘the risky 
intermediary pathways’ (1999: 40) subjects follow when assigning meaning to referents. In this 
case, the rigid logic of positive sentiment enforced on users through ‘like’ button is challenged; 
the pathway to meaning behind the button is made slippery, playful and ironic.63  																																																								
63	Though	not	explicitly	acknowledged	by	Kevin,	the	slipperiness	of	the	‘like’	button	also	allows	for	another	possible	
interpretation:	that	Kevin’s	friends	as	‘liking’	his	‘trashy’	song	choices	because	of	their	subcultural	value	–	that	is,	
the	songs	are	denoted	as	‘likeable’	because	they	are	‘so	bad	that	they’re	good’.	Thornton’s	work	on	subcultural	
appropriation	deals	with	this	kind	of	taste	performance,	(1997),	however	since	Kevin	reported	that	he	feels	the		
 154 
 
This is not the only form of subversion evident in this exchange however – in playing an 
‘amazing’ song five times in a row, Kevin tries to present what he deems to be a publicly 
acceptable song to his audience. In doing so Kevin is attempting to use the app as a ‘tool’ to 
perform a revised selfhood; a self-performance constituted by the public disclosure of 
‘amazing’ rather than ‘trashy’ songs. Unfortunately for Kevin, his efforts to take back control 
of his performance fall on deaf ears so to speak – it seems that Kevin’s friends only 
acknowledge his performative slippage of listening to ‘terrible’ songs in public.  
 
Kevin’s attempted redirection of Spotify’s autoposts exemplifies Gillespie’s proposal that 
algorithmic socio-technical architectures encourage users to ‘orient [themselves] towards the 
means of distribution through which we hope to speak’ (2014: 184). He writes of Facebook:  
Some [users] may work to be noticed by the algorithm: teens have been known to tag 
their status updates with unrelated brand names, in the hopes that Facebook will 
privilege those updates in their friends’ feeds... other may work to evade an algorithm 
(2014: 184). 
 
Here then Kevin is attempting to be ‘noticed’ by the Facebook/ Spotify connection in the 
‘right’ kind of way (by listening to the same song five times in a row) – in order to present a 
socially acceptable form of selfhood, Kevin works hard to orient his actions to suit the 
algorithmic protocols of the two connected apps. The algorithmic personalisation practices 
deployed by Facebook here highlight that the technological actants64 that seek to anticipate and 
intervene in user expressions of selfhood have the performative power to rewrite the self in 
ways that undermine both the autonomy and very identities of those entangled with the 
personalisation process.   																																																																																																																																																																		
songs	were	‘liked’	in	a	derisive	way,	I	have	focused	on	this	instance	of	taste	performance	as	a	kind	of	identity	
slippage	rather	than	sub-cultural	negotiation	of	‘so-bad-it’s-good’	taste.		
64	As	Sauter	uses	the	term	‘actant’	rather	than	‘actor’	it	is	worth	acknowledging	the	difference	between	these	two	
terms:	according	to	Latour,	though	both	terms	refer	to	an	entity	which	has	the	capacity	to	act	in	any	way	on	a	social	
assemblage,	an	‘actant’	is	an	actor	which	has	‘has	no	figuration	yet’	(2005:	71).	As	such,	Sauter	uses	the	term	
‘actant’	to	describe	those	actors	not	yet	configured	into	a	recognisable	site	or	object.	Similarly	I	would	argue	that	
the	contemporary	drives	to	personalise	that	take	the	focus	of	this	thesis	might	be	considered	‘actants’,	whilst	
specific	personalisation	practices	–	such	as	autoposts	–	might	be	considered	‘actors’.		
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Re(writing) and regulating the self through Spotify  
Like Kevin, Beth (24, teacher, UK) also recounted a number of unwanted autoposts by the 
Spotify app. She stated as a part of her survey response: 
I didn’t realise Spotify automatically shared everything [to Facebook]! It was only 
when someone ‘liked’ the fact that I added a song to a play list and played a song that 
I realised. I didn’t care too much, despite having a lot of guilty pleasure songs but I 
generally switch it to a private session now as it just seems unnecessary. 
 
Echoing the exchange between Kevin and Alice, Beth’s sentiments suggest here that music 
choice is a symbolic marker of taste; and by divulging her ‘guilty pleasures’, Spotify is 
unwantedly intervening in her taste performance. Furthermore, Beth expressed later that she 
felt the autoposting of ‘guilty pleasure’ songs could have an impact on how others see her on 
Facebook, stating that ‘I guess [Spotify songs] will affect how people see you, but not 
necessarily in a bad way.’  
 
Like Kevin’s testimony, Beth’s account so far highlights the power of apps such as Spotify to 
intervene in self-performance on Facebook. Yet Beth goes on to emphasise that apps hold 
even greater performative power – not only to disrupt the writing of the self on Facebook but 
to also regulate and restrict the self beyond the boundaries of the site. As Beth explained in her 
interview, the Spotify app currently has a function in which it automatically switches from a 
‘private’ to a ‘public’ listening session after twenty minutes. She stated that: 
Half the time on my phone, if I go out and I just have my headphones on if I’ve left 
[Spotify] for a bit it goes back to the non-private setting, so um, half the time on my 
phone I don’t do it because I’ve already started walking and you have to like, I don’t 
know remember how to find [the ‘private’ setting] or whatever. 
 
The fact that Spotify switches from a ‘private’ to ‘public’ session after twenty minutes impedes 
Beth’s capacity to comfortably remain in the realm of private listening, leading to her concern 
that the type of song she is listening to many not be suitable for sharing: 
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I might be listening to something and then I’m like ‘oh I want to listen to something else’ 
and then I’ll think, I’ll remember I’m online, maybe because I want to listen to something 
that’s a bit more like, I don’t know, that I don’t want anyone to know about. 
 
Beth explicitly states that this disclosure of her song choices is unwanted, but she does not 
know how to stop it; she states: ‘I’d rather have it so it’s a private setting all the time, but... I 
don’t really know how to do that’. To compensate for this lack of technological know-how, 
Beth has come up with an alternative solution to avoid the unwanted disclosure of the songs 
she is not comfortable sharing:  
If I listen to a playlist quite often I’ll just kind of leave it because then it will just say 
I’ve listened to that playlist rather than specific songs. 
 
Beth here then recounts that her Spotify/ Facebook connection has actively led to a restriction 
of the songs that Beth feels she can listen to while she is listening on her mobile phone – to 
avoid the risk of publicising a song ‘she doesn’t want anyone to know about’, Beth will only 
listen to specific play lists. The Spotify app’s connection to Facebook here then works to 
regulate Beth’s listening habits, redirecting Beth’s self-performance through an architectural 
framework that encourages her to adhere to symbolic markers of music taste that she feels are 
publicly acceptable. The ‘publicness’ of Spotify’s listening session thus compels Beth to modify 
her listening practices to suit the perceived scrutiny of her invisible audience, despite the fact 
she is enacting the very much private performance of simply listening to music on her mobile 
phone.  
 
Beth’s strategy for coping with Spotify’s autoposting capabilities expose the power of apps not 
just to perform on behalf of the user but to actively redirect – and in Beth’s case regulate – the 
kinds of performance that can be enacted in relation to the self. Beth’s coping strategies 
exemplify Agre’s ‘capture model’ of socio-technical organisation; that is, ‘the grammar of 
action’ imposed on users causes the individual ‘to orient their activities towards the capture 
machinery and its institutional consequences’ (1994: 110). In Beth’s case the ‘capture 
machinery’ is the algorithmic technologies employed by Facebook and Spotify, and the 
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‘institutional consequences’ are the making ‘public’ (to Beth’s Facebook network at least) of 
music preferences that would otherwise be private. By forcing Beth to orient her activities and 
regulate her music choice to adhere to a normative ideal of publicly acceptable music, the idea 
that Spotify helps Beth express her identity is called very much into question.  
 
It is worth highlighting that Facebook’s ‘capture machinery’ is able to regulate Beth’s behaviour 
here because of the perceived scrutiny of her invisible Facebook audience that the app enables, 
wherein a ‘panopticon’ (Foucault, 1988) of social surveillance is (self)imposed as a disciplinary 
power. Furthermore, the disciplinary power of the invisible audience is deployed and enforced 
via the logic of the ‘like’ economy – that is, Beth’s not only social but private interactions 
(between herself and her music player) are commodified by Spotify and Facebook, who seek to 
generate revenue through the making public of private listening habits. Beth’s negotiations with 
her Spotify/ Facebook connections are therefore conditioned through a complex intersection 
of algorithmic protocols, social surveillance and the logic of the like economy – all of which 
lead to a regulation of Beth’s self-expressions. In structuring these conditions in a disciplinary 
framework, it seems here Spotify/ Facebook hold the performative power to tell Beth ‘who 
she is’, rather than vice versa.  
 
‘Spotify has added an event…’ 
Beth’s negotiations with her Spotify/ Facebook connection were further complicated by 
another account of autoposting. She explains how a few weeks prior to the interview that 
Spotify had ‘added an event from her past’: 
[Spotify] sent me this completely random thing that came up on my phone the other day 
that said um, ‘Spotify has added an event from your past’, and I was like ‘what is that?’ 
and it was just that I’d listened to this completely random song like, several months 
ago… it just popped there, and it kind of annoyed me because it didn’t ask me if I 
wanted to put it on there, it just added it on there. 
 
Beth expanded on her reasoning for being annoyed by this unwanted addition to her ‘past’. 
When asked ‘was it a song that you were happy to be added?’, she explained: 
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It wasn’t one that I minded, no it wasn’t like a cheesy, it was just a random album 
song… I felt a bit indifferent about it, about the song choice, but it felt like [Spotify] 
was trying to make it significant and it wasn’t, because I was just listening to it as part 
of the album you know, it wasn’t like a special thing or anything. 
 
Here then it is not so much the ‘tackiness’ of the song that registers as annoying for Beth – 
rather it is the fact that an ‘insignificant’ song in Beth’s listening habits has been suddenly and 
non-consensually demarcated as ‘significant’ to Beth’s ‘past’. When asked whether she deleted 
the unwanted autopost, Beth replied:  
Well no, because when I actually went on to my page I couldn’t see it, but then 
somebody liked it, so it must’ve been somewhere but I couldn’t find where it was… you 
know when it shows just [notifications] on the iphone, but then it wasn’t like on my 
page or on my, it was kind of just an isolated, so I don’t know where it is, or if it’s still 
there, I don’t really know. 
 
Spotify’s utterance of selfhood on Beth’s behalf here takes on both an ephemeral and archival 
quality – it has been added but Beth does not know where it is, rendering action against the 
offending autopost impossible. As Beth states, the song is not an identity marker deemed 
important enough for her to consider it as ‘significant’ to her archived selfhood on Facebook, 
yet Beth in this instance is powerless to become editor of her written historical identity. The 
ambiguous visibility (i.e. that the post is ephemerally visible to her and may or may not be 
visible to her friends) of such posts is an attribute unique to autoposting, as outlined further in 
the following subsections.  
 
Here however I want to stress that Beth’s Facebook/ Spotify connection exemplifies the 
struggle for autonomy between user and system, that as I argue in Chapter Two is created by 
algorithmic personalisation. By this I mean that in this instance, the app’s decision-making 
capacities to automatically ‘add a song’ to Beth’s ‘past’ exist in direct tension to Beth’s own 
decision that the song is indeed irrelevant to her historical identity. The apparent ‘convenience’ 
of having an app ‘personalise’ for Beth her very history thus becomes a site of struggle in 
which the app is imbued with autonomous capability. In doing so Spotify’s action works to 
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quite literally rewrite Beth’s Facebook history to suit the operational imperatives of Spotify.  
 
‘You have one identity’? Context collapse caused by apps  
Not all moments of identity performance slippage via apps exposed a ‘guilty pleasure’ for 
participants. For example, Sam (digital communications manager, 29) reported that she had 
only experienced one instance of autoposting – by an app called Slideshare – a tool for 
designing and creating professional presentations. Sam explains that:  
So it turns out when I upload something to Slideshare [a presentation app] it posts a 
picture of it on Facebook… that’s why I don’t like things that autopost, because I 
don’t, I don’t really use, I don’t use my personal Facebook profile for works things, I 
use Twitter for it, so my Twitter profile is like my ‘work me’. 
 
Sam thus alludes to the fact that her identity performance changes depending on the platform 
– her Twitter account presents her ‘work me’, while her Facebook account does not. 
Furthermore, as Sam herself admitted during the interview, publicising your professional 
presentations does not necessarily constitute a disclosure of a ‘guilty pleasure’. Why then was 
she bothered by this unintended posting of professional content? She explained that:  
I think for me I guess it goes back to the like, the persona thing because I don’t really 
talk about work on Facebook… it just didn’t really fit with the sort of stuff I do, 
whereas with Twitter I’d more than happily say, in fact probably will say, this is a 
presentation that I did because that’s where I talk to people about work stuff I do, and 
I have people who follow me for work stuff. 
 
Thus in this instance the autoposts of Slideshare do not disrupt the boundary between public 
and private – a boundary crossed in Beth and Kevin’s negotiations with Spotify for instance – 
but instead a boundary between online social contexts. In dissolving the boundary between 
Facebook and Slideshare, the Slideshare app’s actions epitomise what Marwick and boyd call 
‘context collapse’ (2008) – that is ‘the theory that social technologies make it difficult to vary 
self-presentation based on environment or audience’ (Marwick, 2014: 368). As Marwick notes, 
‘people have developed a variety of techniques to handle context collapse’ (2014: 368), and in 
Sam’s case this entails having separate Twitter and Facebook accounts that represent different 
facets of Sam’s selfhood. In autoposting symbolic markers of her professional selfhood to the 
 160 
wrong context (that is Facebook rather than Twitter), the Slideshare app brings about a 
collapse between contexts that Sam has worked hard to avoid.  
 
In creating this context collapse for Sam, the Slideshare app highlights that Facebook’s 
ambition to become a ‘cross-platform platform’ can tangibly disrupt the context-specific 
identity performances enacted by users. In doing so, autoposts by apps highlight that users do 
not have one identity that can be ‘expressed’ across all platforms to all audiences. Sam’s 
sentiments exemplify Van Dijck’s assertion that: ‘each construction of self entails a strategy 
aimed at performing a social act or achieving a particular social goal’ (2013: 212). The function of 
apps to apparently ‘express who you are through all the things you do’ (Facebook, 2013) 
actually works to foreclose the possibilities of enacting multiple identities across different 
platforms.  
 
More than this though, the context collapse caused by autoposting across platforms (which is 
indifferent to the various presentations of self that are deemed appropriate by subjects to 
various contexts) here makes explicit the impossibilities inherent in the contemporary drive to 
personalise: that is, to both ‘know’ and ‘anticipate’ the ‘one identity’ that Zuckerberg believes 
exists, but whose endless expressions can be successfully captured across and recursively used 
to anticipate the endlessly-expressive user. As explored in Chapter Two, data trackers’ tireless 
efforts to correlate and map the trajectories of abstract ‘dividuals’ is indicative of the fact that 
platform providers are not trying to make fixable ‘one identity’ – rather they are trying to 
capture, correlate and monetise real-time movements between dividuals as nodes in a network. 
The cross-platform connectivity of autoposting apps may enhance Facebook’s scope for 
commercial development by allowing Facebook to track or anticipate selfhoods across 
platforms, but in doing so they negate the potential for users to perform multiple, carefully 
performed selfhoods in exclusive online environments. In Sam’s words, ‘the apps I choose 
probably do tell people about me. But I am not my Facebook app permissions’.  
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Sexually suggestive content and exploiting the connectivity of apps  
Kevin, Sam and Beth’s engagement with apps and autoposts so far revolve around the 
apparently innocuous leakage of ‘taste statements’ (Lui, 2008) that unintentionally intervene 
with their self-performance on Facebook and elsewhere. Calum’s experiences of apps however 
involved the disclosure of slightly more sensitive material. Calum explains:  
So what happened was, on Instagram you know, I follow all sorts of things, mostly 
friends but you know sometimes the occasional celebrity who’s interesting on 
Instagram... but in this instance it was a porn star. 
 
Calum explains that he was ‘liking’ (on Instagram, a popular photo sharing platform) photos 
from this porn star, some of which were sexually suggestive, and in doing so these photos were 
appearing as part of his Facebook activity: 
Of course these [photos] were coming up on my News Feed, which I didn’t, which I 
wouldn’t have been made aware of, only for I think another friend had actually liked it 
on Facebook. 
 
Calum, like Sam, Kevin Beth and all other participants who had experienced unwanted 
autoposts, acknowledges that though he may have consented to some form of autoposting as 
part of the Terms of Service for using the app, 65 he was not aware that this particular instance 
of autoposting was going to occur. As Calum puts it ‘I wasn’t aware of what [Instagram] was 
going to be sharing…  I understood it more as that if I took pictures and wanted to share 
them, they would share to Facebook’; it did not occur to him that simply ‘liking’ a photo on 
Instagram would trigger an autopost to Facebook. Though Calum figured out how to cut off 
the connection between Instagram and Spotify (though he admits it was ‘a bit of a job’), his 
experience highlights a subtle but important distinction: though Calum had consented to ‘the 
app posting on his behalf’ at the time of installing the app, he felt he had not consented to the 
specifics of autoposting with which he had subsequently been confronted. As scholars such as 																																																								
65Sam,	Beth	and	Kevin	also	acknowledged	that	that	autoposting	may	have	been	a	prerequisite	to	using	the	app.	For	
example,	Beth	stated	‘maybe	it	was	like	in	[Spotify’s]	Terms	and	Conditions	or	I	just	didn’t	read	it	properly,	but	I	felt	
it	should	have	asked	me	first	[before	autoposting].’	Beth’s	sentiment	highlights	the	precarious	nature	of	consenting	
to	autoposts:	though	participants	recognise	that	they	were	required	to	consent	to	the	possibility	of	autoposting	in	
order	to	use	the	app,	they	did	not	consent	to	the	specific	instances	of	autoposting	that	they	have	had	to	negotiate.		
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Gillespie (2014) and McStay (2012) have noted, the lack of specific information, use of opaque 
and vague terminology in Terms of Service mean that understanding of the socio-technological 
conditions which users commonly accept can at times be ‘vague, simplistic, sometimes 
mistaken’ (Gillespie 2014: 185).  It seems then that for Calum merely consenting to autoposting 
as part of the terms and conditions of app use does not equate to unconditional consent in all 
circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that Calum realised these photos were being publicised on Facebook 
only after his friend had ‘liked’ them highlights a form of opacity unique to autoposting: that is, 
unlike other posts that are consciously written by the user themselves, autoposts by apps do 
not always appear on a user’s own Timeline or Newsfeed – instead, they appear only on 
friends’ News Feeds, or tickers. These autoposts then are invisible to the very individual that 
has supposedly ‘written’ them, thus rendering action against such autoposts impossible – unless 
the autopost is made visible by another user’s acknowledgement of it.  
 
This ambiguous invisibility of autoposts is a characteristic unique to autoposts – all of the other 
‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1994) that can be performed through Facebook (writing 
status updates, sharing content, uploading photos) are fully visible and controlled by the user 
because they are enacted and instigated by the user. The invisibility of autoposting highlights 
the ‘slipperiness’ of algorithmic personalisation – users do not know for sure what is being 
personalised, when and how. In this case what is being personalised are articulations of 
personhood itself. In doing so autoposting can be considered a kind of ‘technology of the self’ that 
is far removed from the self it supposedly articulates – autoposts are invisible to the user they 
speak for. And yet I would argue that even as this articulation of self is removed from the self 
being articulated, it is simultaneously ‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with it because autoposts work 
(in part) to performatively constitute the self articulated to a user’s Facebook audience. To 
elaborate; Jordan emphasises that the process of producing subjective ‘presence’ in internet-
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based communicative practices ‘depends on a priority from receivers who legitimate senders based 
on styles of messages and the sending of messages’ (2013: 131, my emphasis). Applying this to 
the ‘material performative’ (Jordan, 2013: 53) of autoposting, it seems that the self is legitimised 
as a subject by receivers (in this case the Facebook audience) without any conscious action from the 
sender/ subject at all. This might explain why autoposting is so overwhelming unpopular (with 
both participants and the wider Facebook usership) – not because autoposts are ‘confusing’ as 
Facebook claim, but because they algorithmically constitute the self in ways that remove the 
self (at that moment) entirely from the process of constitution.  
 
Wanted autoposting?  
What of those autoposts that are wanted by users? Marc (postgraduate student, 24) and Rory 
(sales manager, 30) were the only participants who said they ‘did not mind’ if apps autoposted 
to their Facebook audiences. However, even these participants did not mean any app – they 
were specific about the apps that they did not mind autoposting on their behalf. For example, 
Marc, who had no specific negative experiences of autoposting, did acknowledge that he 
enjoyed publishing his running activities to Facebook through the Sports Tracker app – he 
stated that ‘I get a few likes now and then if it’s a particularly long run’. Similarly Rory stated 
that he ‘always knows’ when the Pinterest app will autopost, and ‘it’s not necessarily that it’s 
something that I wouldn’t share anyways, it’s just about the fact that you know, I’m in charge 
of all of this’. The key difference between Marc/ Rory’s and Calum’s experiences seems to be 
the awareness enjoyed by Marc and Rory and the high degree of control that such awareness 
afforded them. Thus, in Marc and Rory’s account, the app functions more like a tool than an 
actor, and thus works to support their intended identity performances, rather than disrupt or 
undermine them, or indeed trigger a struggle for autonomous control over what is posted and 
when. It seems then that it is the very unwantedness of offending autoposts that renders their 
function as actors apparent.  
 
 164 
Autoposts as spam and game posting as ‘chavvy’   
This chapter has so far centred on the interventions of apps into participants own self-
performances – yet many participants also noted the presence of apps in their friends’ 
Facebook activities. Somewhat surprisingly given their popularity on Facebook, it was friends’ 
posts regarding game apps that were most frequently cited as irritating, frustrating or annoying. 
As Melanie states of game posts by her friends: 
It’s advertisements as far as I’m concerned… it’s people I know that are advertising 
these things and it’s crafty and I don’t like it. 
 
Melanie’s observations that games posts are ‘advertising’ exists in clear tension to Facebook’s 
rhetorical framing of these same posts as ‘sharing’ – yet her sentiments highlight that the like 
economy is built on a system of social connectivity that can be efficiently monetized by the 
platforms that support it (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). For example, players of the popular 
2014 smartphone game ‘Candy Crush’ can either pay for ‘tickets’ to proceed to the next level of 
the game, or they can ask their Facebook friends for tickets via Facebook. Instances such as 
these render the value of social connectivity as profoundly apparent – the connection between 
three Facebook ‘friends’ (the number of friends needed to get a ticket) is quite literally worth 
79p.  
 
Participants’ framing of posts by games as ‘advertising’ suggest that the monetary value of the 
social web does not go unnoticed by those users implicated in it. These posts by game apps 
highlight the advertising value of Facebook apps for third party stakeholders (app developers, 
app owners, data aggregators etc.) in terms of generating visibility for marketers’ apps – yet 
these same posts, according to participants, also hold negative cultural value for users in relation 
to self-performance on Facebook. For example Sophie (publishing assistant, 28) stated:  
My biggest reaction when I see people post gamey kinds of status things is just like 
I can’t believe you play those stupid games, and people actually go down in my 
esteem.  
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Similarly in their group interview with Daniel and Kevin, Rory and Alice took up the idea 
of game invites as ‘spammy’ and annoying. Like Sophie, Alice and Rory believe that 
autoposts on Facebook affect how others see them: 
Alice: Yeah I think I just think people are probably just a bit stupid that’s really harsh 
isn’t it…  I mean it’s slightly hypocritical me saying this because I’ve clicked through 
terms and conditions without looking at anything, but I think it’s just a sign of people 
not really paying attention to what they’re doing, or not really having the foresight to 
think oh hold on maybe I should check this because games are really dodgy on 
Facebook. 
 
Rory: I guess there are some people who are just, so [pauses] I don’t even know how to  
describe it. 
 
Alice: Were you going to say chavvy? 
 
Rory: Well I can think of somebody who I would class as being chavvy who does, who 
everything comes through and you think, ah, typical. 
 
Alice: I hadn’t thought of it as a generalisation but I can immediately think of some 
people who would fit that bill. 
 
The class connotations in this somewhat hesitant and self-conscious exchange are clear – both 
Rory and Alice agree that inviting people to play games and posting game posts is ‘chavvy’ (see 
footnote 54 for definition). Here then, Bourdieu’s theories of taste, class and cultural capital are 
useful to consider. Bourdieu notes that individuals’ sense of taste – that is ‘our tendency and 
ability to acquire (materially and symbolically) a certain class of classified and classify objects or 
practices’ (189: 173) – is deployed in order to distinguish legitimate and acceptable social 
practices from those deemed to be illegitimate or unacceptable. The act of even unintentionally 
allowing autoposts to bombard friends with invites is used by Alice and Rory to classify those 
who allow it as ‘chavvy’. Rebecca (lecturer, 27), echoed this, stating:  
When I see people post stuff or you know sharing stuff about games, I don’t think 
you’re an idiot for playing the game, I think you’re an idiot for sharing it. 
 
Thus for Rebecca, it is not the playing of the game in itself that matters, it is making the 
game play public that is seen as detrimental. Here, Liu’s analysis of ‘destructive 
information’ in relation to the performance of the self becomes especially relevant. As 
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Liu states: 
Any outlier of interest tokens in [user] profiles – such as the inadvertent mention of 
something tabooed or distasteful – could constitute destructive information and spoil 
the impressions that users are trying to foster (2008: 258). 
 
Autoposts by game apps are framed by Sophie, Rebecca, Alice and Rory as pieces of 
‘destructive information’ – the sharing of game achievement is connoted to be detrimental or 
distasteful. The question of why game posts are so detrimental to these users – as compared to 
other autoposts or actions by other apps – is a complex one that requires critical examinations 
of class, gender and socio-economic circumstance, especially in relation to cultural and social 
capital. As Turner notes however, in the fields of internet studies ‘class has taken little hold as 
an analytical lens outside the literature on the digital divide’ (2014: 257), and so there is limited 
literature regarding the relation between articulations of taste as classed on social media.66 That 
said, scholars such as Livingstone (2014), Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe (2007) and Schradie 
(2012) have begun to broach the roles that class, cultural capital and social capital might place 
in the formation and sustenance of social relationships on SNSs. For example in their study of 
‘social bridging and bonding’ on Facebook (2007), Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe state that ‘we 
can definitively state there is a positive relationship between certain kinds of Facebook use and 
the maintenance and creation of social capital’ (2007: 1161). However though their study 
suggests that Facebook use helps individuals generate social capital67 in the forms of generating 
more social ties, their research does less to consider how cultural capital – that is what Bourdieu 
defines as acquired ‘knowledge’, ‘manners’ or ‘orientations/ dispositions’ (Jenkins, 2002: 85) 
that are seen to be ‘legitimate’ by particular classes or groups and therefore ‘mark and maintain 
																																																								
66	There	is	however	extensive	literature	on	class	and	other	media	–	for	more	see	Skeggs	&	Wood	(2008)	for	work	on	
reality	TV	and	class;	Hall,	Clarke,	Jefferson	and	Roberts	(1975)	and	Thornton	(1997)	for	media,	subcultures	and	class;	
Medhurst	(2002)	for	work	on	British	identities	and	comedy	and	Hesmondagh	(2013)	for	popular	music	and	classed	
taste	judgments.		
67	Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	describe	social	capital	as	‘the	sum	of	resources,	actual	or	virtual,	that	accrue	to	an	
individual	or	group	by	virtue	of	possessing	a	durable	network	of	more	or	less	institutionalized	relationships	of	
mutual	acquaintance	and	recognition’	(cited	in	Ellison	et	al,	2007:	1145)		
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social boundaries’ (Jenkins, 2002: 135)68 – might be affected by the generation of social capital. 
Though I feel this avenue of investigation would contribute to research on how class dynamics 
affect identity and taste performance on Facebook, I feel that a more in-depth study of class, 
game apps and identity performance lies outside the remit of this study of user entanglements 
with algorithmic personalisation. What I would argue here is that algorithmic personalisation 
practices ‘classify’ users in abstract and multiple ways – users are classified as dividuals in 
databases that are then translated back into traditional classifying demographics (as explained in 
Chapter Two), but also at other times algorithmic personalisation practices can make 
interventions into how others classify us, by performing on our behalf taste articulations that are 
judged as ‘distasteful’ or illegitimate. That is, by acting for us, algorithmic personalisation does 
not just ‘personalise’ experience but in the case of autoposting, act for users in ways that trigger 
value judgements by other users.   
 
It seems important to highlight that as well as relating to class dynamics, ‘distasteful’ (to those I 
interviewed) identity performances via game apps seem to involve breach of expected norms 
and practices on Facebook. For example Sam when asked why she finds frequent posts from 
her gamer friends annoying, she states:   
I think the fact that they don’t seem to have any self-control about sharing, so 
whether on not it’s that the app’s too tricky or forces you to invite people... but I 
think it’s because I’d see it as being a little bit impolite, or it’s just not my version 
of internet etiquette to spam people with this stuff. 
 
Game app posts by friends for Sam then breach her expectations of ‘internet etiquette’. As 
McLaughlin and Vitak note, online norms are dependent on the technology that facilitate them, 
and as such the ‘norms’ associated with socio-technical practices (such as autoposting) must 
																																																								
68	Jenkins’	(2002)	work	on	Bourdieu	clearly	demarks	cultural	capital	as	a	matter	of	taste	–	he	writes	of	Bourdieu	
work	Distinction	that	‘Bourdieu’s	target	here	is…	the	consistent	use	of	notions	of	‘taste’	as	a	sort	of	naturally	
occurring	phenomenon-	to	mark	and	maintain	(in	part	by	masking	the	marking)	social	boundaries,	whether	these	be	
between	the	dominant	and	dominated	classes	or	within	classes’	(2002:	135).	In	defining	the	accumulation/	
decumulation	of	cultural	capital	as	a	matter	of	taste	it	is	possible	to	see	how	identity	performance	(by	autopost	or	
by	Facebook	users	themselves)	might	be	considered	to	be	‘tacky’	or	‘tasteless’.		
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‘evolve with the technology’ (2012: 3). Autoposting by apps is a developing socio-technological 
practice that is yet to be accompanied by a fixed set of norms. Such norms can be seen as 
conditioned by taste and value judgements made by others about what is ‘legitimate’ or 
‘acceptable’ in terms of automated social interactions. As such, it seems game autoposts can 
breach the established socio-cultural norms held by some of the individuals exposed to them.  
 
Furthermore, Jordan notes that the changeability of communication technologies has 
implications for these technologies as ‘material performatives’ (2013). He states: ‘what is at 
stake [in communicative practices] are not fixed universals but particular social and cultural 
practices that allow transmission to reliably and repeatedly occur’ (2013: 133). The repetition 
Jordan refers to here relates to Butler’s proposal that it is discursive iterative acts which 
constitute and also destabilise the self; Butler notes that it is through repetition that subjects 
come to be discursively constituted, and yet it is through repetition (which is paradoxically 
never an exact copy of itself) that space for destabilisation opens up (Butler, 1993, Jordan; 
2013). As a new form of material performative, autoposting does not just carry a new set of 
cultural practices, it also opens up new possibilities for iteration and destabilisation of the self – 
as the accounts of Beth, Kevin and Calum make apparent.  
 
It is important to note that the as-yet contestable cultural practices inherent in autoposting are 
structured not only by legitimised social values but also by the exchange values imposed on 
social interactions by the ‘like economy’. As Jarrett notes, we must consider users ‘as agents 
who, while exercising that agency, may nevertheless be working within capital, disciplining 
other users into social norms and patterns of behaviour that support that system’ (2014a: 24). 
With autoposts, though the classed values expressed by participants involve disciplining 
(through judging as illegitimate) other users’ autoposting actions, autoposting seems also to be 
rejected by participants in part because they are viewed as advertising. Here then, the disciplinary 
power of the invisible audience seeks to regulate users through class dynamics, and yet also 
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seems to reject the capitalist mechanics of autoposting as a form of advertising – there is a 
rejection here of autoposts as ‘tasteless’ because they are commercial mechanisms. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, autoposts by apps may soon be phased out of Facebook’s structural 
architecture altogether due to their unpopularity – the next ‘phase’ in the evolution of non-
human ‘tools’ for self-expression seems to be ‘suggested shares’ such as Facebook’s 
automatically generated ‘memories’ updates, which afford the users a far higher degree of 
control over the auto-generated post in terms of who is it shared to and when. For now it 
seems however that the participants included in this study are caught up in socio-cultural 
moment that may not last – their negotiations with apps signify a transient practice of explicitly 
unwanted algorithmic personalisation that may soon be ‘fixed’ by Facebook.  
 
Conclusion: algorithmic personalisation and the performed self 
This chapter has sought to explore and analyse autoposts by third party apps as automated 
utterances of selfhood – and as moments of algorithmic personalisation – that intervene and at 
times disrupt the carefully considered identity performances that Facebook users enact on 
Facebook. My analysis of participants’ accounts of (largely unwanted) moments of autoposting 
has sought to highlight that Facebook’s third party apps are not only tools that ‘help users 
express who they are’ as Facebook claims – they are technological actors that hold the 
autonomous potential to write, and therefore perform, acts of selfhood on behalf of users. By 
considering the lived experiences of those who have encountered autoposting it becomes 
possible to document and critically examine one of the key arguments proposed in Chapter 
Two: that is, personalisation’s attempts to act autonomously yet algorithmically on the user’s 
behalf actually works to undermine the autonomous identity articulations supposedly aided by 
personalisation. This process of personalisation thus creates an entanglement between the 
user’s identity and algorithmic identity – Kevin and Beth must struggle to control the identity 
performance enacted on their behalf by Spotify to their invisible audiences, Sam must negotiate 
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autoposts between two platforms in order to perform the ‘correct’ kind of context-specific 
selfhood. 
 
Though this chapter has looked to examine largely unwanted moments of autoposting, is 
important to reiterate, as highlighted by Marc and Rory’s testimonies, that not all posts by apps 
are viewed as detrimental to self-presentation on Facebook: given the right level of consent, 
control and understanding, apps can and are used by users to display wanted – rather than 
unwanted – taste articulations. The popularity of apps also suggests that many users willingly 
and enjoyably engage with apps on a daily basis. It thus seems it is the unconsensual nature of 
autoposts – where the app as tool becomes the app as unwanted actor that can perform and act 
on behalf of the user – that is resisted by participants.    
 
Finally, this chapter has sought to critically consider what kinds of identity constitution 
autoposting constructs and demands for those entangled with this specific personalisation 
practice. As noted in the introductory chapter and as Jordan recognises, SNSs demand a new 
consideration of the ways that the self is invoked and constructed. Jordan states: 
Uneasily coincident [on SNSs] are the self as someone who came to the network – in 
terms of private and public this is likely to be someone who comes with their identity 
as property – and the performances the identity puts on, which are required to exist 
on the network and so require publicness (130: 2013) 
 
For the Ghostery users interviewed as part of this thesis, the inner, pre-existing self was 
invoked as an identity constitution that must be ‘protected’ against data tracking (but not 
necessarily against personalisation practices for some users). Conversely in this chapter the 
performed self as constituted through the network is brought to the fore in autoposting.  
 
The self that is performatively constituted through autoposting takes on a particular 
significance if we consider the cross-platform potentialities of autoposts to regulate and govern 
the identities beyond the boundaries of Facebook. If we take as an example Beth’s regulation 
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of her listening habits to suit the ‘publicness’ demanded by her Spotify/ Facebook, it is 
possible to mark a tangible moment of constitution and regulation enforced by the 
personalisation process – Beth’s listening habits are redirected through a grammar of action 
that not only regulates her self performance on Facebook but her performative articulations of 
selfhood as she listens to a (limited) playlist walking down the street. Furthermore, Beth’s 
negotiations with Spotify reveal that apps can intervene in not only present articulations of the 
self but past ones too – by adding an unwanted event to Beth’s Facebook history, the Spotify 
app has the power to quite literally rewrite Beth’s ‘past’ selfhood on Facebook.  In doing so, 
autoposts highlight the performative power of Facebook apps to constitute particular kinds of 
selfhood – selves that adhere to ‘legitimate’ classifications of taste, public acceptability and 
cultural interest, and that suit not only the logic ‘like’ economy but also the commercial drive to 
anticipate and act on the user.  
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Chapter Six 
  
In Google We Trust: 
the predictive promises of Google Now 
 
 
‘With the predictive power of Now you get just what you need to know, right when you need it’   
            (Google Now, 2014).  
 
‘They know I’m on campus, but I mean they got that wrong as well… I think like I’d trust them to be able to 
do more than that… I mean like with all the information and like algorithms and whatever they have, I 
wouldn’t assume them to get it wrong’  
   (Lisa, in focus group, 2014). 
 
Part I 
Introduction: the information you need before you even ask 
This chapter is the last of three to focus on a specific site of investigation that explores how 
individuals engage with and negotiate contemporary algorithmic personalisation practices. The 
site of investigation focuses on ‘digital personal assistant’ Google Now (Google Now, 2014) as 
an example of algorithmic personalisation. The chapter draws on the accounts of six Google 
Now users who were interviewed four times over the space of six weeks, and so the study 
differs from the previous two in that it was designed to capture participants’ sustained yet 
developing engagement with an example of a technology that heavily relies on algorithmic 
personalisation. The chapter is structured around the themes that emerged as part of the study. 
These themes include; participants’ framing of the app as ‘smart’ and ‘impressive’ even as the 
app failed to be ‘useful’; participants’ invocation of self-blame in order to explain the app’s 
failures; their faith that Google would uphold its side in the data-for-services exchange that has 
arisen at points in this thesis; and finally, participants’ expectations that the app could and 
should know them, anticipate them and personalise for them to an extraordinarily complex 
degree. Furthermore, this chapter proposes that Google Now’s interface and algorithmic 
protocols construct and evoke an ideologically normative ‘ideal user’ in order to present 
‘personalised’ information. These themes come together to produce what I define as an 
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enduring sense of ‘trust’ that these participants bestowed not only in the app itself, but in 
Google as a broader technological, socio-cultural and commercial force.  
 
It is important to note that all participants in this study were ‘freshers’ – first year 
undergraduate students enrolled in a digital media studies module. As such this study is 
underpinned by a methodology that seeks to acknowledge and build on these participants’ 
simultaneous development as Google Now users and as developing media studies scholars, to 
explore the ways that their critical skills intersect with their sustained engagements with this 
personalisation app. 
 
The former title quote above is taken from the launch video accompanying the roll-out of 
Google’s newest search engine manifestation: Google Now, a component of the Google 
Search mobile app and ‘intelligent personal assistant’ designed to feed users ‘information that is 
relevant to them’ (Google, 2104) as and when they need it. Google Now promises to 
algorithmically deliver this information in ‘one simple swipe’, offering to the user ‘cards’ 
containing the information that Google has deemed worthy of need ‘throughout their day’ – 
such as commute times from ‘home’ to ‘work’, traffic and location updates, TV and movie 
recommendations, ‘photo spots nearby’ and stocks, sports, flights and weather data.69 As the 
quote suggests, unlike the established Google Search widely used in computers browsers 
throughout the world, Google Now promises frictionless, pre-emptive information retrieval 
that supposedly circumvents the need to actively input a search query in order to receive 
‘relevant’ information – an apparently now unnecessary moment of user-initiated action upon 
which Google Search has conventionally had to rely. As Chapter Two explored, contemporary 
digital assistants such as Google Now claim to assist users by offering an efficient and 
convenient information management service that imbues the system with some autonomous 																																																								69	These	cards	are	structured	to	correspond	to	the	following	categories:	Birthdays,	Events	Nearby,	Flights,	Gmail,	
Movies,	New	Releases,	News	Updates,	Next	Appointment,	Photo	spot,	Places,	Public	Alerts,	Public	Transport,	Topic	
updates,	TV	&	Video,	Sports,	Stocks,	Traffic,	Travel,	Weather	and	Website	Updates	(see	figures	8-12	for	examples).	
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decision-making capacities. In encompassing these decision-making capacities, Google Now 
presents the development of a new (if somewhat flawed, as this chapter explores) stage towards 
pre-emptive, personalised information retrieval wherein, in the company’s own words, Google 
can now ‘give you the information you need throughout your day, before you even ask’ (Google, 
2014, my emphasis).  
 
Google’s predictive promise is at face-value a neat rhetorical tagline designed to appeal to busy 
mobile users ‘on the go’ (according to the study’s participants at least, as I shall explore). 
However the statement also exemplifies Google’s long-standing conceptual ideal; that is, to 
‘know’ a user’s needs, desires and ‘intentions’ (Jarrett, 2014: 17) in order to provide the most 
efficient and convenient forms of search retrieval. As I will explore shortly, scholars such as 
Hillis, Petit and Jarrett (2013), Jarrett (2014) and Campanelli (2014) have noted that this 
conceptual ideal gives rise to a host of potentially profound philosophical, theoretical and 
socio-political implications for the users aggregated and constructed by this recursive system. 
Google Now’s ‘predictive powers’ (Google Now, 2014) also signify an important shift in terms 
of the human/ non-human agency model with which it has previously operated, wherein the 
autonomy usually afforded to the user in searching for ‘relevant’ information is instead 
afforded to the app; making Google Now an exemplary form of algorithmic personalisation. 
This shift raises a range of critical questions relevant to this thesis; what does it mean to 
attempt to realise the task of giving a user ‘what they want’, ‘before they even ask’? What forms 
– and formats – of information does Google Now deem worthy of personal ‘need’ to any given 
user’s everyday trajectory? How does that user negotiate, appropriate and understand this 
apparently necessary information? In what ways, if any, is the user’s lived experience informed, 
altered, and even constructed by the pre-emptive inferred ‘experience’ that Google Now 
attempts to map onto an individuals’ daily lived trajectory? This chapter draws on the accounts 
of six Google Now users, who engaged with the app over the space of six weeks, to explore 
these users’ engagements with the app’s ‘predictive powers’ (Google Now, 2014).  
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Theorising Google’s pre-emptive vision 
In attempting to give its users what they need before they even ask, Google Now signifies an 
important step closer to Google co-founder’s Larry Page and Sergey Brin conceptual ideal; that 
is, to deliver to users a kind of frictionless search mechanism in which a user’s informational 
needs and desires can be met without any labour on the user’s part. In 2004 Brin envisioned:  
Right now you go into your computer and type a phrase, but you can imagine 
that it could be easier in the future, that you can have just devices you talk into, 
or you can have computers that pay attention to what’s going on around them 
and suggest useful information (2004, cited in Levy, 2011: 67). 
 
Brin and Page’s ‘dream’ of designing a system with the user’s wants and needs in mind was not 
a concept unique to them – as Oudshoorn, Rommes and Stienstra note, the late 1980s marked 
a shift in ‘the paradigm in design theory’ away from ‘technology-oriented design’ and towards 
‘user-oriented design’ (2004: 30). Brin and Page’s ideal thus follows a dominant belief of the 
time in that user-oriented design approaches placed users’ needs, interests and intentions at the 
heart of the design process. However, as Oudshoorn, Rommes and Stienstra (2004) and other 
design theorists such as Law have noted, this emphasis on user-oriented design can be 
problematised by design structures and processes that ‘configure the user’ (Law, 1991) through 
assumed ideological norms that constructed an ‘imagined’ user. Implicit in these structures was 
a user assumed to be ‘everybody’ but that in reality reflected and maintained pre-existed socio-
cultural assumptions that the ideal user was white, male, and middle class. In other words, 
through this normative design process ‘technologies become adjusted to certain groups of 
users and not to others’ (Oudshoorn, Rommes and Stienstra 2004: 32), whilst even as this 
process is assumed to be ‘designed for all’ (2004: 30).  
 
As I will explore in the latter sections of this chapter, such ideological assumptions of the  
‘ideal user’ can very much be applied to Google Now’s interface. Here however it is important 
to note that though Brin and Page’s dream of user pre-emption in some ways followed 
dominant paradigms of user-centred design, their concept also marks a departure from user-
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oriented design in that rather than a human-led design process configuring the user, in their 
predictive ideal the user is instead configured through a process of algorithmic inference;70 the user 
could be ‘known’ and catered for through data tracking and algorithmic mechanisms.  
 
Campanelli identifies this shift towards Google’s pre-emptive search mechanisms at work in 
Google’s autocomplete function and in Google Now: 
Google Now.... uses the potentialities of the most popular search engine, along 
with localization and access to personal user data, to automatically offer 
information and news about the context in which one is situated. The idea is that 
such tools, which automatically organize the information we need, ‘free’ us, as they 
allow us to focus on what’s important to us. Such a view implies that, according to 
Google, information selection should not be considered a core activity in the lives 
of human beings, but a burden that one may well leave to machines and their 
algorithms (2014: 43). 
 
The ‘unburdening’ of informational decision-making to personalisation algorithms thus takes 
on a problematic status – that is, though the ‘outsourcing’ of this decision-marking process 
might be time-saving for the user, Campanelli notes that such outsourcing works to undermine 
user control and autonomy. As Hillis, Petit and Jarrett (2013) acknowledge, this kind of 
imagined computational information retrieval system implies that ‘achieving perfect relevance 
would be akin to the technology seeming to read one’s mind’ (2013: 55). These theorisations 
help to highlight that the conveniences of pre-emptive search come with the disconcerting 
possibility that such a system actually ‘promises a limited form of virtual sovereignty’ (Hillis, 
Petit and Jarrett, 2013: 22), wherein the searcher and search system become blurred and even 
unified. Thus, as explored in Chapter Two, Google’s pre-emptive search systems open up the 
possibilities that algorithmic personalisation might create a struggle for autonomy between user 
and system even as it purports to ‘aid’ users. 
 
																																																								
70	Manovich’s	(2013)	work	suggests	that	this	process	again	is	not	specific	to	Google;	he	notes	that	since	the	1990s,	
the	computational	form	rather	than	the	user	has	been	increasingly	awarded	control	over	the	decision-making	and	
interaction	processes	build	into	computational	architectures.	
 177 
Jarrett notes that in order to provide pre-emptive search, Google must attempt to collect 
and amass a ‘database of [user] intention’ (2014: 17) – that is, ‘a massive clickstream 
database of desires, needs, wants, and preferences that can be discovered, subpoenaed, 
archived, tracked and exploited for all sorts of ends’ (industry analyst John Battelle, cited 
in Jarrett 2014: 17). Jarrett argues that this database of intention could theoretically lead to 
a situation in which the ‘algorithmic identity’ that Google constructs for each user 
effectively shapes and regulates the web experience of the identity that it is supposed to 
simply reflect. She writes:  
In [Google’s pre-emptive] mechanisms, the intentions ascribed to me are 
fed back to me, working to inform my ongoing search articulations. A 
feedback loop emerges in which presumptions about activity, based on 
Google’s assumptions about users’ intentions, go on to inform a user’s 
experience of, although not necessarily their engagement with, the web 
(2014: 23). 
 
Thus these kinds of predictive search strategies do not simply attempt to ‘read one’s mind’; 
they hold the potential to inform and even construct the subjectivity that they are supposedly 
only ‘reading’. With Google Now however, this feedback loop – and its consequences – extend 
beyond the ‘web’ to the domain of everyday life. After all, the predictive promises of Google 
Now do not just look to provide pre-emptive search, they also look to pre-empt a user’s 
commute to work, their dinner plans, their evening’s TV schedule, and their trajectories around 
their (commercial) local environment.  
 
Jarrett recognises that these user ‘intentions’ – the affective, conscious and unconscious driving 
force embedded in every user search query – can at once be easily commoditised by Google 
but also are always forever unknowable. She writes: 
If Google can still be called a database of intentions, it is only of extensive 
manifestations – the textual, cognitive, discursive trace of digital archives…. 
Google cannot actually capture the meaningful, inalienable aspects of my 
intention. These cannot be alienated from me. They cannot be expropriated from 
me (2014: 22). 
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Jarrett notes however that though Google’s goal to capture user intentions is ultimately 
unreachable, its attempt to do so has material socio-economic effects; she states that ‘once 
alienated, my intentions have the power to act upon me, autonomously of my desires, 
meanings or interests’ (2014: 19).  
 
It is not only Google’s pre-emptive search mechanisms that have attracted scholarly attention. 
As scholars such as Beck et al (2011), Van Couvering (2007), Andrejevic (2013) and 
Vaidhynathan (2011) note, the increasing ‘Googlization of our lives’ (Vaidhynathan, 2011) – 
the ubiquitous, deceptively neutral and socio-culturally integral place that Google currently 
holds in contemporary information societies – has been subject to much academic critique. As 
scholars such as Hillis, Petit and Jarrett (2013) have noted, part of Google Search’s current 
popularity and market dominance can be afforded to the fact that most web users feel that 
Google Search is simply convenient and efficient. In the age of ‘infoglut’ (Andrejevic, 2013) 
Google has provided web users with a welcome solution to this problem of seemingly infinite 
information overload.  
 
By offering respite from this infoglut Hillis, Petit and Jarrett argue that Google has been 
elevated in popular discourses surrounding informational retrieval to the supreme status of a 
kind of ‘divine mind’ (Hillis, Petit and Jarrett, 2013), infallibly capable of finding, organising, 
managing and filtering what the user ‘wants’ amidst this sea of (dis)information. The treating of 
these seemingly omnipotent automated technologies as ‘god-like’ is not exclusive to search 
engines – as Noy’s (2015) work on ‘drone metaphysics’ highlights, automated technologies 
such as drones are afforded by political advocates and in popular discourses an almost divine 
status that fetishises the external and unknowable forces that appear to lie behind automated 
and autonomous technologies (2015: 16). Furthermore, as Burns (2015) notes and as I will 
further explore, this ‘faith’ in media technologies  – despite the limited affordances of 
developing technologies (such as Google Now) – allows users to discursively ‘redraw the 
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boundaries’ (2015: 9) of faulty objects to retain their faith in that object. I will be drawing on 
some of these scholars throughout this chapter, as well as the work of Livingstone (2014), De 
Certeau (2002) and Lapenta and Jørgensen (2015) to attempt to take into account the lived 
experiences of Google Now users whilst analysing Google as a socio-technical force and actor.  
 
Method: project design 
Reported usage of Google Now is fairly widespread: the app boasts over 1 billion potential 
‘active users’ worldwide on Android phones alone (Techcrunch, 2014).71 After initial activation 
of the app, any user-initiated customisation of the app is minimal72 – the user can customise 
content if they wish, but Google Now will attempt to infer information about the users’ 
everyday trajectory regardless of whether they choose to input data explicitly (for example their 
home address), or confirm the accuracy of the Google Now’s predictions (for example by 
confirming that Google Now has correctly inferred their home address). This study sought not 
to engage Google Now users as a representable population, but to consider the experiences of 
a small number of individual users through an in-depth – loosely ethnographic – but certainly 
highly qualitative methodological approach.  
 
All participants of the ‘Google Now research project’ (as the project was labelled during 
participant recruitment) were recruited from a Digital Media Studies module at a UK 
university. These individuals were invited to participate on the grounds that they did not 
necessarily identify as ‘Google Now users’ – unlike the self-identified Ghostery users or 
Facebook app users who participated in the other two studies that constitute the sites of 
																																																								
71	Figure	based	on	‘current	Android	activations’	of	Google	Now	over	a	30-day	period	(Techcrunch,	2014).	However,	
some	of	these	billion	users	might	only	be	using	the	app	to	perform	more	‘traditional’	user-initiated	Google	Searches	
rather	than	using	the	predictive	search	functions,	as	these	two	forms	of	search	are	standalone	features	in	the	app.	
Though	the	one	billion	figure	is	therefore	questionable,	the	potential	number	of	users	using	Google	Now’s	
predictive	functions	is	very	high.		
72	Explicit	engagement	with	the	app	is	especially	minimal	for	Android	users,	who	will	find	the	Google	Search	app	
already	preloaded	onto	their	mobile	when	they	purchase	their	phone.	All	Android	users	have	to	do	to	use	Google	
Now	is	‘activate’	it.	For	iPhone	users,	initial	installation	is	slightly	less	‘frictionless’	–	they	must	download	the	app	
from	the	iTunes	app	store.	
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investigation for this thesis. By asking students – some of whom had never before used the app 
– to participate, this study hoped to capture the engagements of potential non-users of an 
algorithmic personalisation practice. As Baumer et al. note the ‘non-user’ – that is, ‘a particular 
individual or group of individuals…. [who] are unable or choose not to use some specific 
technology or technological system’ (2015: 2) – is perhaps the most elusive mode of socio-
technical subjectivity to identify and theorise, yet ‘focusing explicitly on non-use can function 
as a dialectic manoeuvre, an inversion that provides a novel perspective on, and potentially 
fuller understanding of, the complex, multifaceted relations among society and technology’ 
(2015: 2). Though two participants had limited interaction with the app prior to the study, and 
all participants did end up ‘using’ Google Now as part of the study, I believe the study touches 
upon this notion of ‘non-use’ since the participants were consistently disappointed that they 
could not find a ‘use’ for Google Now, as I will explore.  
 
All participants were students entering their first term of their first year at university. Their 
enrolment as Digital Media Studies students raised a number of methodological considerations; 
the most pressing being that the content of their Media Studies module – which covered topics 
such as online privacy, search engine politics and even the socio-political implications of 
personalisation – was likely to inform and effect participant engagements with Google Now, 
and their interview responses. To account for this, the study was conducted in the first few 
weeks of the students’ first term at university.73 However, as I will further explore, the mutual 
development of students’ critical learning with their use of the app transpired to be valuable 
site of exploration in terms of their engagement with Google Now; that is, participants’ 																																																								
73	Nonetheless,	some	students	may	have	had	some	exposure	to	critical	media	studies	through	their	A	levels	or	other	
means.	However,	the	motivation	behind	interviewing	them	early	on	in	their	university	studies	was	not	so	much	to	
catch	them	as	‘clean	slates’	in	terms	of	their	critical	understanding	of	digital	media	-	as	Maynard	(1994)	highlights	
and	as	outlined	in	Chapter	Three,	all	research	participants	are	situated	within	specific	socio-cultural	contexts	and	so	
trying	to	capture	‘clean’	experience	would	be	a	misguided	methodological	assumption.	I	hoped	instead	to	chart	
their	simultaneous	development	as	new	critical	media	scholars	and	as	users	of	the	Google	Now	app.	I	do	believe	
however	that	trying	the	same	methodological	approach	with	second	or	third	year	students	would	have	been	less	
successful	–	their	experience	of	university	life	and	their	developed	attitude	toward	critical	media	studies	may	have	
prompted	the	interview	participants	to	‘perform’	their	expertise	as	scholars	rather	than	express	their	engagement	
with	the	app	as	users.		
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development of ‘expertise’ intersected in a number of nuanced, reflexive and yet often 
contradictory ways with their engagement with the app.  
 
All in all, six participants took part in the full study, who attended four interview sessions over 
the space of six weeks (please see Appendix A for study timetable). Though at first I intended 
all participants to be grouped into focus groups, a number of volunteers dropped out before 
the first session and so final interview dynamics were structured as follows:  
 
Table 1. Participant interview set-up 
Focus Group  Tariq, 18, Dubai, lives on campus 
Rosie, 19, UK, lives on campus 
Heena, 18, Malaysia, lives on campus 
Lisa, 18, UK, lives on campus 
One-on-one interview 1  
 
Giovanni, 18, Italy, lives on campus 
One-on-one interview 2  
 
Laura, 18, UK, lives on campus 
For further information on interview set-up and structure please see Appendix A. 
 
One methodological consideration that I also want to highlight here was initial muted 
responses I received from participants to my semi-structured interview questions. In interview 
Session One it transpired (perhaps unsurprising) that non-users of technologies made for 
somewhat disengaged research participants – despite constantly checking their phones 
throughout the session, participants simply did not seem to have much to say about the app. 
This muted response in the first session seemed to be compounded by the participant/ 
research dynamic of this particular study – as discussed in Chapter Three, I was a tutor, and 
they students74 and therefore their engagement with me seemed accompanied by an 
expectation that I was to direct their engagement with the app, with each other and with myself 
in ways not expected in the other interviews I had conducted for this thesis. As a result the 																																																								
74	This	dynamic	may	have	been	reinforced	by	they	fact	that	interviews	took	place	in	a	pre-booked	seminar	room.	
However	as	the	students	all	lived	on	campus	it	made	sense	to	use	a	seminar	room	to	conduct	interviews	–	this	
meant	I	could	guarantee	the	same	quiet,	free	space	every	week.	See	Sin	(2003)	for	further	discussion	on	space	and	
interview	dynamics.		
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interviews developed from straightforward semi-structured questions in Session One to 
incorporate other exercises in Sessions Two, Three and Four. For example in Session Two I 
conducted a structured ‘walk-through’ (Kennedy et al., 2015) of Google Now’s interface and 
functionality and also asked them to write down a short diary of what they had done the day 
before, and then discuss if/ how Google Now has aided them/ not aided them. In Session 
Three we conducted a ‘walk-through’ not only of Google Now itself but of Google Ad Settings 
which triggered some very interesting discussions of being ‘recognised’ by Google, as I will 
explore. I also conducted informal experiments with two participants – Tariq and Laura – and 
their use of Google Now, as I will explore. All-in-all, of the three studies that comprise the 
body of this thesis, this study proved to be the most methodologically challenging and yet 
(again methodologically-speaking) the most dynamic and interesting.  
  
To return briefly to the notion of ‘non-use’; it was important prior to the study to gauge the 
level of engagement that participants already had with Google Now. Two of the students – 
Tariq and Giovanni – had used Google Now, though both told me that they did not use it 
often. The other fours students – Laura, Rachel, Lisa and Heena – had never used Google 
Now.75 These four students were split in two sections: two participants, Heena and Rachel, 
who could customise the app in whichever way they wished and confirm the app’s inferences, 
and two participants, Laura and Lisa, who were at first not allowed to customise the app or 
confirm any of the app’s predictive interferences. Acknowledging and managing the level of 
usage that these participants had with Google Now transpired to be a crucial component in 
relation to some participant responses – for example Laura’s insistence that the app would 
work ‘better’ if she had been allowed to customise it, as explored later. The following analysis 
subsections explore some of the themes, negotiations and responses that emerged from the 
interview sessions. I have tried to keep them in broadly chronological order.  																																																								
75	Giovanni	and	Tariq	both	have	Android	phones	that	come	pre-installed	with	Google	Now,	whilst	Laura,	Heena,	Lisa	
and	Rachel	have	iPhones,	wherein	they	had	to	download	the	app	to	gain	access.	This	may	explain	why	the	latter	
four	participants	had	not	used	the	app	before.		
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Part II 
‘Cool’, ‘impressive’, ‘smart’ – but ‘useful’? The trust that Google is ‘relevant’ 
To turn to the study itself, as ‘freshers’, all six participants new to the university (and 
surrounding university town) and all lived on campus. Participants were asked to activate 
Google Now a week in advance of the first interview session, and were asked to check Google 
Now frequently over the course of the week to see what ‘cards’ Google Now had shown them. 
They were asked to take screenshots of these cards and email them to me, and were required to 
open Google Now at the beginning of each interview session to see what the app was 
displaying. For all participants Session One (and each subsequent session) began with the 
question ‘what cards has Google Now shown you this week’?  
 
In the first session this question elicited the general consensus that Google Now mostly 
showed the participants local weather updates, traffic information to and from ‘home’ and 
‘work’, and ‘places nearby’ (these ‘places’ being exclusively restaurants and cafes). The most 
frequent card shown to participants was local weather, followed by a ‘home’ to ‘work’ 
commute time, which displayed a mode of transport (car, train, bus) inferred by Google Now 
based on the GPS location and travel trajectory of the users in question (see figure 8-10).  
 
Participants’ overall responses indicated a sense of disappointment with these initial 
engagements with the app – all participants said they thought this information was lacking or 
‘not enough’. For example Laura told me that Google Now had shown her weather, 
restaurants, and ‘my location, but that was about it’. Whilst Lisa also stated ‘Yeah I just got the 
weather’, and Rachel in both interview sessions One and Two said Google Now showed her 
‘absolutely nothing’ (apart from the weather) – a source of much frustration and dismay for 
Rachel, as I will explore shortly. Tariq also echoed the sentiment that Google Now did not 
offer much, stating ‘it just gave me information about the traffic’.  
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Figure 8.               Figure 9.            Figure 10. 
 
Figure 8: Heena’s screenshot of the local weather. Figure 9: Tariq’s (wrongly) inferred ‘commute’ from ‘home’ to ‘work’ 
(bearing in mind he both lives and ‘works’ on campus). Figure 10: Laura’s ‘local weather’ and ‘places nearby’ cards.  
 
In Session One then, Google Now did not seem to be offering the participants much in terms 
of information that they ‘needed throughout their day’; traffic, location and weather updates 
did not in these initial stages seem to fulfil their desired use or expectations of the app. 
However, this failure to deliver ‘useful’ information did not stop many of the participants from 
expressing positive sentiments about the app. For example when I asked Laura if she had 
found the ‘nearby places’ card to be helpful (which showed her Japanese restaurants near to her 
location), she replied: 
Laura. Yeah it was helpful. It was helpful to have it there. 
 
Interviewer: Did you use any of the restaurants? 
 
Laura: No [laughs]. 
 
Laura’s statement that Google Now was ‘helpful’ was quickly contradicted by her self-
conscious answer that no, she did not in fact actually use the information that was provided to 
her – she went to an alternative restaurant instead. Similarly, Heena expressed positive 
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sentiments regarding Google’s predictive powers. For example when I asked Heena ‘how do 
you think [Google Now] manages to predict where you work and where you live?’, she replied:  
I think it predicts quite well because I mentioned that I was in Southville76 but 
then it managed to guess that I was in Southville Lane which is quite good, and 
then it guessed where I had my classes, which is more interesting. 
 
Aside from the fact that Heena does not really address the question (instead of explaining how 
she thinks the apps predictions work, she states that Google Now predicts ‘quite well’), Heena 
seems to be most ‘interested’ by Google Now’s inferences, which she deemed to be ‘quite 
good’. What is determined to be ‘good’ here is simply the fact that Google Now has predicted 
something correctly – it is not that the app has been ‘helpful’ by showing Heena where she has 
to go. After all, Heena already knows where she is, and where her classes are: Heena’s praise 
seems to lie in the fact that Google knows this too.  
 
These positive sentiments were also expressed in Session Two. For example Tariq, who had in 
Session One had also found that Google Now mostly just showed the weather and locations 
nearby, became excited when he discovered that this week Google Now had correctly inferred 
he had taken the train the day before:  
Tariq: Oh look! It’s got the train station on there now because I took the 
train yesterday! That’s good!  
 
Interviewer: Are you taking the train today? 
 
Tariq: Um no I don’t think so, I’m not going to, well I am going to go into 
town but I think I’m going to take the bus.   
 
The fact that Google’s cards display information that is ultimately not useful to Tariq here then 
seems to be inconsequential – he remains impressed by Google Now’s offerings, despite this 
lack of tangible use.  
 
																																																								
76	Location	names	have	been	changed	to	ensure	participant	anonymity.	
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Here then, it is Google Now’s tracking and predictions in and of itself that are deemed by Laura, 
Tariq and Heena to be ‘good’, ‘smart’, and ‘impressive’. It seems these participants’ positive 
sentiments regarding Google Now refer directly to Google Now’s data tracking and 
surveillance strategies and subsequent predictive powers, rather than the helpful outcomes or 
tangible usefulness of those predictive powers on their everyday trajectories. It is the 
possibilities that Google Now offers, rather than the realisation of those possibilities, that 
seems to trigger the positive comments.  
 
How can these positive sentiments – even in the face of disappointment – be theorised? As 
Wyatt notes in relation to non-users and the internet, emerging technologies are often publicly 
framed by institutions, media, policy makers and even as users as ‘necessarily desirable’ and 
therefore deemed necessarily useful (2005: 68). Similarly, Best and Tozer’s qualitative study on 
user resistance and appropriation of new technologies identifies a process in which users find a 
way to accommodate new technologies into their everyday lives, even as that technology fails 
to be useful (2012: 14). Such a process involves an element of ‘self-blame’ (Best and Tozer, 
2012) as I will explore in the next section. Here though I want to emphasise that it is the 
predictive possibilities of Google Now that are demarked as ‘cool’ and ‘impressive’, even as the 
app fails to function in a way that these participants expect. I do not mean to suggest however 
that if the app did function as ‘useful’ then a critical interrogation of the app would not be 
valuable – as explored in Chapter Two, critical interrogations of the ‘successes’ of algorithmic 
personalisation expose a host of socio-cultural implications in regards to user control, 
commodification, autonomy and universal experience. I will explore the critical implications of 
Google Now’s ‘successes’ later in the chapter, but here it seems that these participant 
responses are largely echoing Wyatt and Best and Tozer’s observations that emerging 
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technologies are assumed to be beneficial, even when the technology fails to offer up 
affordances77 that meet the expectations of the user.  
 
Expectations and excuses: the trust that Google will provide  
As well as finding positive sentiments in Google’s ultimately unhelpful inferences, during the 
first few weeks of the study participants offered a range of explanations as to why Google 
Now’s interface lacked so much useful information. For example, in Session One Tariq blamed 
‘3G’ for Google Now’s incorrect prediction of his ‘home’ address, and Rachel stipulated that 
her inability to connect to the campus wi-fi might be the reason that Google was showing her 
‘just the weather’. Alternatively, Heena offered the following reasoning: 
Well, for some reason I only have the weather, but I guess it’s because I’m a 
new user, and I don’t use it a lot and I don’t even customise it.  
 
According to Heena then, Google Now’s apparent failure to provide useful information was 
not due to a failure on Google’s part, it was rather her status as a ‘new user’ that proved to be 
responsible for the app’s shortcomings. Lisa also blamed her lack of engagement with the app 
for Google Now’s failure to deliver more cards, stating that: ‘I’m not using mine properly, if I 
had more in it then it would be helpful’, referring here to the fact that, as part of the study’s 
initial conditions, she was not allowed to customise Google Now in any way. Similarly, in 
Session One of her one-to-one interview, Laura seemed adamant that her issues with Google 
Now could be put down to the fact that she was not allowed to personalise the app, as evident 
during the following exchange:  
Interviewer: Why do you think that Google Now chooses to show you things like where 
you work? 
 
Laura: Probably for the convenience factor, and to make it more efficient I 
guess, to show you different routes to get there and to show you 
personalised ways of to try and help you get to places… 																																																								
77	By	‘affordances’	here	I	mean	participants’	perceived	tangible	uses	and	functions	of	the	app.	Gibson	(1986)	notes	
that	the	notion	of	‘affordance’	is	politically	contestable	and	conditioned	by	dominant	ideological	structures.	As	
stated	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	in	being	‘useful’	Google	Now	would	be	unquestionably	advantageous;	I	simply	
wish	to	ascertain	the	kinds	of	interactions	that	Google	Now	allows	in	regards	to	the	specific	lived	experiences	of	
these	participants.		
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Interviewer: Has it actually helped you find anywhere? 
 
Laura: No, no [laughs] it said where I worked but it didn’t show me how to 
get there. Yeah I think that’s because I didn’t put any of my personalised 
details in, I think when I do it probably will.  
 
By Session Two Google Now had not shown her anything more than weather and travel 
updates. Again when I asked her if she used the app that week she replied: 
Just, actually just for the weather because there wasn’t anything that came up at 
all, apart from yeah, that was really it. But I think I would’ve used it a lot more 
if I did have, if I was able to put in stuff that was relevant.  
 
Due to the app’s lack of cards and Laura’s assertions that the study was limiting her use rather 
the app, we agreed that at the end of Session Two, Laura could customise the app in any way 
she wished in order to try and improve the app’s functionality. Consequently Laura’s hopes 
were in some ways fulfilled78 – her user-initiated customisation of the app resulted in the 
display of many more cards. However, the reasons here offered by participants for app’s initial 
failures seem thus to displace the ‘blame’ for the Google Now’s lack of functionality anywhere 
but Google Now itself – Google Now has failed to provide because of 3G; Google Now has 
failed because of the campus’ wi-fi network; Google Now has failed because of the 
disengagement of these users themselves with the app.  
 
Where might this reluctance to blame the app itself for its shortcomings come from? As a 
plethora of scholars have noted, Google’s place in most web users’ everyday lives extends far 
beyond simply a functioning as search engine – it is the search engine, its worldwide use so 																																																								
78	In	some	ways	Laura’s	theory	that	Google	Now	would	work	better	once	she	was	able	to	personalise	it	was	proved	
right.	For	example,	in	Laura’s	third	interview	she	stated	‘Last	weekend	I	went	to	see	my	family	in	Amsterdam,	and	
so	I	had	to	fly	there…	and	because	I’d	said	that	[Google	Now]	could	access	my	email,	it	basically	showed	me	this	
[Laura	shows	interviewer	the	‘flights’	card]…	so	it’s	basically	saying	that	my	flight	was	on	time	and	stuff,	and	all	the	
details	about	the	flight,	and	what	terminal	I’d	arrive	in	and	what	time,	so	I	found	that	quite	cool,	I	was	quite	excited	
about	that.’	Google’s	inferences	are	once	again	‘cool’	and	Laura	seemed	pleased	to	report	that	Google	Now	had	
been	‘really	good’	since	she	had	been	able	to	customise	it.	Again	however,	the	idea	that	Google	Now’s	predictive	
powers	are	‘cool’	in	and	of	themselves	still	persists	–	she	told	me	that	the	app	‘was	really	efficient,	I	was	in	the	
airport	and	I	opened	it	and	it	was	just	out	of	curiosity	and	it	said	like	all	the	things	that	I	needed	about	my	flight	and	
it	was	really	interesting’.		
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ubiquitous as to have become ideologically ‘naturalised’ as a socio-technical practice. As Beck 
and Stalder write: ‘Google not only dominates markers, it also dominates our minds – to such a 
degree that it is not to conflate the generic issues of search engines with the specific practices 
of Google’ (2011: 7). Here then the dominance of Google as the search engine seems to be 
invoked in participant responses; their trust in Google lies on the assumption when it comes to 
information retrieval, Google should – and does – just work. Such theoretical arguments were 
supported by participants’ own testimonies regarding search engine use: in the induction stages 
of the study, all participants reported that they used Google Search as their only search engine.  
 
Of course, the fact that Google Search has for the past few decades successfully met and 
managed its users’ expectations does not exempt the company from critique – Hillis, Petit and 
Jarrett highlight that the very ideas of ‘efficiency’ and ‘convenience’ are themselves a ‘meta-
ideologies of the contemporary technised, consumerist conjecture’ (2013: 5).  In participant 
accounts so far, Google Now’s ‘efficiency’ and ‘convenience’ is rendered questionable by the 
lack of information Google Now provided to participants; and yet participant trust that Google 
could and should be capable of providing an efficient and convenient service persisted. It seems 
then that Google’s reputation not just precedes itself; it actively constructs and manages these 
user expectations, even in the face of failure.  
 
In his analysis of tablet use in academic labs, Burns describes a similar displacement of blame 
invoked by tablets in which, in order to retain their perception of tablets as ‘perfect’ techno-
social objects, ‘users… responded to unexpected failures of their devices by tactically redrawing 
the boundaries of the object so as to eject the faulty element’ (2015: 9). In the context of the 
Google Now study, the Google Now app remains far from ‘perfect’ in the eyes of the 
participants – and yet the reluctance to see the apps’ failures as a product of Google Now itself 
persists. This ‘redrawing’ of Google Now to eject its faults did not last however; as I will 
explore, Google Now was eventually taken to be (still somewhat mysteriously) at fault.  
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Privacy and data tracking: The trust that Google will protect  
In the first two sessions then the apps’ front-end capabilities were described as ‘impressive’ yet 
consistently failed to live up to the participants’ high expectations. I will return to these 
expectations shortly, but first I would like to turn to the back-end data tracking capabilities of 
the app. From Session One onwards, in both the focus group and in the two standalone 
interviews, the fact that Google Now was tracking participants in some way was established 
very early: all participants knew that Google Now could track their geolocations and search 
history. How then did they feel about Google mining and tracking them?  
 
It transpired from Session One onwards that Google Now showed more cards to Heena than 
it did any of the other participants – even though Heena had not customised the app or 
confirmed the correctness of any of the app’s inferences. Heena was perpetually perplexed that 
Google seemed to ‘know’ a lot about her – for example Google Now seemed to be capable of 
tracking her online television watching and inferring shows based on her viewing habits (see 
figures 11 and 12). As well as describing her (comparative) bounty of cards as ‘smart’ and 
‘interesting’ Heena also described Google Now as ‘like your own personal stalker’. When asked 
‘why do you feel like that?’, she stated:  
Because it can tell you where you’re going and because it can assume what you’re like 
and I think it’s kind of scary at times because… maybe it can use your information like 
against you it’s like identity theft and it’s like really scary, and identity is all you have, it’s 
yours, and it’s like a little bit scary. 
 
Heena’s description of Google Now as ‘scary’ was offered in Session One alongside more 
positive descriptions of the app’s predictive powers. This somewhat contradictory 
juxtaposition persisted throughout the study – by Session Three Heena was still describing 
Google Now as a ‘personal stalker’, and she also expanded on what she meant be ‘identity 
theft’. When explaining why she would not want Google Now to know her ‘permanent 
address’, she stated:  
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Who knows, maybe there’s someone in Google, like hackers, like they might just 
be able to track someone down, like they know everything about you, so they 
might know like incriminating things, and then they might want to target you. So if 
they have your permanent address, then you’re screwed.79 
 
Figure 11                                Figure 12                                 Figure 13 
 
Figure 11 and 12: Heena’s cards displaying Google Now’s ‘what to watch’ recommendations, which Heena described as 
suited to her interests but ‘scary’. Figure 13: Tariq’s currency converter card, displayed top of the screen. 
 
Here then Heena seemed to be less concerned by Google’s own treatment of her personal data, 
and more worried that ‘incriminating things’ about her might fall into the hands of ‘hackers’ – 
thus Google itself is again framed as trustworthy. Furthermore, in Session Three Tariq stated:  
Literally what would happen if I gave up all of my information to Google, I feel like I 
have nothing to hide, but then there’s certain things that I do that I wouldn’t want my 
parents to know.  
 
In some ways, Heena and Tariq’s sentiments echo the findings of wider qualitative and 
quantitative studies that analyse young people’s responses to online privacy concerns (Lapenta 
and Jørgensen, 2015). As Lapenta and Jørgensen note, the notion that young people are ‘digital 
natives’ – that is, users who are ‘born’ into digital media technologies and therefore fully 																																																								
79		Heena	said	that	she	does	not	mind	that	Google	Now	has	her	campus	address,	it	was	only	her	more	permanent	
home	address	that	she	felt	needed	protecting.	
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equipped to deal with the negotiations and expertise needed to successfully navigate them – is 
often mobilised in policy making and media accounts to suggest that for young people ‘privacy, 
is, so to speak, “no longer the social norm”’ (Lapenta and Jørgensen, 2015: 4). They note 
however that there is a building body of research that suggests this is not the case: ‘On the 
contrary, these studies of young people’s practices on social media platforms illustrate the 
emergence of a new privacy norm that corresponds to the structural conditions of online social 
life’ (2015: 3). They note however these ‘structural conditions’ tend to frame online privacy as a 
matter of control over their self-representation online – that is, control of their photos, and 
who has access to representations of their self, ‘whereas potentiation privacy risks related to the 
state or private companies received limited attention’ (7: 2015). This is at work in Tariq and 
Heena’s responses to privacy: it is not Google itself that represents a threat, but the threat to 
self-representation that matters more, either from hackers looking to steal Heena’s identity, or 
from losing control over what Tariq’s parents do and do not see. Again Google as a 
commercial, socio-technical force is discounted from any privacy risks – Google will protect, 
even when it is responsible for the data tracking upon which pre-emptive search relies. 
 
The data-for-services exchange: the trust that Google is worth it  
This was not the only privacy implication expressed by participants: throughout the study 
participants acknowledged Google Now’s mobilisation of data-for-services exchange that has 
emerged at points throughout this thesis and which scholars such as Bassett assert is a key 
driver of the contemporary web economy. For example in Session One I asked Tariq if he 
minded that Google Now showed him pictures of ‘places nearby’, and he response almost 
immediately became a matter of privacy in exchange for the app’s services: 
 
Tariq: For me it’s not really a simple answer, so for me so like it’s really useful and handy 
sometimes, like you know with the currency converter, and to tell you what time at home 
it is because I remember one time I called my parents on Skype it was like 9 here but I 
realised it would be 12 there because of this, so they probably wouldn’t pick up, but um 
it’s useful in that way but then you’re also sort surrendering a part of yourself up to 
 193 
Google right? So, they’ve got all this power over you, they know so much about you, so 
it’s just really complicated I think. 
 
Interviewer: When you say surrendering, what do you mean by that? 
 
Tariq: Like basically it’s information about yourself that Google could potentially use to 
take advantage of you, I guess that’s what I mean by surrendering – well you see I’m just 
like one person in 7 billion so what interest would they have in me which is why I mostly 
don’t care.  
 
Interviewer: Do you ever feel taken advantage of?  
 
Tariq: By Google? No.  
 
 
Here then Tariq feels him must weigh up the convenience and benefit of using the app 
with the threat of ‘surrendering yourself to Google’. He rearticulated in Session Three that 
allowing Google Now to track him involved a negotiation between feelings of ‘apathy’ and 
‘fear’ of Google’s data tracking practices; an uncomfortable juxtaposition also articulated 
by Laura, Lisa and Rachel. For example, Laura, who throughout the study was extremely 
positive about Google Now, told me in Session Four that she felt that Google targeted 
‘younger people’, who could then be left vulnerable to ‘manipulation’ by Google. She 
stated during the following exchange:  
Laura: …we’re more reliant on [Google] I suppose and we use it for a lot more 
things than older people would I would say, and so we’re more, we don’t have as 
much knowledge on it so therefore we kind of don’t really realise how it’s 
manipulating us. 
Interviewer: Do you mind about that sort of thing? 
Laura: No not really. 
Interviewer: Why don’t you mind?   
Laura: That it manipulates us?   
Interviewer: Yeah. 
Laura: Well I think it’s mainly that they manipulate us in order to, like for marketing 
purposes I suppose, and for advertising, to personalise it, so it’s not really to invade 
your privacy on purpose, it’s for their own business purposes in order to benefit the 
company, it’s not to stalk you, so [pauses] And anyway it’s helpful. 
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Of all the participants Laura displayed the strongest faith in Google Now and told me that she 
‘definitely’ trusts Google (even after studying the privacy implications of data tracking as part 
of the module, as I will explore). Laura, Heena and Tariq’s sentiments support another point 
made by Lapenta and Jørgenson in regards to young people’s treatment of privacy online. They 
state that for young people ‘the “repurposing” of their data (data mining, commercial use) is 
perceived as a precondition for social participation’ (2015: 8). In other words – ‘signing off 
privacy rights to the social network was seen as a necessary price to be paid in order to 
participate’ (2015: 8). However, I want to make an important point here: Tariq and Laura’s 
responses clearly also draw parallels with the data-for-services negotiations that some of the 
Ghostery interviewees also recounted. As such it seems that is not only ‘young people’ 
partaking in these exchanges: it is all web users who find themselves positioned as ‘data 
providers’ (Van Djick, 2009), even those resolutely interested in protecting their privacy. A 
explored in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, and as scholars such as Bassett (2013) note, this 
exchange lies at the very heart of many of the contemporary web’s most successful free-to-use 
services; an exchange that is premised on the notion that there is an (economic) need to ‘know’ 
and ‘anticipate’ users.  
 
What happens when the exchange fails? An experiment in data-for-services 
How does this exchange of data-for-services intersect with the failures of the app to 
provide useful cards? Though this sacrifice of privacy for services was deemed ‘worth it’ 
for most participants, there is a disconnect here between participants’ acceptance of the 
data-for-services ‘contract’ and their assertions that Google Now was not providing the 
level of service they expected. When it came to providing a personalised service in 
exchange for data, Google Now did not seem to be ‘holding up its side of the bargain’, so 
to speak. To explore this, I want to briefly expand on Tariq’s engagement with a ‘card’ that 
he did find useful: that is, the app’s ‘currency converter’ card (see figure 13). Tariq, who 
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already had Google Now activated on his phone prior to the study, stated that he finds 
this card particularly useful:  
Right now [Google Now] still thinks I’m in Dubai, Dubai is where I live, so it 
thinks I live in Dubai but it’s says like, it shows me tourist hotspots, and there’s 
like this really handy currency converter. 
 
It became apparent that showing the currency converter was an attribute specific to Tariq’s 
usage of Google Now compared to other participants’ usage – and as he states here, Google 
Now showed him the currency converter because Tariq’s ‘home place’ was set in Dubai 
(Tariq’s home country). Thus, Google Now assumed that Tariq was a tourist visiting the UK, 
and therefore in need of a currency converter.  
 
This ‘card’ was indeed useful to Tariq – and yet it seemed that that the only reason Google 
Now had shown him this card was because it had wrongly inferred that Tariq was a tourist, 
rather than an overseas student. Tariq and I speculated that Tariq’s currency converter might 
disappear if Google Now correctly inferred that he in fact now lived in the UK, which up until 
Session Three it had not correctly inferred (his home address was inferred as in Dubai on the 
app). Given the lack of engagement that the app had so far afforded to the participants, it 
seemed fruitful to try and make the most of this useful card; that is, perform an informal 
experiment to see if the currency converter card would still appear if Tariq’s ‘home address’ 
was set to his university address. During Session Three it was decided that we should address 
this hypothesis:  
 
Interviewer: Did you end up resetting your home address?  
 
Tariq: No I was still kinda hoping that [Google Now] would but I’ll do it now.  
 
Interviewer: Is that alright? Can we see, can we see what happens if you reset it? 
 
Tariq: Sure.  
  
[Tariq manually sets his Google Now ‘home address’ to his campus address] 
 
Interviewer: Do you still have the currency converter? 
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Tariq: Um no, oh well, I can always find it I guess. 
 
….  
 
Interviewer: How do you feel about the fact that that information is not there any more? 
 
Tariq: Um, well hopefully, it will give me other helpful information. But I can 
always like customise it so I have the right cards right? 
 
Again displaying faith in Google Now’s predictive capabilities, Tariq had been hoping that the 
app would automatically infer his new ‘home address’ to be campus; but as the app had not yet 
performed this algorithmic personalisation, Tariq was happy to initiate it and input his campus 
address. However, once Tariq had input the ‘right’ and supposedly ‘relevant’ personal data into 
Google Now – that is his ‘correct’ home place – the information that he had found most 
‘useful’ subsequently disappeared.  
 
Despite the card’s disappearance, Tariq remained optimistic that the app ‘will give me other 
helpful information’ – and hoped that he can ‘always find’ the currency converter by 
customising the app to display it once again. However, after some investigation, it transpired 
that he could not find a way to customise the app and display the currency converter. Ironically 
then, Google Now’s attempts to provide ‘personally relevant’ information through inference 
actually has the opposite of the intended affect – guided by the (in this case flawed) logic of 
algorithmic personalisation, the only ‘card’ that Tariq found useful to his lived experience was 
stripped from the app. In this case Google Now’s role in the exchange of personal data for 
personalised services is made highly problematic – the ‘personal’ information that Tariq gives 
up to Google actually results in a less useful service.  
 
As a methodological approach, this somewhat informal experiment proved particularly fruitful 
in that through a mutual and on-going discussion between myself and Tariq over the course of 
the study, it was possible to challenge and subsequently change Tariq’s relationship with 
Google Now. Doing so exposed the failure of the app to live up the data-for-services ‘contract’ 
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so common in the contemporary web, and further accepted by these participants. Furthermore, 
the experiment revealed not only Tariq’s faith in Google Now, but Tariq’s own self-perceived 
expertise that he could figure out how to personalise the cards if they were not to be 
personalised for him. As with the Ghostery participants, the ‘expertise’ required to successfully 
negotiate one’s way through algorithmic personalisation practices is once again revealed as 
‘fleetingly held’ (Kennedy et al., 2015: 9). I will further explore participants’ perceived 
‘expertise’ as developing media studies students shortly, but here I want to highlight that by 
challenging and changing Tariq’s engagement with the app, this experiment proved that though 
the data-for-services exchange is a ‘contract’ that currently underpins the economy of 
monetised web services, in this case the reality of this exchange meant that in ‘donating’ 
(Bassett 2013) more data to Google Now, the app was actually rendered less useful, less 
convenient, and exposed as ironically apersonal.  
 
‘I’ve got so many interests!’: the trust that Google ‘knows’ you 
By Session Three it was firmly established that Google Now did track participants, however, 
the specifics of exactly what Google Now ‘knew’ about them remained uncertain. As part of 
Session Three I therefore wanted to discuss with participants the extent of their knowledge 
surrounding Google’s attempt to track them, as well as how they engaged with and responded 
to such attempts. To do this my original research aim was to access the back-end database of 
Google Now in order to unpick the data tracking mechanisms the app employed. However 
after some research, which involved attempting to ‘hack’ some commercially available Google 
APIs,80 it transpired that getting to the back end of Google Now’s user database – and 
especially these users in particular – would not be possible (a methodological limitation that is 																																																								
80	There	are	a	handful	of	Google	Now	APIs	available.	For	example	the	Google	Now	Developer	Schema	permits	
access	to	the	Google	API	to	allow	those	businesses	to	display	to	their	customers	Google	Now	cards	based	on	
reservation	or	booking	info	(Google	Now	Developer	Schema,	2014).	Alternatively	the	Google	Search	Xposed	API	
Mod	is	non-Google	affiliated	open	source	app	that	allows	developers	to	access	Google	Now’s	search	capabilities	
(Google	Search	Xposed,	2014).	After	consultation	with	Sussex-based	developers	it	became	apparent	that	these	APIs	
gave	extremely	restricted	access	to	back-end	user	data	and	would	have	been	unhelpful	in	trying	to	discern	what	
user	information	Google	Now	gathers.	As	such	API	access	was	not	taken	up	as	a	methodological	approach,	as	
explored	further	in	Chapter	Three.		
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explored further in Chapter Three). As such, it seemed the ‘next best thing’ would be to discuss 
not Google Now’s database, but the publicly available Google user profiles available through 
Google Ad Settings (2014). 
 
At the time of the study, Google Ad Settings displays to any Google user their inferred gender, 
age, language and ‘interests’, with these categories mined and largely algorithmically determined 
from a Google user’s search history, YouTube history and Google + profile – though again, 
the specifics of how a user’s Google Ad Profile is aggregated is not publicly available (Google 
As Settings, 2014). As with the experiment with Tariq, discussing Google Ad Settings with 
these participants meant once again intervening in their engagement with Google, as none of 
them had seen this service before.  
 
Initial access to Google’s Ad Setting profiles elicited mixed reactions from participants. 
For example, Giovanni was not particularly happy to see that Google had inferred his 
‘interests’, while Laura was happy to be profiled in such as manner, as long as it led to 
‘conveniently’ personalised results (echoing her sentiments explored in the previous 
section). Conversely, Rachel’s reaction upon seeing her profile was at first one of 
profound disappointment as all of her ‘settings’ were blank: Google did not know her 
age, gender or interests. As stated earlier, Rachel had routinely expressed disappointment 
in regards to the lack of useful ‘cards’ that Google Now had shown her over the duration 
of the study. As she explained in Session Three, the lack of cards occurred despite her 
best efforts to integrate her pre-existing networked services into the app:  
 
[Google Now is] linked to my YouTube, like I checked what it’s linked to, and 
I like checked my privacy settings, and so I go on YouTube and like nothing 
pops up and like I literally ask it questions… but it won’t give me cards.  
 
 
Despite Rachel’s best efforts, Google Now would not respond to her attempts to be ‘noticed’ 
by the app and therefore offer her some ‘cards’. The disappointment Rachel felt towards 
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Google Now’s functionality was thus also reflected in her interactions with the Google Ad 
Settings. However, this time, her despondency had little to do with Google Now’s lack of 
function; instead Rachel was disappointed by the fact that Google apparently ‘knew nothing’ 
about her – her settings were blank.   
 
This desire to have one’s selfhood noticed by Google – to be ‘noticed’ by the algorithm – 
draws parallels with the ‘tactics’ that Kevin mobilised in the Spotify app, as recounted in 
Chapter Five. There, Kevin worked hard to ‘turn to face the algorithm’ (Gillespie, 2014: 84) in 
that he reoriented his actions on Spotify in order to perform a ‘better’ articulation of selfhood 
towards his ‘invisible audience’ on Facebook. In attempting to be ‘noticed’ by Google Now, 
Rachel is employing a similar tactic – she tries to ‘reorient’ herself in order align her actions to 
suit the algorithmic protocols of the app. However I use the ‘tactic’ cautiously here; after all, 
Rachel is clearly not attempting to evade, challenge or resist Google’s algorithmic 
personalisation mechanisms in De Certeau’s sense of employing ‘tactics’ as a form of resistance 
to oppressive surveillance ‘strategies’ (1984: 39). Instead, Rachel is attempting to use ‘tactics’ 
not to resist Google’s algorithms, but instead ‘turn to face’ them in order to have her actions 
and activities appropriated by the app. After all, Rachel’s epistemic uncertainty of not knowing 
what data the app needs to work here renders Rachel a ‘tactician’ rather than a ‘strategist’ (De 
Certeau, 1984). She cannot know for certain what manoeuvres she must make to suit the 
operational logic of the app, and so she must, though ‘lacking a view to the whole’ (De 
Certeau, 1984: 39) of Google’s algorithmic operations, try to connect her interactions on other 
platforms to ensure she is noticed by Google Now. 
 
So far over the study, Rachel’s attempts have not succeeded – as she states above, she simply 
could not get the app to show her cards. During the course of the Ad Settings exercise 
however, Rachel’s ‘luck’ changed: she realised that she had omitted to sign into her Google 
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account, and that this was affecting her what she could see. On signing into her Google 
account, her Ad Settings profile was suddenly revealed: 
Rachel: Oh it does know I’m female! That’s nice! 
[She then finds that Google has also listed some inferred interests] 
Rachel: Oh and I have got interests! I’ve got so many interests!.. I’ve got so 
many good ones! 
 
I: What good ones have you got? 
 
Rachel: Um like ones that are just actually like, um, are like me, I’ve got like loads 
of animal ones, like dogs, wildlife, which I’m super into. I’ve got rock music, 
fashion and style, hair care, I’ve got oh, I’ve got make-up and cosmetics. I’ve got 
metals and mining, and I don’t ever do that… I’ve got like five out of 65 that I’d 
don’t do, but the rest of them are pretty good.  
 
Rachel is obviously pleased about the accuracy of her ‘algorithmic identity’ – and she 
feels that it is ‘pretty good’ in the sense that it reflect her interests. More than this 
though, Rachel seems happy that this spectre of algorithmic identity simply exists:   
 
Interviewer: So how do you feel about them?  
 
Rachel: I’m so happy [laughs] that I’ve finally got something from them, like 
actually.  
 
 
Interviewer: How come it makes you happy? 
 
Rachel: I just feel really excited, I don’t actually know [laughs] I think it’s, for ages 
it didn’t like do anything, and I was just really disappointed, like I expected a lot 
from it so I’m quite happy now, at least it knows my interests. 
 
It is important here to consider exactly what Rachel feels she has ‘got from them’ – ‘them’ 
referring her to both Google and Google Now. Rachel has in fact got nothing more from 
Google Now in terms of correct functionality or service – all her ‘Ad Settings’ profile has 
revealed is that she has been ‘noticed’ and profiled by Google. Furthermore, Rachel’s pleasure 
at finding her ad settings seems to negate the previous disappointment at Google Now’s lack of 
functionality – yet as is clear from her previous disappointment, her Google profile has 
apparently not informed or enriched her experience of Google Now. As Rachel herself states, 
‘it’s weird because like I didn’t know like it [Google] knew like so many of my interests, so it’s 
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like it’s weird that it [Google Now] doesn’t act on that, like it doesn’t actually show me cards 
related to that sort of stuff’. There is a clear disconnect here between Google’s tracking of 
Rachel’s intentions and the personalised data outputs that Rachel is (supposed to be) receiving 
in the form of Google Now ‘cards’. Yet Rachel considers Google and Google Now to be 
interchangeable actors, and remains happy that at the very least, Google ‘knows’ who she is. 
 
Rachel’s pleasure at being recognised by Google’s database here can be theorised as moment in 
which technology facilitates a form of self-recognition.81 As explored in Chapter Five, a 
number of theorists have asserted that digital media technologies have afforded new 
possibilities for self-constitution and performance. Focusing specifically on moments of self-
recognition, Mowlabocus examines mobile phones as ‘transitional objects… [that] serve as 
negotiating points between self and other’ (2014: 1). Mowlabocus uses Lasch’s work on the 
culture of narcissism to explore how mobiles technologies might ‘secure our sense of self’ 
(2014: 1) in 21st Century contemporary cultural frameworks that place the individual as the 
centre-point of reference. Mowlabocus states:  
In our phones we become consumed by recognition of ourselves through the 
eyes of others (tagged comments, liked posts, other forms of phatic 
communication) that become mediated, brought to our attention by these 
technologies (2014: 2). 
 
Here then Mowlabocus refers largely to a process wherein the mediated interactions human 
actors engage in constitute moments of recognition. However, Rachel’s pleasure in self-
recognition comes not from the eyes of others but from the reflection of the ‘algorithmic identity’ 
																																																								
81	For	more	work	on	self-recognition	see	Sartre’s	(1957)	work	on	the	self	and	consciousness	in	relation	to	ideas	of	
freedom,	or	Mead’s	(1934)	theorizations	of	the	self	as	constituted	through	the	recognition	of	others.	For	self	
recognition	through	technology,	Walker’s	work	on	the	‘selfie’	provides	a	useful	framework	for	understanding	how	
new	media	technologies	and	emerging	cultural	operations	(in	this	case	the	‘selfie’)	are	used	in	the	process	of	self	
recognition	(2014).	
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constituted by Google.82 The self is secured through wholly algorithmic mechanisms, which here 
have been configured through ‘gender, age and interests’.  
 
As explored in Chapter Two, the algorithmic identity presented to Rachel here has – despite 
her pleasure in being noticed – little to do with her being explicitly identified and represented 
as an individual by Google. That is, Andrejevic notes that commercial data aggregation is not 
interested in individuality but in general patterns of mass user behaviour – he cites a CEO of a 
Data analysis company, who states that ‘[i]f we’re right 70 to 80 per cent of the time, we don’t 
care about any single story’ (2013: 56). Bolin and Andersson-Schwartz’s work suggests that the 
individuality of Rachel’s Ad profile comes instead from the data aggregated from her web 
trajectory being ‘translated back’ (2015: 1, my emphasis) into categories that Rachel herself can 
recognise as applicable to her. Rachel’s selfhood is only momentarily ‘fixed’ into 
representational demographics that she recognises and finds not just ‘correct’, but pleasing. 
Despite the lack of individuality present in Rachel’s profile, Rachel enjoys a moment of self-
recognition none-the-less. This suggests that the labour of rending algorithmic personalisation 
‘personal’ actually lies with the user and not the system, as I will explore further below.  
 
Epistemic uncertainties: the trust that Google can personalise 
As I have stated throughout this chapter, participant expectations of the app’s capabilities 
remained very high, even as the app failed to meet those expectations. Similarly, on a number 
of occasions (especially in the first two sessions of the study), participants seemed to expect the 
app to ‘know’ and ‘anticipate’ their actions – and therefore algorithmically personalise the app – 
to an extraordinarily high degree. For example, during Session One Heena pointed out that so 
																																																								
82	It	should	be	acknowledged	here	that	although	Rachel’s	self-recognition	might	be	secured	through	Google	Now,	
her	feeling	of	the	‘lack’	of	Google	Now’s	recognition	might	be	produced	through	social	interactions	with	other	
participants	in	the	study.	Heena	for	example,	received	far	more	cards	despite	making	less	efforts	to	‘turn	to	face’	
(Gillespie,	2014:	87)	Google	Now,	and	Rachel	knows	this.	I	would	argue	though	that	though	the	lack	of	recognition	
may	be	as	a	result	of	comparisons	with	other	participants,	it	is	interesting	that	her	Google	Profile	works	to	
pleasurably	secure	her	sense	of	self	rather	than	create	privacy	concerns	for	example.		
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far, she had not used the ‘weather’ card because she had other means of telling the weather at 
her disposal:  
 
Heena: I don’t check the weather, I just open my window and just feel how it 
feels outside. 
 
[Everyone laughs]  
 
Interviewer: Why do you think Google think that’s helpful [to show the weather]? 
 
Heena: I don’t know really, maybe it thinks I’m in a foreign country, because 
I did come from Malaysia where it’s generally very hot all the time, so I think 
I come here and it just wants me to know that it’s going to be colder in 
England, and for me to put a few more layers on [laughs]. 
 
This light-hearted observation fails to acknowledge that Google Now shows all participants the 
weather (as already established, even in Session One of the study) – however Heena assumes 
that the weather card must somehow have identified her, knows she is from Malaysia, and 
therefore anticipates she will be cold in England. In the same session, the ‘work’ feature of 
Google Now was subject to similar speculation – the group discussed why Google Now had 
inferred ‘work’ places for the participants, even though the participants are all students and 
therefore perceived themselves to not be engaged in the act of ‘work’.83  Tariq and Lisa thus 
discussed the reasons behind Tariq being shown a ‘work’ place (bearing in mind Tariq used 
Google Now prior to the study):  
Tariq: I do remember that even back home when I used to go to school… [Google 
Now] didn’t say school it said work, time from home to work, distance from home to 
work… so it thought you were an adult. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah so you think it should say school?  
 
Tariq: Yeah but it never really asked for my age did it, I have a Google 
account, but I’m not sure if it’s got my age on it.  
 
Lisa: I think you might do because they put Google and YouTube together at 
some point, and YouTube generally wants your age in case there’s like a video 
that’s 18 or over, so like maybe they got it from work. 																																																								
83	The	fact	that	the	participants	did	not	feel	that	their	studies	equated	to	‘work’	is	indicative	of	a	wider	societal	
assumption	that	students	do	not	‘work’	in	the	same	manner	of	paid	labour.	A	wider	critique	of	this	assumption	lies	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	small	study,	yet	it	seems	clears	that	Google	Now	is	operating	on	the	normative	implication	
that	a	user	will	have	‘work’	place	that	they	‘commute’	to.		
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Tariq: Yeah yeah yeah because back in the day, well a few years ago, when I 
was 18, I pretended I was 18 when I joined YouTube, so that’s why it thinks 
I’m old enough to work or something. 
 
Tariq here then assumes that Google Now thinks he goes to work because he once pretended 
he was 18 in order to join YouTube; and Lisa proposes Google Now has obtained this 
information via Google’s 2006 acquisition of YouTube. Here again Tariq and Lisa are 
speculating that Google can ‘know’ and ‘anticipate’ Tariq, and by extension personalise his 
experience of the app, to an extraordinarily complex degree. To give one more example of such 
speculations, in Session Two Heena told the group Google Now had shown her the ‘stocks’ 
card that week, which lead to the following exchange:  
 
Interviewer to Heena: Why do you think Google Now shows stocks? 
 
Heena: I don’t know. 
 
Tariq: Is your dad into investments, or your mum, like? 
 
Heena: Yeah probably, but how would [Google Now] know my dad was?  
 
Tariq: Oh wait he’s not on Facebook? [As established earlier in the focus 
group]. Google plus maybe?  
 
Heena: My dad doesn’t have an account. 
 
Tariq: Oh OK.  
 
Here Tariq speculates that Google might know that Heena’s father is ‘into investments’ and 
have access to Heena’s Dad’s Facebook or Google plus account and know that Heena and her 
Dad are related; and therefore be able to infer that Heena is interested in stocks. The 
speculation is dismissed by the conclusion that Heena’s dad does not have Facebook or a 
Google account, but no other explanation is thereafter offered by any participant. 
 
There are a two points I want to make here. The first is that in speculating about the apps 
predictive and personalising capabilities in this manner, participants display an uncertainty 
about what data Google is mining from them across platforms (including non-Google affiliated 
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platforms such as Facebook), when and how. To return to the epistemic uncertainties that data 
tracking created for Ghostery participants in Chapter Four, I would argue that a similar 
epistemic uncertainty is at work in these speculations – but instead of emerging as an anxiety in 
regards to how users are known and anticipated, participants here display a sense of trust in 
Google to ‘know’ them, anticipate them and personalise for them. The ‘epistemic asymmetry’ 
(Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011) between data provider and data controller in this sense 
generates not concern that data tracking poses a threat to their privacy – and by extension their 
sense of self – but instead a speculative faith that Google Now is capable of knowing their 
selves and personalising their experience to a complex and extensive degree.  
 
 The second point is that they assume that the app is personalised to this high degree even as the 
app gets these apparent predictions wrong – Heena reported that she has no interest in stocks, and so 
Google Now has failed again to meet the participants expectations. Despite these failings, like 
Rachel the participants find personal relevance in Google’s computational architecture, even as 
it fails to personalise. As explained in Part One, scholars such as Hillis, Petit and Jarrett have 
noted Google’s discursive framing as a kind of ‘divine mind’ (2013) – a mind that here is 
framed as something that can know and anticipate users interests in all their complexities. To 
return to Mowlabocus’ (2014) work on self-recognition, it appears that the participants are 
reading self-recognition into the app – they are finding something ‘personal’ in the apps 
inferences despite the fact it is not anticipating them accurately. This kind of reading is not new 
– Adorno’s work on astrology identifies a similar process of reading individual poignancy into 
texts that are in fact universally standardised and consumed (1994). However in this instance it 
is not just an adherence to ideologies of individualism that create such faith, it is data capture 
mechanisms at work in Google that are material operations but are not fully known by these 
participants. This epistemic trust in Google Now can be considered again from an ontological 
perspective – that is, participants’ sense of self is not threatened by data tracking as with 
Ghostery participants, but is instead secured in the speculations that Google ‘knows’ these 
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participants’ preferences, identities and even their parents.  
 
Personalisation vs ‘the ideal user’: Google Now’s normative framework 
At this point I would like to propose a more straightforward explanation to Google Now’s 
predictive power: ‘stocks’ is simply one of twenty drop-down categories of lifestyle and 
personal interest preference upon which the app’s structural architecture is predicated. As a 
scholars such as Nakamura (2002), Oudoorshen et al. (2004) and Grosser (2014) have noted, 
the reliance on pre-defined, finite categories of lifestyle choice, interest preference and identity 
expression – such as the ‘stocks’, ‘sports’, ‘flights’, ‘movies’, ‘weather’ etc. upon which Google 
Now is built – have implications regarding ‘how data structures and computational power lead 
to certain kinds of interfaces or modes of presentation’ (Grosser, 2014: np).  
 
These scholars propose that the predefined architectural and ideological frameworks that 
structure technologies can lead to the presentation of standardising, homogenising and 
reductive ideals of lifestyle choice and self-expression, wherein the ‘default user’ is normatively 
assumed, configured and maintained to be white, male, heterosexual and middle class 
(Oudshoorn et al, 2004). If we take Google Now’s twenty lifestyle categories – which are used 
to frame and deliver the information that a user ‘needs throughout their day’ – as an example, it 
becomes apparent that Google Now is using a ‘limited choice interface model’ (Grosser, 2014: 
np) to construct and infer the lived trajectory of its assumed ‘ideal user’ (Oudshoorn et al, 
2004). For example, the ‘sports’ category is built on a set of structural protocols that only allow 
users to receive updates about the pre-registered, exclusively male sports team saved in Google 
Now database, thus excluding the interests of users who might want updates regarding female 
football teams. Even those categories that do not rely on pre-defined databanks of information, 
such as ‘stocks’, construct an ‘ideal user’ in that they assume that ‘stocks’ updates are of 
relevance to the lives of all individuals; despite that fact that stocks updates would most likely 
be ‘relevant’ to only a small, affluent and wealthy subset of Google Now’s one billion potential 
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worldwide users. Thus, Google Now’s choice to show Heena stocks is far more likely to be 
predicated on Google’s normative assumption that stocks information is ‘relevant’ to the daily 
lived trajectories of its ‘ideal user’, rather than the fact that Heena’s dad is into investments.  
 
The negotiations here between Google Now and these users reveal the app’s operation via a 
homogenous, apersonal framework, by offering cards that appear personalised but yet adhere to 
a highly normative framework. However, Lisa, Tariq and Heena’s speculations do not entertain 
that the idea that Google Now is simply not personal enough – in fact they put down Google 
Now’s failures to provide ‘relevant’ information to quite the opposite problem; Google Now 
does know them personally (it knows Heena’s parents are into stocks; it knows she is Malaysian 
and used to hot weather; it thinks Tariq is a ‘worker’ because he lied about his age – on his 
YouTube account), but has anticipated their preferences incorrectly. The assumption here then 
is that Google Now fails because it is personalised, not because it isn’t. 
 
All participants said that they had ‘no interest’ in stocks – and though Tariq, Heena and Lisa 
speculated that Google Now’s choice to display ‘stocks’ might be due to complex 
personalisation processes, Laura and Giovanni (who were interviewed separately) answered 
differently. For example when I asked Giovanni why the app shows him stocks even though 
(as reported) he has no interest in them, he answered:  
Because I think that… this is a product made to be suitable for everyone, so maybe I 
could be a business person, a businessman… or a normal person through Google Now. 
 
For Giovanni then, Google Now is for ‘everyone’, for a ‘normal person’ – an identity category 
which is tellingly also conflated with being a ‘businessman’ (a conflation also made by Google 
Now itself). I also asked Laura ‘why do you think Google Now… has options for things like 
Sport and Stocks?’ to which she replied ‘probably just to support everyone’s interests’.  
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Unlike Heena, Lisa and Tariq, Giovanni and Laura do recognise that the display of categories 
such as ‘sports’ and ‘stocks’ can be explained by Google Now’s imperative to provide 
information deemed ‘universal’ or ‘normal’ in everyday life. However, far from questioning this 
framework, Giovanni and Laura place their use of Google Now outside the boundaries of the 
‘normal’ usage expected of Google Now users. In showing this unhelpful information, the 
disconnect between Google Now’s assumed trajectory of everyday experience and these 
participant’s lived experiences is revealed. Differently put, Google Now fails because its 
normative framework is too far removed from these students’ lived experience (who do not 
‘work’, who do not ‘commute’, who are not into ‘stocks’, who have other ways to check the 
weather). Yet tellingly this disconnect is explained not by recognition of Google’s normative 
framework, but instead through participants’ acceptance that their lived experience must exist 
outside ‘the norm’.  
 
As Gillespie notes, computational categories – such as the twenty categories of lived 
experiences upon which Google Now’s inference system is structured – work to impose a 
powerful form of politics on the users exposed to and constructed by these categories. He 
writes:  
Categorization is a powerful semantic and political invention: what the categories 
are, what belongs in a category, and who decide how to implement these 
categories in practice, are all powerful assertions about how things are and are 
supposed to be (2014: 198). 
 
Google Now’s picture of ‘how things are and are supposed to be’ thus constructs its users as 
stock market followers, jet-setters, workers, male sports team fans and consumers, a picture of 
life that these participants did not recognise as relevant to their own experience. Yet, instead of 
questioning the apersonal nature of this apparently ‘personalised’ system, participants (such as 
Tariq, Heena, Lisa) put Google Now’s flaws down to complex systems of personalisation that 
lead to false inferences, or others (such as Giovanni and Laura) positioned themselves as 
outside the ‘everyone’ for which Google Now supposedly works. 
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Participants as media studies scholars: legitimising trust in Google  
In this section I want to devote some time to participants’ status as developing media studies 
scholars. As mentioned in the introduction, as part of their module participants actually studied 
the socio-political implications of data tracking and personalisation in the week leading up to 
the last session of the study. This begged the question: how did their critical introduction to 
personalisation intersect with their high expectations of the app? 
 
Session Four of the study was largely designed to respond to any critical developments 
participants may have made. As part of their study that week, students had learned about data 
tracking as a potential invasion of privacy, as well as Pariser’s (2011) argument that algorithmic 
personalisation might create a restrictive, invisible ‘filter bubble’ of consumption (as outlined in 
Chapter Two). I asked students how they felt about this critique. Tariq told me:  
Personalising your internet experience is pretty bad because you’re really just 
validing [sic] your own opinions, which is like, you don’t really want to do that, 
you want to be exposed to a diversity of opinions. 
  
Tariq here then accepts Pariser’s critique, and Rachel, Lisa and Heena also displayed awareness 
of this argument. Yet Lisa, Rachel and Heena agreed that though the effects of algorithmic 
personalisation can be detrimental, for the most part viewing personalised content did not 
negatively affect their own experience of the web. For example Rachel explained:  
If I wasn’t so interested in world events and stuff, and then I wouldn’t get like 
maybe world events on the top of my thing [search results] um so some people 
aren’t going to be as educated about that sort of stuff and I think that’s quite 
important. But because I am, like it’s not really a problem for me, I feel like I 
get all the stuff that I need. 
 
Rachel seems confident that viewing personalised content is ‘not really a problem’ for her 
because she feels she gets ‘all the stuff’ she needs. If we take into account Pariser’s assertions 
that we need to be aware of the ‘things we didn’t know we didn’t know’ (2011a: np) however, 
Rachel’s point becomes slightly problematic; in his theoretical critique, the personalised 
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webscape prevents us from exposure to information that we cannot know exists (Pariser, 
2011), and therefore Rachel’s confidence in her own informational abilities is somewhat 
misplaced. Similarly, as mentioned as part of the data-for-services exchange discussed earlier, 
Laura displayed a critical awareness that Google Now might ‘manipulate’ her, but she 
legitimised her acceptance of this through an individualistic rationalisation that she is aware of 
such manipulations. In these responses then, students’ critical engagements with 
personalisation are weighed up as applicable to other people, but not to them. Thus, their 
negotiations with Google as a trustworthy socio-technical force are legitimised through a kind 
of critical distance between ‘other people’ and participants’ themselves.  
 
Conversely however, in Session Four Giovanni told me that the module has made him ‘more 
aware’ of privacy issues, and suggested that the only way in which he was going to use the app 
was as a form of resistance against Google’s data tracking strategies: 
Interviewer: Do you think you’re going to continue using Google Now? 
 
Giovanni: Er I don’t know, I mean I think I’m going to use it randomly, like 
when I have to search for something on Google, just to for piece of mind to 
check what Google Now is saying. 
 
Interviewer: When you say for piece of mind, what do you mean? 
 
Giovanni: To check that Google Now hasn’t taken too much personal stuff.  
 
This resistant use exemplifies Gillespie’s statement that ‘[w]hile it is crucial to consider the ways 
algorithmic tools shape our encounters with information, we should not imply that users are 
under the sway of these tools. The reality is more complicated and more intimate’ (2014: 186). 
However, it seems important to acknowledge that throughout the study, Giovanni’s trust in 
Google was muted; therefore his critical development largely remained consistent with his 
engagement with Google Now. For the other participants however, though they were aware of 
the potential detrimental effects of algorithmic personalisation, algorithmically personalised 
information was to be embraced as convenient and largely beneficial to these individuals, even 
if there were wider concerns for more universal use.  
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Conclusion: ‘I’ll use Google, just because it’s there now’  
In the final session, as well as discussing critiques of algorithmic personalisation I asked 
participants to sum up their experiences of Google Now. For almost all the participants it 
transpired that the app had in general failed to live up to their expectations. For example, when 
I asked participants ‘how would you describe your experience of Google Now?’, Lisa stated 
‘[Google Now] promises a lot, and it sort of didn’t really help me in any way… its not as 
impressive as I thought it would have been’, though later in the session she invoked an element 
of self-blame, stating ‘I mean I’m not sure if that’s my fault for not giving it enough 
information.’ Similarly, Rachel replied to the same question: 
I’d just say it was disappointing… I just, I think I expected a lot from it, like from 
- what’s its slogan? Like giving you the information you need before you even ask 
for it, well that’s what I expected… by I barely got any information on it when I 
asked, so [shrugs]. 
 
To conclude then I want to reconsider to one of the questions asked in the introduction of this 
chapter: are these users’ lived experience informed, altered and even constructed by the pre-
emptive inference experiences that Google Now attempts to map on to user’s lived trajectory?  
 
In one sense the answer is ‘no’: these users’ experiences did not seem to be informed, altered or 
constructed by Google Now’s predictive powers – after all, the participants repeatedly reported 
that they were disappointed by the app’s functions, and did not seem to be able to find a use 
for them.  Taking Jarrett’s theory that Google’s inferences can autonomously act on the 
identities of those it seeks to reflect (2014), it seems here that Google Now’s very 
disfunctionality has rendered the app’s autonomous powers somewhat redundant: Google 
Now is not acting on, constructing or altering the lived experiences of these participants, 
because it has failed to anticipate their intentions and daily trajectories. In some ways then, 
failure to find a ‘use’ for Google Now, coupled with the disconnect between Google Now’s 
‘ideal user’ and their own lived experiences, seems to have formed a kind of unintentional 
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resistance to Google’s attempt to create an appropriative and performative database of 
‘intention’. To put it more crudely, these participants are not ‘under the sway’ (Gillespie, 2014: 
184) of the app’s predictive powers because the gap between the ‘anticipated user’ and the ‘user 
themselves’ (Gillespie, 2014) is simply too great.  
 
I do not mean to suggest that is this gap was closed – if Google did manage to align its 
predictions with the lifestyle trajectories of these users – then these students’ lived trajectories 
would be necessarily constituted or conditioned by Google Now. There are many ways that 
users resist, appropriate or ‘make do’ with technologies as the work of Kennedy (2015) and 
Best and Tozer (2012) highlight; however, given that the students could not find a use for the 
app, I do not feel I am able to critique how these participants’ usage could be read as regulatory 
or resistant. Nor do I mean that if Google Now’s inferences did ‘work properly’ then they 
would be discounted from critical interrogation – as Hall (1989), Jarrett (2014a) and Delueze 
(1992) and other media and cultural theorists stress, the structural mechanisms of neoliberal 
capitalism mean that even as these structures may afford benefits, they can still work to regulate 
and discipline the subject. However, the gap between users’ lived experiences and Google’s 
ideal of what life should look like that was so wide that I am not inclined to make claims 
regarding how the app’s functions regulated or constructed these participants’ lives.  
 
What I do propose though is that even as this disconnect between ‘ideal user’ and these 
participants lived trajectories arose time and time again, the participants were happy to place 
their trust Google Now predictive and personalising promises.  This trust was not based on 
Google Now’s functionality, wherein the structural framework of Google Now imposed a kind 
of regulatory adherence to the norms embedded in the app’s framework. Instead, this trust 
emerges from participants’ adherence to discursive ideologies that are implicit in Google’s 
contemporary drives to personalise user experience. Differently put, participants assumed that 
the app must be convenient, that is must know them and that is must be able to personalise for 
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them, even as it failed to function in this manner. In fact, participants seem to work hard to 
find something personal in Google Now’s normative framework – from Rachel’s pleasure at 
recognition, to Heena, Lisa and Tariq’s assumption that the app is capable of knowing who 
their parents are, their age and their nationality. It is therefore the possibilities of personalisation, 
and not its tangible functional outputs or uses, upon which participants’ trust in Google Now 
was built.  
 
This embrace was exemplified in Rachel’s concluding remarks of her engagement with Google 
Now. Though Rachel described her experience of Google Now as disappointing, she later 
implied that the app’s very existence was enough to reorient her practices to incorporate its 
functions, as evidenced in the following exchange: 
Rachel: I’ll probably still use [Google Now], if I like need to find somewhere in Brighton, 
I can always like use it to find stuff, so I probably still will. 
 
Lisa: But you can just use normal safari for that can’t you? 
 
Rachel: Yes, you can [laughs]. But I’ll use Google, just because it’s there now.   
 
Remember, Rachel was the participant who was most consistently disappointed in the app, but 
who enjoyed the moment of self-recognition that Google Ad Settings awarded her. In her 
attempt to find a place in her lived trajectory for Google Now, Rachel’s statement highlights 
Google’s power as a monolithic force – its ubiquitous and naturalised status in individual lives, 
combined with the fact that Google can add services like Google Now to users’ devices free of 
charge, means that Google no longer needs to ‘work’ in order to create the opportunity to 
attract and keep users. As discussed, participants found a way to ‘make personal’ Google 
Now’s apersonal operations, even as they failed. Google’s predictive promise becomes the 
reason in and of itself to trust in Google – as Rachel says, she’ll use the app, ‘just because it’s 
there now’.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion: removing ‘the personal’ from personalisation 
 
To conclude this thesis I would like to return first to the research questions proposed in the 
introductory chapter. I do so not only to address some of the ways that they have been 
answered but to also re-evaluate the questions themselves in a retrospective sense – by 
reconsidering them through the research that they have produced. By re-evaluating these 
questions it becomes possible to reflect on the core interventions of this thesis and also 
consider new questions that might emerge as a foundation for future research.  
 
The questions were: What ‘horizons of possibility’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) does 
algorithmic personalisation – as a market-driven practice designed to anticipate the user –
 create for users, who are at once bound up in, and are the subject of, its operations (RQ1)? 
How do users who encounter algorithmic personalisation practices understand, engage with 
and negotiate those practices (RQ2)? And how can the negotiations and engagements created 
between algorithmic personalisation practices and those who encounter such practices be 
critically scrutinised (RQ3)?  
 
It is the second and third questions that I would like to focus on first and foremost, as it is 
through exploring the engagements, understandings and negotiations of users who are bound 
up in algorithmic personalisation that this thesis has made its central critical interventions. I 
have argued that users find their horizons structured partly through the algorithmic operations, 
discursive frameworks and socio-technical constraints inherent in algorithmic personalisation 
practices, but also that users’ experiences and negotiations themselves help to constitute these 
horizons. The co-constitutional relationships created between user and system by algorithmic 
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personalisation mean that these horizons must be considered in this way in order to critically 
interrogate the implications that emerge from algorithmic personalisation at the level of lived 
experience.  
 
Thus I see as one of my central interventions into research on algorithmic personalisation an 
insistence on the need to critically interrogate through users’ lived experiences as anticipated 
subjects the ways in which they bound up in, and are subject to, algorithmic personalisation. I 
have argued that this emphasis on lived experience provides new methodological and critical 
possibilities for scrutinising algorithmic personalisation. Specifically I developed fresh 
understandings in regards to how users protect their autonomy, navigate the data-for-service 
exchange, understand the forms of knowledge that data tracking produces, constitute their 
sense of self, perform their identity and classify others bound up in algorithmic personalisation 
practices.  
 
This focus on user experience has in particular enabled me to make a strong case to assert one 
of my starting arguments: that privacy – the invasion of it or the protection of it – is not the 
only issue to be critically considered in terms of contemporary commercial data tracking.  By 
considering users’ accounts of platforms’ attempts to anticipate them, new avenues of 
investigation emerge that consider not only if data tracking is invasive to the self, but what kind 
of self is constituted and reframed through systems of anticipation.   
 
This thesis has argued that these formations of self are constituted in relation to the epistemic 
uncertainties that algorithmic personalisation creates for the users who are anticipated by 
commercial systems. I have argued that the slippery, complex, cross-platform and dividuating 
nature of algorithmic personalisation means that users cannot know in any certain way what 
data is being tracked and used by platform providers, what ‘experiences’ are being personalised, 
and crucially, how their identities are being not only anticipated but also constituted. I have 
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pursued this connection partly by identifying the uncertainties that emerge in context-specific 
ways; for Ghostery users interviewed, epistemic uncertainties emerge as anxiety that these users 
can never ‘know’ the extent and reach of their data trails, and therefore never completely 
protect themselves from the threat of data tracking. And yet, for Google Now participants the 
epistemic uncertainties created by algorithmic personalisation emerge as trust – these 
participants again did not know exactly how they were being tracked, anticipated and 
personalised, yet displayed a deep faith in Google not only to protect their data but to 
anticipate them and personalise their experiences to extraordinary degrees.  
 
These reported uncertainties in some ways have triggered a re-evaluation of my questioning of 
how users ‘understand’ algorithmic personalisation. I stated in the introduction that algorithmic 
personalisation is ‘slippery’ – it is both there and not there, is ‘felt’ by users and legitimised by 
platforms but not pinned down. It has become increasingly clear to me that this thesis has 
explored not only how users understand algorithmic personalisation, but how users ‘cope’ with 
the fact that as data providers, we do not and perhaps cannot fully understand all the ways and 
means in which platforms seek to anticipate and act on our movements, interactions and 
through this, intervene in our sense of and performance of our identities.  
 
I do not mean to suggest that in ‘coping’ with algorithmic personalisation that its effects are 
some how only ‘felt’ or ‘imagined’ by those that encounter it. Quite the contrary: the 
operations of personalisation are tangible and material – it is just that for those web users who 
encounter such practices, these practices remain elusive but effective. I mean ‘effective’ not in 
the sense that they ‘work’ (for some participants in this thesis, algorithmic personalisation did 
not ‘work’ for them) – but in the sense that they have tangible effects on everyday experiences 
with online and web technologies.  The computational operations deployed to make 
personalisation possible may be slippery to those subjected to them – but they continue to 
tangibly intervene in user experiences and everyday trajectories nonetheless.  
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I have argued that in creating epistemic uncertainty, the slipperiness of algorithmic 
personalisation emerges also as an ontological consideration: algorithmic personalisation has 
critical implications for identity itself. As I have argued, algorithmic personalisation practices 
do not just seek to know and anticipate web users; they seek to act on them. The actions that 
algorithmic personalisation practices make in the name of ‘convenience’ and automated 
decision-making for the user are in fact recursive and co-constitutional of the very actions they 
seek to aid. As such users become ‘entangled’ (Barad, 2007) with and with(in) the algorithmic 
personalisation practices they encounter. 
 
By exploring this, I have argued algorithmic personalisation raises critical implications for the 
performative production of users’ selfhoods in ways that intersect with utterances of identity 
and with users’ sense of autonomy. The capacity of algorithmic personalisation not just to act 
for users but on them is sometimes welcome, but also often, and particularly in the cases I have 
chosen to explore, creates a struggle for autonomy between user and system – wherein the 
decision-making capacity of the algorithm becomes a site of struggle in regards to the actions it 
takes in the user’s stead. In acting on behalf of the user, algorithmic personalisation practices 
intervene in the performative process of identity constitution, of making oneself (visible) to 
other users bound up in personalisation, and in making oneself ‘known’ to the system. This has 
emerged throughout this thesis: but here I’d remind readers of Chapter Five especially, wherein 
autoposting apps sought to actively constitute users’ selfhoods, and also Chapter Six where 
Google Now users worked hard to find self-recognition in the system, and to be ‘known’ as a 
person by the algorithmic personalisation practices they encountered. Such instances highlight 
that the entanglement of self and system is experienced in ambiguous ways for web users; 
algorithmic personalisation disruptively reworked users’ performative self-constitutions on 
Facebook and yet legitimised the self through Google Now.  
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It has emerged through this research that algorithmic personalisation incorporates and 
facilitates at times complex disciplinary regimes into users’ everyday actions  and interactions. 
An example of the latter, discussed in the body of the thesis, is the act of listening to music via 
the ‘like’ economy, wherein the market drive to anticipate the users worked to restrict and 
regulate how users classify and constitute their own performative utterances of identity. 
Furthermore, the market drive to personalise user experience by acting in their stead also 
intervened in how users classify others’ identity performances; as ‘chavvy’, as legitimate, as 
playful, as commodified.  
 
These investigations have partly highlighted that identity is (always-already) collectively 
informed and socially legitimised. However, my research has also uncovered new forms of 
algorithmic mediation between users’ sense of self as unitary, private and interior but also as 
multiple, context specific and recursively reworkable. My research has found that it is users, as 
well as service providers, that at times frame the self as inner and unitary. This formation came 
to the fore especially in my discussions with Ghostery users, many of whom felt that the self 
was an interior entity that should be protected from the dehumanising threat of data tracking. 
Therefore, even as algorithmic personalisation intervenes in how the self is performatively 
produced – and is in this sense understood as a performance of a non-essential self – it also 
frames and maintains the self as a unitary, inner and private entity.  
 
 As I have argued throughout this thesis, it is through considering the lived experiences of 
users that such contradictions and complexities of identity can be interrogated. To achieve this 
I have sought to pin down and bring together critical theorisations of personalisation, and to 
interrogate the slipperiness of personalisation at the level of everyday life – put together these 
enabled me to distinguish algorithmic personalisation as a practice distinctive from other forms 
of ‘personalised’ media. It has also allowed me to approach personalisation in ways that depart 
from existing theorisations. For example I have explored the effects of algorithmic 
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personalisation not in regards to how it might structure and restrict a user’s (online) world – as 
with Pariser’s ‘filter bubble’ critique (2011), but how, conversely, the user themselves is brought 
to the world.  
 
Directions for future research 
This thesis has stressed at various points that despite the fact platforms use the idea of a 
‘personalised experience’ to legitimise the tracking and anticipation of users, algorithmic 
personalisation is not about ‘making it personal’ for users – the processes that supposedly seek 
to ‘know’ users are in fact there to constitute web users as commodifiable ‘dividuals’.  One of 
the distinctive modes of operation of the forms of anticipation I have dealt with, and one of 
the areas where the ambiguity of selfhoods demanded by personalisation is developing, is in 
emerging forms of predictive identification. In Chapter Six especially, Google Now’ predictive 
powers failed to personally know users and personalise their lived experiences accordingly, and 
yet participants worked hard to find ‘personal relevance’ in Google Now’s normative lifestyle 
frameworks. Such negotiations suggest to me that the ‘personalisation’ supposedly enacted by 
the system is in fact at times enacted by the user – it is individuals themselves that find a way to 
‘make personal’ the apersonal, everyday interventions created by algorithmic personalisation 
practices.  
 
Here then I would like to offer a re-evaluation of the research question of how to critically 
scrutinise user negotiations with algorithmic personalisation. I would argue that to label the 
entities created from algorithmic personalisation ‘algorithmic identities’ (Gillespie, 2014) is in 
some ways to give these anticipation systems ‘too much credit’ – there is not a holistic 
‘algorithmic identity’ that exists in some back-end system, attempting to reflect the ‘user 
themselves’. There are only abstract, fragmented, recursive correlations between the users as 
nodes in a network. However, the research in this thesis highlights that this in no way means 
these fragmented abstractions do not have implications for the identities of the users they 
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dividuate: they absolutely make complex, potentially profound, performative and material 
socio-cultural interventions into the every lives, articulations and interactions of the individuals 
they anticipate. This thesis has sought to highlight the significance of the interventions of 
algorithmic personalisation in the everyday lives of individual users, even as it dividuates.   
 
One of the directions for future research that might emerge from this research is to attempt to 
get at the mechanics of these developing, dividuating back-end predictions, and using such 
mechanics to map individuals’ lived trajectories on to such dividuations. This would mean 
trying to track not the ‘doing subject’ as Ruppert, Savage and Law call it (2013), but the ‘doing 
configurations’ that effect not only what users see when they go and online, but also how they 
perceive their sense of self. Such a task would require a methodology capable of combining big 
data analysis with the lived experiences of individual users, and recognising their context-
specific identity configurations alongside their inputs into the correlational, abstract network 
that Bolin and Andersson-Swartz (2015) describe. The marrying of ‘big data’ with ‘small data’ is 
becoming increasingly used as a methodology (as acknowledged in Chapter Three), and I 
believe research on algorithmic personalisation would strongly benefit from such a 
combination.  
 
Algorithmic personalisation practices, like many web-based technologies and operations, are 
likely to become more developed as web users adapt their interactions to embrace or reject the 
data-for-service exchange so common on the web, and as data tracking becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous and advanced (Peacock, 2014). It is telling, for instance, that developments in 
personalisation also include discursive erasure of the term itself. For example, Google no 
longer employ the term ‘Personalized Search’ (Google Blog, 2009) to describe the tailoring of 
search results based on individual ‘relevance’. This is certainly not because Search is becoming 
once again more ‘universal’ and ‘objective’ as it was when it was first launched (Van Couvering, 
2007) – as Google’s latest information video makes explicit, Google’s ‘goal’ is still to ‘create a 
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seamless connection between [a user’s] thoughts and their information needs and the results 
they find’ (Google, 2016). The desire to anticipate the individual in the name of convenience 
(and of course commerce, as the video suggests though does not make this explicit) still 
persists, but the term ‘Personalized’ does not feature in any of Google’s current information 
materials.  
 
To me this suggests not that personalisation is disappearing, but that the notion that platforms 
should track us, anticipate us and act on us is becoming ever-more ubiquitous and naturalised: 
what was once ‘Personalised Search’ is now simply ‘Search’. There is therefore pressing need to 
continue to critically consider the ways in which users negotiate, understand and are entangled 
with(in) such practices if we are to understand what such naturalised anticipation systems do to 
the users they anticipate. For those web users who currently encounter algorithmic 
personalisation as part of their current lived experiences and trajectories, the drive to 
personalise demands negotiations for autonomy, identity and epistemic knowledge production. 
Such negotiations will continue to create new avenues for critically exploring how algorithmic 
personalisation intervenes in users’ everyday interactions, socio-technical negotiations and 
formations of personhood.  
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Appendix 
A: List of interviewees 
1. Interviews for Ghostery study: 
Participant information Interview date  Format 
Katherine, Managing Director, Netherlands 25/09/2013 
 
Face-to-face 
(audio recorded) 
 
Edward, occupation undisclosed, France 26/09/2013 
 
Email 
 
Christopher, Snr. Systems Engineer, US 05/10/2013 
 
Email 
 
Gyrogearsloose, unemployed, Canada 30/10/2013 
 
Skype (audio recorded) 
 
Participant, undisclosed, undisclosed 10/11/2013 
 
Email 
 
Mary, web developer, US 
 
09/11/2013 
 
Skype (audio recorded) 
 
Hellokitty, unemployed, UK 
 
12/11/2013 
 
Face-to-face 
(audio recorded) 
Note :  in t erv i ewed wi th  Yoda,  
Hel loKit ty ’ s  par tner   
Yoda, IT user support officer, UK  
 
12/11/2013 
 
Face-to-face  
(audio recorded) 
Note :  in t erv i ewed wi th  
Hel loKit ty ,  Yoda’s  par tner  
Robkifi, researcher, UK  14/11/2013 Face-to-face  
(audio recorded) 
Claire, postgraduate student, UK  15/11/2013 
 
Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Chris, unemployed/ activist/ digital miner up 
the North-West Passage, UK 
13/12/2013 
 
Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
Lisa, activist, UK 12/12/2013 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
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2. List of interviews for Facebook autoposting apps study: 
 
Participant information Interview date Format 
Calum, duty manager, 30, UK  
 
11/ 03/ 14 
 
Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Melanie, civil servant, 29 
 
17/03/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Sam, digital communications manager, 29 30/04/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
Marc, postgraduate student, 24 
 
20/05/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Beth, primary school teacher, 28 
 
19/05/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Sara, customer service manager, 30 30/06/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
 
Focus group one 13/05/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
Alice, researcher, 28   
Daniel, graphic designer, 29   
 
Rory, sales manager, 30   
Kevin, accounts executive, 25 
 
  
Focus group two  05/06/14 Face-to-face (audio recorded) 
Sophie, publishing assistant, 28   
Rebecca, lecturer in EAP, 27   
Terry, graphic designer/ carer, 28   
Steve, trainee surveyor, 29   
Audrey, marketer, 29   
TP, producer, 29   
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3.  List of interviews and study timeline: Google Now Study 
 
Table 1. Participant interview set-up 
Focus Group participants Tariq, 18, Dubai; Rosie, 18 UK; Heena, 18 Malaysia; 
Lisa, 18, UK 
One-on-one interview 1 participant 
 
Giovanni, 18, UK  
One-on-one interview 2 participant 
 
Laura, 18, UK 
 
Table 2. Study timeline 
01/09/14 Participants recruited to study and asked to activate Google Now and email screenshots 
 
8/10/14 Interview/ focus group Session One: Introductory questions/ discussion 
 
15/10/14 Interview/ focus group Sessions Two: Google Now questions, diary-writing exercise 
 
22/10/14 Interview/ focus group Session Three: Google Now questions, Google Ad Settings 
exercise, experiment with Tariq 
29/10/14 No interview session – students on Reading Week  
 
5/11/14 Interview/ focus group Sessions Four: Last session of study (note: students attended 
lecture on privacy/ personalisation the morning before last sessions took place)  
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B. Consent forms and information sheets 
1. Consent and information sheet for Ghostery project participants  
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Thesis Project Title: Problematising personalisation: interrogating the relationships between end users and 
online personalised media 
 
Case Study Title: Ghostery and tracker blocking: How do users understand and negotiate practices of 
personal data tracking?  
 
Project Approval Reference: ER/TK44/1 (Project approved 17/07/13) 
 
I agree to take part in the University of Sussex research project named above. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the information sheet, which I may 
keep for my records. 
 
I understand that agreeing to take part in an interview means that I am willing to: 
To discuss my opinions about Ghostery, tracker blocking, online personal privacy, data 
collection and personalisation 
Allow the interview to be recorded. 
 
I also understand the following: 
- I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information 
that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the 
project, either by the researcher or any other party. 
- I understand that if applicable I will be given a transcript of the interview, which I will 
be invited to comment on should I wish to. 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in 
the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project prior to publication 
without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
Signature:____________________________________ 
 
Name:______________________________________ 
 
Date:_______________________________________ 
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Information sheet 
 
Project title: Problematising personalisation: interrogating the relationships 
between end users and online personalised media 
 
Case study: Ghostery users, data tracking and personalisation  
 
Thank you very much for considering to take part in this study. Before deciding 
whether or not to participate, it is important to understand why this study is being 
conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. 
 
What is the aim of the study? 
The aim of this study is to explore how Ghostery users feel about data tracking and tracker 
blocking, as well as how they think these topics relate to online privacy and personalised 
media (such as targeted advertising).  
 
By undertaking semi-structured interviews, this study focuses on how Ghostery users like 
you feel about their experiences of data tracking in online environments, and how they 
engage with the technologies that use tracking blocking, behavioural profiling and targeted 
advertising as part of their everyday operations. It also explores how users feel about the 
privacy issues that arise from the use of data tracking on online platforms. Finally, the 
interview will explore how you feel these privacy issues might connect to personalised 
media.  
 
What does participation in the study involve? 
If you decide you would like to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in an 
interview, either via email, phone, Skype or in person – whatever suits you best. The 
interviews will be semi-structured to allow you to express your feelings about the topics 
raised as fully as possible, but will probably take around 30 minutes to an hour to complete. 
Face-to-face interviews may take a little longer, depending on the time you are willing to 
allow for questions. Email interviews may be followed up with further questions specific to 
your original interview, if you are willing to respond to them. Live interviews will be 
recorded but will be anonymous. After the live interview, you will have the option to read 
the transcript of our conversations.  
 
Taking part in this study is entirely optional. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time prior to publication and without giving a 
reason. 
 
 
Why I have I been chosen to take part? 
Because you are a Ghostery user and you are over 18 years old.  
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What are the possible disadvantages of participating? 
You will need to commit approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour of your time in order to take 
part.  
 
What are the possible advantages of participating? 
All interviews are designed to be flexible and fun, to allow you to feel comfortable and to 
answer questions in a way that reflects how you feel about the topics – there are no right or 
wrong answers, it is your opinion that is valuable! The overall aim of the study is to explore 
how platform users feel about privacy issues, personalised media and tracker blocking, so 
your interview answers will contribute to important academic research into how platform 
users engaged with online personalisation in everyday contexts – an area of study that has 
so-far been little explored by Media and Cultural Studies.  
 
Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
All identifying information gathered in this study will be kept strictly confidential. The 
finalised thesis will use a pseudonym of your first name, which can be self-selected or 
chosen on your behalf, in order to protect your identity. Your name and contact details will 
be stored separately to the transcripts of the interviews and your name will not be used in 
the transcriptions and subsequent writings. 
 
How will the results of the study be used? 
The results of the study will be used as part of my research for a PhD thesis in Media and 
Cultural Studies.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting this research as a doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex in the 
School of Media, Film and Music. I am currently funded by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC). 
 
  
 
Contact for further information 
 
Tanya Kant – tk44@sussex.ac.uk 
 
For more information on the project please visit: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/mediaandfilm/people/list/person/174167 
 
Or the research project blog: http://problematisingpersonalization.wordpress.com/  
  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for your interest in this 
study. 
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2. Consent form and information sheet for Facebook ‘Plugged-in Profiles’ research 
project 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Thesis Project Title: Problematising personalisation: interrogating the relationships between end users and 
online personalised media 
 
Case Study Title: Plugged-in profiles: How do Facebook users understand and negotiate the external services 
connected to their Facebook accounts? 
 
Project Approval Reference: ER/TK44/1 (Project approved 17/07/13) 
 
I agree to take part in the University of Sussex research project named above. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the information sheet, which I may 
keep for my records. I confirm that I am 18 years old or over.  
 
I understand that agreeing to take part in an interview means that I am willing to: 
To discuss my opinions about Facebook, services that connect to your Facebook 
profile, identity management and personalisation. 
Allow the interview to be recorded (applicable to live interviews only). 
 
I also understand the following: 
- I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no 
information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in 
the reports on the project, either by the researcher or any other party. 
- I understand that if applicable I will be given a transcript of the interview, 
which I will be invited to comment on should I wish to. 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to 
participate in the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project 
prior to publication without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Signature:____________________________________ 
 
Name:______________________________________ 
 
Date:_______________________________________ 
Information sheet  
 
Project title: Problematising personalisation - interrogating the relationships 
between end users and online personalised media 
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Case study: Plugged- in prof i l es :  How do Facebook users understand and negot iate  the 
external  serv i ces  connected to the ir  Facebook accounts?  
 
Thank you very much for considering to take part in this study. Before deciding 
whether or not to participate, it is important to understand why this study is being 
conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. 
 
What is the aim of the study? 
The aim of this study is to explore how Facebook users feel about the entertainment 
services that connect to their Facebook profiles (such as Spotify, Neflix, Instagram or 
Candy Crush Saga), as well as how these connections relate to ideas of identity 
management, personal taste, control and choice.  
 
By asking semi-structured questions – either online or in person -  this study focuses on 
how Facebook users like you feel about their experiences of services that automatically or 
manually connect to their Facebook profiles. Questions are designed to explore the ways in 
which entertainment services have connected to your Facebook profile, if these 
connections were involuntary or voluntary, and if these connections were public, semi-
public or private. Furthermore, the questions seek to unearth the consequences of the 
connection between entertainment services and your Facebook profile – do these 
connections affect your online identity? Do you feel you have a choice in how these 
connections relate to your Facebook profile? Have these services ever tried to ‘write’ 
something on Facebook on your behalf? The project hopes to examine these questions, 
and others like them.  
 
What does participation in the study involve? 
If you decide you would like to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in an 
interview, either via email, phone, Skype or in person – whatever suits you best. The 
interviews will be semi-structured to allow you to express your feelings about the topics 
raised as fully as possible, but will probably take around 30 minutes to an hour to complete. 
Face-to-face interviews may take a little longer, depending on the time you are willing to 
allow for questions. Email interviews may be followed up with further questions specific to 
your original interview, if you are willing to respond to them. Live interviews will be 
recorded but will be anonymous. After the live interview, you will have the option to read 
the transcript of our conversations.  
 
Taking part in this study is entirely optional. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time prior to publication and without giving a 
reason. 
 
Why I have I been chosen to take part? 
Because you are a Facebook user, your Facebook account is connected to one or more 
entertainment services, and you are over 18 years old.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages of participating? 
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You will need to commit approximately 30 minutes to an hour of your time in order to 
take part.  
 
What are the possible advantages of participating? 
All interviews are designed to be flexible and fun, to allow you to feel comfortable and to 
answer questions in a way that reflects how you feel about the topics – there are no right or 
wrong answers, it is your opinion that is valuable! The overall aim of the study is to explore 
how platform users feel about automated personalisation, personalised media and online 
identity, so your interview answers will contribute to important academic research into how 
platform users engaged with online personalisation in everyday contexts – an area of study 
that has so-far been little explored by Media and Cultural Studies.  
 
Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
All identifying information gathered in this study will be kept strictly confidential. The 
finalised thesis will use a pseudonym of your first name, which can be self-selected or 
chosen on your behalf, in order to protect your identity. Your name and contact details will 
be stored separately to the transcripts of the interviews and your name will not be used in 
the transcriptions and subsequent writings. 
 
How will the results of the study be used? 
The results of the study will be used as part of my research for a PhD thesis in Media and 
Cultural Studies.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting this research as a doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex in the 
School of Media, Film and Music. I am currently funded by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC). 
 
Contact for further information 
Tanya Kant – tk44@sussex.ac.uk 
 
For more information on the project please visit: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/mediaandfilm/people/list/person/174167 
 
Or the research project blog: http://problematisingpersonalization.wordpress.com/  
  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for your interest in this 
study 
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3. Consent form and interview sheet Google Now research project 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
Project Title: The predictive promises of Google Now: How does Google Now map, interrupt and infer the lived 
experience of mobile users? 
 
Project Approval Reference: ER/TK44/1 (Project approved 17/07/13) 
I agree to take part in the University of Sussex research project named above. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the information sheet, which I may keep 
for my records. I confirm that I am 18 years old or over.  
 
Part One: I understand that agreeing to take part in the project means that I am willing to: 
To take part in research activities and data collection exercises (primarily undertaken in 
Week 7), to discuss my opinions of Google Now, and to talk about my opinions 
of online identity, privacy, personalization as well as my day-to-day movements.  
To download or activate Google Now on my phone. I understand that by 
downloading or activating the app I agree to Google’s Terms of Service. I also 
understand that Google Now may gain access to my search history, location 
history and any services that I use if I have Google account. 
 
I also understand the following: 
- I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no 
information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the 
reports on the project, either by the researcher or any other party. 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate 
in the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project prior to 
publication without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Signature: ___________________________________________ 
Name: ______________________________________________ 
Date :   01/10/14  _____________________________________ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Part Two: Participation in a series of focus groups  
Please indicate whether you are interested in participating in a series of focus groups to further 
discuss your opinions of Google Now (taking place Wednesday afternoons, in Weeks 3, 4, 5 and 7). 
You will be entered into a prize draw to win one of two £50 vouchers for your participation in the 
focus groups.  
 
    ⃣  Yes, I am interested in participating in the focus groups  
    ⃣  No, I am not interested in participating in the focus groups  
 251 
If you answered ‘Yes’, please leave your signature and email address below. Please note: focus 
groups will be recorded and you can pull out of participating in them at any time.  
 
Email address: _________________________________________ 
Signature: _____________________________________________ 
 
Research study 
 The pred i c t i v e  promise s  o f  Goog l e  Now: How does  Goog l e  Now map,  in t e r rupt  and in f e r  the  
l i v ed  exper i ence  o f  mobi l e  user s?  
 
Thank you very much for considering taking part in this study. Before deciding whether or 
not to participate, it is important to understand why this study is being conducted and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the aim of the study? 
The aim of the study is to explore how Google Now collects and predicts information about the 
individuals that use the app, and how that information might affect that lived experiences of 
individuals that engage with the app. The study also looks to explore how Google Now users feel 
about the app’s predictive capabilities, as well as how the app might affect their identity, privacy and 
everyday movements.  
 
What does participation in the study involve? 
If you decide you would like to participate in this study, you will be asked to download or activate 
Google Now on your phone (if you haven’t done so already), check Google Now on a weekly basis 
and take part in some data collection exercises during Week 7 of the module.  
 
If you are interested in participating further in the research, you will be asked to take part in four 
group interviews (also known as focus groups) over the space of one month. The interviews will be 
semi-structured to allow you to express your feelings about the topics raised as fully as possible, 
and will probably take around an hour to complete. Interviews will be recorded but will be 
anonymous. You may also be asked to check Google Now on a daily basis, save a screen shot of 
any information that you find interesting and keep a short online diary of Google Now’s 
predictions. After the interview, you will have the option to read the transcript of our 
conversations. Participants who take part all four focus groups will be entered into a prize draw to 
win one of two lots of £50 in vouchers. If you are interested in taking part in the focus group, 
please sign part two of the consent form and leave your email address so I can send you 
more information.    
 
Taking part in this study is entirely optional. If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are 
still free to withdraw at any time prior to publication and without giving a reason. 
 
Why I have I been chosen to take part? 
Because are over 18 years old, you are a student at Sussex University and you have a mobile phone 
that has the capability to run Google Now. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of participating? 
If you participate in the focus groups, you will need to commit to attending four group interviews 
over the space of four weeks, you will be asked to keep screenshots and share them with the 
researcher. Please note: by using Google Now you are agreeing to Google’s terms of service.  
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What are the possible advantages of participating? 
All research activities are designed to be flexible and fun, to allow you to feel comfortable and to 
answer questions in a way that reflects how you feel about the topics – there are no right or wrong 
answers, it is your opinion that is valuable!  
 
If you decided to take part in the focus groups, you will also be entered into a prize draw to win 
one of two lots of £50 gift vouchers of your choice.  
 
The overall aim of the study is to explore how platform users feel about automated personalisation, 
personalised media and online identity, so your interview answers will contribute to important 
academic research into how platform users engaged with online personalisation in everyday 
contexts – an area of study that has so-far been little explored by Media and Cultural Studies.  
 
Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
All identifying information gathered in this study will be kept strictly confidential. The finalised 
thesis will use a pseudonym of your first name, which can be self-selected or chosen on your 
behalf, in order to protect your identity. Your name and contact details will be stored separately to 
the transcripts of the interviews and your name will not be used in the transcriptions and 
subsequent writings. 
 
How will the results of the study be used? 
The results of the study will be used as part of my research for a doctoral thesis in Media and 
Cultural Studies.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting this research as a doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex in the School of 
Media, Film and Music. I am currently funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC). 
 
Contact for further information 
Tanya Kant – tk44@sussex.ac.uk 
 
For more information on the project please visit: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/mediaandfilm/people/list/person/174167 
Or the research project blog: http://problematisingpersonalization.wordpress.com/  
  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for your interest in this study  
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C. Base Interview questions. 
 
Note: all interviews conducted for this thesis were semi-structured. As such the 
following interview questions are base questions which formed the basis for project 
interviews, however questions were also interview-specific and so the following 
does not cover all questions asked and answered. 
 
1. Interview questions for Ghostery interviews  
 
Part one: Ghostery  
1. Why did you decide to download Ghostery? 
 
2. In your own words, how would you describe Ghostery? 
3. How do you use Ghostery? To block trackers? Or to see who’s tracker you on the 
web? Both? 
4. What do you like about Ghostery? 
5.  What don’t you like about Ghostery? 
Part two: data tracking and privacy  
6. How do you feel about the trackers (listed in the purple box at the upper right hand 
side of every wed page) that track you? 
7. What do you know about the trackers that are tracking you?  
8. Why do you think these trackers are tracking you? What do you think these trackers do 
with your information? 
9. To what extent does tracking impact on your online privacy?  
10. Do you think privacy matters when you surf the web? If so, why do you think privacy 
matters? 
11. Many trackers say they help businesses make their services more relevant to their 
audiences, by personalising content. How do you feel about this claim? 
12. Some of the data gathered through tracking is used to deliver you targeted advertising, 
based on things like your age, your location and your gender. How do you feel about 
targeted advertising?  
Part three: Other tracker blockers  
14. Do you use any other tracker blockers alongside Ghostery? If yes, which tracker 
blockers do you use?  
15. This paper argues that using multiple tracker blockers can actually help trackers to 
identify your browser. How do you feel about this claim?  
16. Do you think your efforts to protect your data trail have been successful? Do you 
think it is possibly to completely protect your data trail when you surf the web?   
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17. Do you have any other comments or questions regarding tracker blocking and 
online privacy that you’d like to add?  
18. Ghostery is owned by Evidon, a commercial company that assists businesses in 
complying with online privacy regulations and monitoring the third parties that use 
their sites. How do you feel about the fact that Ghostery is owned and operated by 
Evidon?    
 
2. Base interview questions for Facebook study  
 
Part one: Facebook 
1. Why did you decide to join Facebook?  
2. Do you use Facebook often? 
3. What do you do on Facebook? 
4. What do you like about Facebook?  
What don’t you like about Facebook? 
5. Do you think Facebook is a public or private space?  
6. Do you think your Facebook profile, and Facebook use in general, reflects ‘who you 
are’?  
Part two: your Facebook connections 
7. Can you name any of services or apps that are connected to your Facebook account 
(well-known services and apps include Spotify, Neflix, Candy Crush and Instagram)? 
8. When did you notice that these services where connected to your Facebook account? 
How did you notice them? 
9. Do you let these services post info to your Facebook on your behalf? 
10. Have these services ever posted on your behalf without your knowledge? 
11. Do these entertainment services ever try and personalise content on your behalf? 
12. How do you feel about these services posting on your behalf? 
13. Do you feel in control of this connection? If yes, why do you feel in control? If no, why 
do you not feel in control? 
13. Do you think these posts affect how other see you? 
14. Did you read the privacy policy or Terms of Service when you signed up to the 
entertainment services that connect to your Facebook?  
15. Facebook claims that it’s apps ‘let you express who you are through all the things you 
do’. How do you feel about this claim?   
16. Have you ever had to ‘invite’ people to use the app in order to get what you wanted out 
of the app? 
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Part three: Other people’s connections 
17. Have you ever noticed a friend’s connection to an entertainment and their Facebook? 
If yes, what made you become aware of this connection?  
18. What did you think when you saw the connection? 
19. Did you comment on the post?  
20. Did the post affect how you see your friend?  
21. Any other questions or comments? 
 
3. Base interview questions Google Now research project 
Week one questions 
 
Part one: Google Now motivations for use/ non-use 
 
1. Who uses Google Now already? Why did you decide to activate it? 
2. For those that don’t use it – why did you not use it before this study? 
3. If you’ve used it before – have you customised it in anyway? Did customising it 
make any difference to your experience?  
 
Part two: Google Now – bring up Google and take a look at the cards  
 
4. What cards has Google Now shown you?  
5. How do you feel about these cards? 
6. Are they helpful? Which ones are helpful and why? 
7. What information has Google Now tried to predict about you? For example, has it 
tried to predict you work or home address? 
8. What predictions has it got right?  
9. What predictions has it got wrong?  
10. How do you think Google has managed to find out this information?  
11. How do you feel about Google using your location and search history?  
12. Is there any information that you wouldn’t want Google to access?  
 
Week two questions: 
 
1. What cards has GN shown you this week?  
2. Who’s taken screenshots? What are the screenshots of? 
3. Why did you decide to take them? 
4. How Google Now been useful to anyone this week? Have you checked it for any 
specific reason?  
5. I want to have a think about your everyday movements. Without thinking about 
Google Now too much, take a minute to write down a run-down of what you did 
yesterday – can be detailed/ not detailed/ personal/ not personal as you like. 
Hand the piece of paper to me.  
6. OK and now what you did on Saturday.  
7. Go through and ask some details 
8. Did you use Google Now for any of the things? 
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9. Could you have used Google for any of the things? What could you have used it 
for? Why didn’t you use it? 
10. Settings – what types of cards would you be interested in using? Football? 
Stocks? TV and Movies?  
11. OK so does anyone have any hobbies? Follow any sports? What’s you main 
interests? Music? Clubbing?  
 
Week 3 questions: 
What cards have you got this week?  
Has anyone noticed any improvements in Google Now’s predictions? Or has it got 
worse?  
Google Now says it can give you the information that ‘you need throughout your 
day’ before you even ask? How do you feel about this claim? 
4. Check the home/ workplace cards again – what’s the same/ what’s different  
 
Specific questions 
Currency converter for Tariq – can we change your home address and see if the 
currency convert 
Rachel – have you managed to get Google Now to show you anything else that’s 
interesting ? 
Lisa – has it given you sports information on your football team?  
Laura- has Google’s predictions improved now that you can customise it ?  
 
Data and identity 
5. What do you think Google knows about you? 
6. How do you think it gets that information? 
7. Why do you think it wants that information? 
8. Google uses the information to bring you personalised content. How do you feel  
about personalised content? 
9. Do you think that Google Now is personalised to you? 
10. Lots of sites – Facebook, YouTube, Netflix and Google Search – personalise 
content for you. How do you feel about personalised content?  
11. Google Now doesn’t have personalised ads but other sites do – how do you feel 
about personalised ads? How do you think personalised ads work?  
12. Do you think the things you do online – surf the net, watch TV, etc – reflect  the 
sort of person that you are?  
13. We went through everyone’s hobbies/ interest last week. Why do you think your 
interest// hobbies are not included in Google Now’s categories? 
Google Ad Settings 
1. Explain Google Ads – ask Students to view/ sign in if needed 
2. What settings have you got? 
3. How do you feel about your settings? 
4. Do you feel your settings reflect your gender, age and interests? 
5. How do you feel about Google trying to predict your gender age and interests? 
 
Week four questions: 
1. Ultimately, how would you describe your experience of Google Now? 
2. Will you continue to use Google Now? 
3. Do you think Google Now has/ or could have any impact on your everyday 
experience?  
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4. What sort of person do you think Google Now is designed for? Is it designed for 
you? 
5. Why do you think it’s designed for you/ not you? 
6. Would Google Now’s predictions would be better if it knew more about you? 
7. What sort of stuff would you like to see on Google Now?  
Media studies and personalisation  
8. What do you think about the problems of personalisation that we explored in the 
lecture? 
9. 20. Do you think the content of the course has affected how you think about 
online privacy and identity? 
10. Are you surprised that the web is personalised to you? 
11. Do you think that the web should be personalised to you? 
12. Do you know what happens to the data that Google collects from you? 
13. Do you have a good  idea of what Google know about you? Do you think you 
know everything it knows, and what is does exactly? 
14. Do you think you’re well informed about what happens to your personal data 
online in general? 
15. Do you think it’s possible to know exactly what happens to your personal data and 
how it’s used? 
16. Do you feel that you want to protect your personal data in anyway?  
17. Do you think governments having access to your online data? Do you mind that 
companies have access to your data?  
18. Do you ever clear your search history? 
19. Do you take any other steps to protect your online privacy? 
20. Do any of you use add block, or track blocking software?  
21. Do you think online privacy matters?  
22. Have you learnt anything from your experience of Google Now? 
 
Specific questions:  
Laura – are you still finding Google Now helpful? Still improving? 
Heena: still giving you suggestions for shows? 
Rachel: Has Google showed you any info yet? 
 
 
 
 
 
